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TEXT AND CONTEXT

A Case Study of International News Discourse

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ABSTRACT

TEXT AND CONTEXT

A Case Study of International News Discourse

Through discourse analysis, this study compared and contrasted the *New York Times* and *Renmin Ribao*'s coverage of the failed Soviet coup in 1991. By carefully examining the texts of the news reports, while at the same time relating them to the contexts from which they were developed, this study set out to analyze news discourse both at the macro-level (through studies of topics, thematic structures, and schematic structures of the news), and at the micro-level (through the analysis of styles). As many studies have shown that there is a determinate relation between linguistic process and ideological process, it is important and proper to use linguistic theories in such work.

The findings of this study suggest that the coverage of this event by the two newspapers was both structurally and quantitatively different. By including information on the contexts, backgrounds, causes of the event, the *New York Times* was found to be structurally more complete. *Renmin Ribao*, the Chinese Communist Party newspaper, on the other hand, had omitted all background and contextual information. Important findings further suggest that the press coverage of this event was culturally, ideologically, and politically situated.

TEXT AND CONTEXT: A CASE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL NEWS DISCOURSE

I. Introduction

Many studies, especially those in the fields of structuralism and social linguistics, have shown that the relations between language and ideology are not only close, but inseparable (see, for example, Volosinov, 1986; Macdonell, 1986; Davis & Walton, 1983; Jalbert, 1983; Pecheux, 1982; Hall, 1980; Fowler, Hodge, Kress, 1979; Trew, 1979; and Coward & Ellis, 1977). Because ideologies are "sets of ideas involved in the ordering of experience, making sense of the world" (Hodge, Kress & Jones, 1979, p. 81), and because these ideas are expressed through language, the analysis of language becomes necessary when one attempts to study ideological processes.

Journalism is, without a doubt, an ideological process. Its work of "gathering, writing, and publishing or disseminating news" (Webster's New World Dictionary, 1982) definitely involves in the ordering of experiences and making sense of the world for its readers/ audience. Similarly, the audience/reader's perception of these reconstructed events is also ideological, because there are no uninterpreted facts in news reporting. Like any other field of ideological creativity, journalism possesses semiotic value, has its own kind of orientation toward reality, and refracts reality in its own way (Volosinov, 1986). It is therefore important to pay special attention to language in any attempts to study the process of journalism, since it is in and through language that journalistic reports exist (Kress, 1983).

By comparing and contrasting the American and Chinese press coverage of the failed Soviet coup that took place in 1991, this study seeks to explore, through discourse analysis, the relations between language and ideology in news reporting.

II. Research Problem

The year 1991 witnessed one of the most significant events in the world history, the collapse of the Soviet Union. The failed coup on August 19 was arguably the most important trigger for this incredible development. During those three days (August 19 to 21) of coup, confusions as well as uncertainties dominated the world political scenes and news coverage alike. Old assumptions and systems were under serious scrutiny while the new ones were yet to be established. No one was sure as to whom they should claim as their friends. It is exactly that kind of complex, uncertain, and fast changing situations that make this event significant and valuable for researchers and scholars to put different press theories to test.

It is beyond doubt that the United States and the People's Republic of China (henceforth China) share the most complicated and even love/hate relations with the former Soviet Union. Although both countries were on friendly terms with the former Soviet Union at the time of the coup, their respective relations were far from stable due to different historical factors and ideological differences. After providing substantial political and, to a lesser extent, financial aids to help the Soviets with their political reforms, and after numerous talks on mutual nuclear disarmament, the United States would not want to see the hardliners regained power and control in the Soviet Union. China, although was in the middle of economic reform itself, did not agree with the drastic steps the Soviet reformers took in their political reform policies. The success of the coup could mean more harmony and cooperation between the two largest communist parties in the world. This study examines, in some detail, how two important newspapers of the U.S. and China covered this event, how the contexts had affected the "texts" of these reports, and how different ideologies had affected the structures of the news reported in these two newspapers. The two papers chosen are the *New York Times* and the Chinese Communist Party newspaper *Renmin Ribao* (the *People's Daily*) in Chinese.

Content analysis has been the classical methodological approach used to investigate media messages. According to Berelson (1952, p. 18), "Content analysis is a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication." Precisely because of its emphasis on enumeration and manifest content, this quantitative methodological approach has been criticized for seldom addressing questions of meaning. As Hall (1980) has commented that because media are a major cultural and ideological force in the society, it takes more than the classical, quantitative approach to critically study the underlying meanings of media messages.

The main research tool this study used was that of discourse analysis, although a quantitative content analysis has also been conducted. Discourse analysis is superior to traditional content analysis in that linguistic data (such as news texts) require a treatment which is "less mechanical, less concerned with manifest content and more aware of the power of language, and the varieties and contexts of language use" (van Dijk, 1985, p. 46). Discourse analysis provides researchers with a powerful tool to study the intrinsic language structures and processes, hence centering not only on what has been said, but on how and why it has been said, and what it means. As both Pecheux (1982) and Macdonell (1986) have suggested that the real 'exterior' of those meanings has "nothing at all to do with purely linguistic properties" (Pecheux, 1982, p. 185), and that meanings are actually part of the "ideological sphere" (Macdonell, 1986, p.45), discourse analysis is found to be important because it is one of ideology's specific forms.

Discourse analysis, according to Stubbs (1983), refers to attempts to "study the organization of language above the sentence or above the clause, and therefore to study larger linguistic units, such as ... written texts" (p. 1). Just as different social groups have different varieties of language available to them, newspapers also have their own unique discourse patterns. Because these discourses are developed out of clashes with one another, and not at all peaceful (Peuchex, 1982, discussed in Macdonell, 1986), there is a political and ideological dimension to each use of words and phrases in writing. The news discourse theories provide us with a more adequate approach to probe into these underlying political, ideological, and cultural dimensions of the news texts. They also allow us to "assess differences in format, presentation, size, structures, style, or perspective that may be a function of regional, political, or cultural factors in news reporting across the world" (van Dijk, 1988a, p.32).

III. Research Method

This study compared and contrasted news content in the *New York Times* and *Renmin Ribao* (the *People's Daily*) for the week of the coup. All related news items (i.e., straight news, news analyses, commentaries, features, editorials, opinion columns and photographs) appeared in these tow newspapers were examined. Both quantitative content analysis and qualitative discourse analysis were conducted. Two time frames were used in this study due to the different nature of the quantitative content analysis and qualitative discourse analysis (see below).

A. Quantitative Content Analysis

The content analysis includes frequency analysis of the following: (1) the total number of related news items carried by each newspaper; (2) the number and percentage of front-page news items; (3) the total number of photographs used; (4) the number and percentage of official news sources used; and (5) the number of editorials and opinion columns appeared in both papers. Altogether 214 news items and 124 photographs were examined. The time frame of the content analysis was from August 19 to 26, 1991.

B. Discourse Analysis

The discourse analysis models developed by van Dijk (1985, 1988a, & 1988b) were followed in this study. News items carried by both newspapers from August 19 to 21, the duration of the coup, were carefully analyzed. Because detailed analysis of the text is crucial to discourse analysis, special attention was given to the first news item appeared on both papers. Thematic and schematic structures of these two news items, along with stylistic descriptions of main actors found in all related news items (from August 19 to 21), were analyzed.

The discourse analysis begins with a thematic analysis of the two news stories. By thematic structure, suggested van Dijk (1988a, 1985), we understand the "hierarchical organization of themes or topics of a text" (p.72) because it defines the most important information in a text. Headlines, different topic categories, and the thematic structures of the two news items were analyzed. The most frequently mentioned thematic actors were also enumerated in this part of the study.

Topics also serve other functions in a news discourse. They contribute to the building of theoretical frameworks, or schemata, in the news. In other words, they may play "conventional roles" in a news story by giving information about "a Main Event, Context, History or Verbal Reactions" (van Dijk, 1988a, p. 91). A superstructure schema for each of the two stories was therefore created to assess the differences or similarities in their respective schematic structures.

The last focus of the discourse analysis covered by this study was that of styles. Stylistic descriptions of the main thematic actors found in all related news items were examined. This is of great importance because from these descriptions we may detect not only the implicit evaluations journalists had of these actors (van Dijk, 1988a), but also the possible factors affecting their perceptions and reconstructions of the event.

IV. Results

A. Quantitative Aspects of Research Findings

Table 1 lists the quantitative content analysis results of all the related news items reported by the *New York Times* and *Renmin Ribao*.

TABLE 1
Quantitative results of the content analysis*

	news items	front-page news items	official news sources	photos	editorials	opinion columns
NYT						
total #	185	29	21	122	7	18
percentage		16%	11%		4%	10%
RMRB						
total #	29	5	27	2	0	0
percentage		17%	93%		0	0

* This analysis covers the period of August 19 through 26, 1991

It can readily be seen from the quantitative evidence that the *New York Times* devoted much more space (185) to the reporting of this event than did *Renmin Ribao* (29). *Renmin Ribao* did not carry any editorial or news analysis on the development of the event. It seemed to have steered clear of comments in its coverage. Furthermore, ninety-three (93) percent of the stories used official news sources. The two newspapers, however, carried similar percentage of front-page items, implying the significance these two newspapers had assigned to this event.

One of the most striking and interesting differences is the number and nature of the photographs used by these two newspapers. The *New York Times* carried 122 photos over the one-week period, with the themes of pictures focused mainly on main actors of the event, namely Gorbachev, President Bush and his administration, Yeltsin, the coup members, and the Soviet public. *Renmin Ribao*, on the other hand, not only used a minimum number of photographs (only two were used during the week of the study), but both were on Yanayev, Acting President and leader of the coup. No picture of either Gorbachev or Yeltsin was used. This seems to indicate, implicitly, China's support of the coup. Note that *Renmin Ribao* is the main mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party, its content is under strict Party control, especially after the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident.

B. Thematic Analysis

1. **Headlines**

The first coup story appeared on the front page of the *New York Times* on August 19 with a multiple banner headline plus smaller subheadlines. Main topics were expressed by the headlines:

a. GORBACHEV IS OUSTED IN AN APPARENT COUP
BY SOVIET ARMED FORCES AND HARDLINERS;
ACCUSED OF STEERING INTO A 'BLIND ALLEY' (banner)

b. COMMITTEE FORMED (banner)

c. 'Health Reasons' Cited
-- No Word From the Vacationing Leader

The headlines basically tell the main points of the story. The main headline reveals the most important information concerning this event, that Gorbachev was ousted in a coup by Soviet armed forces and hardliners, because he had steered his reform program into a "blind alley." The subheadlines continue to tell the specifics of the story. A committee had been formed, and "health reasons" were cited for the ouster.

The lead of the story contains a simple sentence and repeats the information found in the headlines: "Mikhail S. Gorbachev was apparently ousted from power today by military and K.G.B. authorities while he was on vacation in the distant Crimea."

The first coup story *Renmin Ribao* carried was also a front-page story with multiple headline. Its content and style, however, was different from that of the *Times*. Very detailed information was contained in the headlines:

a. The Soviet Vice President Yanayev Announces GORBACHEV IS PROHIBITED FROM PERFORMING HIS DUTIES AS THE SOVIET PRESIDENT

b. Under the Soviet Constitution Yanayev Starts Performing the Presidential Duties

c. A State Committee for the State of Emergency consists of 8 members is formed, members include Acting President Yanayev, Prime Minister Pavlov, First Deputy Chairman of the Defense Council Baklanov, Defensive Minister Yazov, Interior Minister Pugo, and K.G.B. Chairman Kryuchkov

Like the afore-discussed *New York Times* headline, *Renmin Ribao*'s headline also expresses major topics of the event. However, because the headline was structured differently, a slightly different story was told. By starting and ending the headline with the members of the coup, and by focusing its content on the power transfer in the Soviet Union, *Renmin Ribao* seemed to have expressed its acceptance of the coup and have recognized its legality. No reasons of the coup was cited. The word "coup" was actually never mentioned in the story. Gorbachev was simply described as being "stopped from performing his duties as the Soviet President." Furthermore, it is unusual for a headline to contain such detailed information as names and complete titles of the coup members.

The lead contains similar information, except that the reason for the coup was cited: "According to the TASS dispatch on the morning of the 19th, the Soviet Vice President Yanayev made an announcement that the ill health of the Soviet President Gorbachev was preventing him from properly performing the duties of the President. Yanayev will start performing the duties of the President starting today based on the Soviet Constitution."

2. The Derivation of Topics from the Text

By examining carefully the sentences and paragraphs of the two news stories, a score of topics were identified. Tables 2 and 3 list the topics and subtopics found in the *New York Times* and *Renmin Ribao*'s news stories on the coup. These topics addressed major questions about the coup: the circumstances of the event, results, major participants, contexts and historical backgrounds, reactions and consequences, etc.

As these two tables have demonstrated, while both stories addressed similar topic categories (i.e., circumstances, event, actors and consequences), the *Renmin Ribao* story was structurally much simpler

TABLE 2

Topics and topic categories in the thematic structure of the news report in the *New York Times* (August 19, 1991)

Topic Category	Topic
a. Circumstances	- G. (Gorbachev) was ousted from power
b. Actor(s) (1)	- G. was ousted by military and K.G.B. authorities
c. Actor/Event/Location	- G. was on vacation in the distant Crimea
d. Actor(s) (2)	- The announcement was made by "the Soviet leadership"
e. Actor/Cause	- G. was about to proceed into a new era of power sharing with the republics
f. Consequences (1)	- Kremlin officials declared a state of emergency
g. Context (1)	- The removal of G. came 3 days after his former reform adviser left the Communist Party
h. Event/Reasons (1)	- G.'s "inability for health reasons" to perform his duties as President
i. Consequences/Actor (3)	- Yanayev assumed presidential powers under the State Committee for the State of Emergency
j. Actors (4)	- Committee members include K.G.B. chief Kryuchkov, and Defense Minister Yazov
k. Event/Reasons (2)	- i. the Committee had found a mortal danger had come to loom large in the nation ii. G.'s reform has gone into "blind alley" and caused "extremist forces" to threaten the nation
l. Reaction (1)	- i. The scene on the streets of Moscow was calm when the announcement was made ii. Armored personnel carriers moving a few miles north of Red Square toward the Kremlin iii. There were no crowds or other signs of public reaction
m. Event/Reasons (3)	- Increasing domestic instability in the Soviet Union undercut its position in the world
n. Consequences (2)	- i. The state of emergency would be temporary ii. All power in the country had been transferred to the Committee
o. Context (2)	- i. On Tuesday the leaders of the 15 republics were scheduled to sign a new union treaty ii. Kremlin authorities criticized the treaty as dangerous
p. Actor	- G. was last seen 2 weeks ago after his meeting with President Bush
q. Event/Circumstances	- The announcement stunned the public and signaled that an attempt was being made to bring under heel G.'s democratization reforms
r. Consequences	- No immediate means of estimating the chances of success of the move
s. Actor	- Yeltsin was certain to be highly critical. No immediate comment was available from him
t. Actor	- No details were offered on G.'s alleged failing health
u. Consequences	- Announcement was a blow to the leaders of the republics
v. History	- G. had thought to appease hard-liners last winter by retreating from his reform agenda
w. Context	- i. G. cast himself more fully with the reformers last April and reached a compromise to share powers more fully with the republics ii. Some of his own Cabinet ministers were strongly resistant about the union treaty

TABLE 3

Topics and topic categories in the thematic structure of the news report in *Renmin Ribao*

Topic Category	Topic
a. Event/Time	- Morning, the 19th
b. Event/Actor (1)	- Vice President Yanayev made an announcement
c. Circumstances	- G. is unable to perform presidential duties due to ill health
d. Event/Actor (2)	- Yanayev will assume presidential powers under the Soviet Constitution
e. Consequences	- i. State Committee for the State of Emergency formed ii. State of emergency declared in parts of the country for 6 months iii. Yanayev informed leaders of states and governments, and Secretary General of the UN of the decisions
f. Actor(s)	- Committee members include Yanayev, Pavlov, Baklanov, Yazov, Pugo, Kryuchkov
g. Consequences	- letter to the Soviet people released
h. Actor/Causes	- G.'s reform policies had entered a blind alley
i. Consequences	- Called for the citizens to support the Committee
j. Consequences	- The 16-Point-Order from the Committee announced

than that of the *Times*. The *Ribao* story focused mainly on the members of the State Committee for the State of Emergency and their activities while totally omitting the contexts and historical backgrounds of the event. The ten (10) topic categories that the *Renmin Ribao* story did address were simplified. For instance, under the category of consequences, the focus was once again on the Committee related activities, with no mentioning of the fate of either Gorbachev or other Soviet republics. In other words, the story presented by *Renmin Ribao* was more or less one sided, told from the angle of the Committee. The *New York Times* story, conversely, was thematically more complicated than the *Renmin Ribao* one. Not only were more contexts and historical backgrounds presented, the story was told from multiple angles which covered more actors, circumstances, and consequences.

3. Thematic Structures

After the lists of topics and topic categories are compiled, Figures 1 and 2 organize these topics into the thematic structure of these two news stories. From the analysis of Figures 1 and 2, one may conclude that the *New York Times* story is more structurally complete according to the standard news format (van Dijk, 1988a). The *Times* episode (see Fig. 1) provides rather comprehensive information on both the actual episode, which includes main categories as the main events and consequences, and the conditions and causes of the episode. (History and context were covered). The traditional journalism questions of "5 W's," who, what, when, where, why, and the "H," how, were more or less all answered.

The *Renmin Ribao* item, in contrast, provides a rather different thematic structure of the news episode. As mentioned earlier, a big part of the "why" question was omitted by the *Renmin Ribao* item. Even the other four "W" questions (i.e., where, when, who, what) and the matter of "how" were covered only briefly and partially. The thematic structure of this episode hence appears to be incomplete.

4. Main Actors

Table 4 enumerates the frequencies of the major thematic actors appeared in news stories from August 19 to 21 in both papers.

The variation in the frequencies of main actors is illuminating. While the *New York Times* mentioned Gorbachev most often (283 times, and 15 headline occurrences), *Renmin Ribao* gave the


NEWS EPISODE
The Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev is ousted from power (a)
CONDITIONS CAUSES
ACTUAL EPISODE
HISTORY
Gorbachev appeased hard-liners last winter by retreating from reform agenda (v)
CONTEXT PREVIOUS EVENTS
Power sharing with the Republics; the signing of the Union Treaty (e) (o) (w)
MAIN EVENTS
CONSEQUENCES
ACTS
Yanayev assumed Presidential power; state powers transferred to the Committee (i) (n) (u)
SPEECH ACTS
Declaration of the state of emergency (f) (n)
SCENE
HAPPENINGS
SETTING
CIRCUMSTANCES
On vacation (c)
TIME
Today Time: not mentioned (a)
PLACE
Crimea
PARTICIPANTS/ ACTORS
Gorbachev, eight Committee members, Yeltsin (b) (c) (d) (e) (j) (p) (s) (t)
REASONS (ALLEGED)
Gorbachev's inability for health reasons; Gorbachev's reform program gone into blind alley; mortal danger the USSR is facing (h) (k)
RESULTS
Gorbachev ousted by hard-liners (a) (b)
REACTIONS
Calm on streets (e)

FIGURE 1 The thematic structure of the news episode as described by the *New York Times*
Letters between paranthesis refer to themes listed in Table 2


NEWS EPISODE
On the morning of August 19, 1992, Soviet Vice President Yanayev announced that Gorbachev was unable to perform presidential duties due to ill health (a) (b) (c)
MAIN EVENTS
CONSEQUENCES
SCENES
HAPPENINGS
ACTS
SPEECH ACTS
State Committee for the State of Emergency formed; Yanayev assumed Presidential power; (c) (d)
Declaration of the state of emergency; letter to the Soviet Public released; informed state and government leaders and the Secretary General of the UN; call for citizens to support the Committee; 16-point-order announced (e) (g) (i) (j)
SETTING
TIME
morning, August 19, 1992 (a)
PARTICIPANTS/ ACTORS
(ALLEGED) REASONS
RESULTS
Gorbachev, Yanayev, Pavlov, Baklanov, Yazov, Pugo, Kryuchkov (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (n)
Gorbachev's ill health; Gorbachev's reform policies entered a blind alley (c) (h)
Gorbachev unable to perform presidential duties (c)

FIGURE 2 Schema of the thematic structure of the news episode as described by *Renmin Ribao*

TABLE 4

Frequencies of Main Actors in the *New York Times* (August 19 to 21)

Actors	*NYT*	*RMRB*
Gorbachev	283 (15)*	9 (1)
Bush	124 (10)	2 -
Yeltsin	110 (14)	3 (1)
The Republics	50 (2)	3 -
The State Committee for the State of Emergency	37 (3)	17 (7)
Yanayev	31 (4)	15 (7)
K.G.B.	29 (1)	- -
Robert S. Strauss (new U.S. ambassador to the USSR)	24 (1)	- -
Pugo	23 (2)	2 (1)
The European Community	17 (1)	- -
Yazov	16 (3)	1 (1)
Shevardnadze	13 -	- -
Kryuchkov	10 (2)	1 (1)
Military authorities	8 (1)	- -
Scowcroft	8 -	- -
Pavlov	8 (2)	1 (1)
Yakovlev	7 (1)	1 (1)

* ( ): Number of headline occurrences

members of the coup most coverage, especially Yanayev, Acting Soviet President after the coup. It is also noteworthy that while the *New York Times* covered the Bush Administration's reactions to, and policies of, the coup heavily, *Renmin Ribao* did not cover the Chinese Government's reactions to the incident. Another interesting comparison comes from the different treatment Yeltsin received from the two papers. In the *Times* coverage, Yeltsin received the third most frequent mentioning (following Gorbachev and Bush) and the second highest headline occurrences. As an important figure in the contemporary Soviet political scene, Yeltsin was almost neglected by the *Renmin Ribao* coverage. He was mentioned only three times by the *Ribao* during the duration of the coup. The context in which Yeltsin was mentioned by *Renmin Ribao* was the reporting of an Emergency Committee's warning against him not to take any "irresponsible and unwise actions" (August 21, 1991, p.6). The absence of Yeltsin in the *Ribao* coverage could be interpreted as a result of ideological differences between the politically hardline Chinese government and the politically reform-minded Russian President.

C. Schematic Structures

After examining the "thematic structures" of the news episode as described by the *New York Times* and *Renmin Ribao*, this section continues to examine schematic structures, the overall organization of news items, of this news episode. As van Dijk (1985) has pointed out that by the "thematic structure" of a news discourse, one understands the overall organization of global 'topics' a certain news item is about; whereas news "schemata" are used to describe the "overall *form* of a discourse" (p. 69, original italic). van Dijk (1985) compared the relations between schematic superstructures and the thematic structures as follows: "schematic superstructures organize thematic macrostructures, much in the same way as the syntax of a sentence organizes the meaning of a sentence" (p. 69). It is therefore crucial to examine the schematic superstructures of the news episode, since the themes and schemes are all closely related in the study of news discourse.

Figures 3 and 4 compare the superstructure schemata (or schematic superstructures) of the news episode as described by the two newspapers. The superstructure schemata provide us with a even clearer picture of how different the two newspapers are in reporting the event, not only in the thematic structures of their respective discourse styles, but also in the overall "forms" of the discourse. As one can see from Figure 3, the *New York Times* presents a fairly complete schema for the news episode. Its news discourse contains comprehensive schematic categories in summary and story. In the part of the story, categories of situation (which includes subcategories of episode and backgrounds, which then include more sub-subcategories) and comments (with subcategories of verbal reactions and conclusions) are also covered in great detail. The *Renmin Ribao* story, on the contrary, presents a very simple superstructure schema for the news episode. Most of the *Times*' schematic categories are absent from the *Ribao*'s schema. Although the summary part of the schematic superstructure is complete (i.e., with headline and lead), the story part presents a comparatively weak structure. The whole category of comments and the subcategory of backgrounds, as well as other related sub-subcategories, are missing. After analyzing the schematic superstructures constructed by the *New York Times* and *Renmin Ribao*, it appears that *Renmin Ribao* had presented a single-line discourse structure in describing this particular news event. One should keep in mind, however, that since only one story of this particular event was examined in this study, it would be inappropriate to draw the conclusion that these two papers treat all international news items in the same fashion.


NEWS DISCOURSE
SUMMARY
STORY
HEADLINE
Gorbachev ousted in a coup; hard-liners took power
LEAD
Gorbachev ousted by military authorities
SITUATION
COMMENTS
EPISODE
BACKGROUNDS
VERBAL REACTIONS
CONCLUSIONS
MAIN EVENTS
Gorbachev ousted while vacationing in Crimea
CONSEQUENCES
State of emergency declared; State Committee for the State of Emergency formed; Yanayev assumed presidential powers
CONTEXT
CIRCUMSTANCES
The signing of union treaty to share power w/ the republics on august 20, 1991
PREVIOUS EVENTS
Relations w/ the republics, devastating economy, reform
HISTORY
Gorbachev's relationship w/ the hard-liners. Tried to appease them last year
EXPECTATIONS
Will the coup succeed? Waht will happen to the reform pgogram? What will happen to Gorbachev?
EVALUATION
The hardliners take power

FIGURE 3 The superstructure schema for news report (the *New York Times*)


NEWS DISCOURSE
SUMMARY
STORY
SITUATION
EPISODE
HEADLINE
LEAD
Yanayev announces that Gorbachev is prohibited from performing Presidential duties
According to TASS, Yanayev announces Gorbachev's ill health is preventing him from performing duties properly; Yanayev took power
MAIN EVENTS
REASONS
CONSEQUENCES
Gorbachev is prohibited from performing the duties of President due to ill health
Gorbachev's reform program entered into a blind valley
State of emergency declared; State Committee for the State of Emergency formed; Yanayev assumed Presidential power

FIGURE 4 The superstructure schema for news reort (*Renmin Ribao)*

D. Stylistic Description of Main Actors

Tables 5 and 6 illustrate the stylistic descriptions of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, respectively, by the two newspapers from August 19 to 21.

TABLE 5
Stylistic descriptions of Gorbachev

The *New York Times*:
- Mr.
- President
- the Soviet leader
- indecisive
- [his] leadership has been to lead from the center, never getting too far ahead of his balky conservatives or too far behind his itchy radicals
- he began to resemble a captain running from port to starboard to keep his ship afloat
- his die-hard defense of the status quo placated the hard-liners, but cost him precious public credibility
- the Soviet President
- walking a tightrope
- managed to stay afloat by skillfully maneuvering between left and right

Renmin Ribao:
- The Soviet President

TABLE 6
Stylistic descriptions of Yeltsin

The *New York Times*:
- Mr.
- first elected president of the Russian Republic
- President of the Russian Federated Republic
- who has often been at odds with Mr. Gorbachev
- become one of his strongest supporters today
- President
- an ex-Communist who has made a second career out of doing battle with the Communist Party
- arguably the most popular politician in the Soviet Union today
- the first to publicly condemn the "unconstitutional and unlawful coup d'etat
- the rare Soviet politician to make a successful comeback
- Chairman of the Russian Parliament
- the President of the Russian Republic
- President of the Russian Federation
- the most important remaining reformer
- champion of democracy
- the Russian President
- the Russian republic's first elected president
- the Russian leader
- the Russian Republic President

Renmin Ribao
- the Russian leader
- the Russian Republic President

After reviewing the stylistic descriptions of these two main actors of the event, it is strikingly evident that the nature and direction of words used by the two newspapers were very different. *Renmin Ribao* (Table 6) took a very neutral stand and treated these two actors equally. They were both addressed as Presidents, and no evaluative terms were used. The portrayals of these two actors presented by the *Times* were totally different. The *Times* treated Yeltsin very positively, presented him as the "champion of democracy," as the most courageous, popular, last remaining true reformer of the Soviet Union. In other words, the last hope for the Soviets. Not too long ago similar terms were used by American media to describe Gorbachev. At the time of the coup, however, Gorbachev was seen as indecisive, as someone who was walking a tightrope, and who "managed to stay afloat by skillfully maneuvering between left and right."

The stylistic descriptions used by the two newspapers seemed to have corresponded to their overall news structures. *Renmin Ribao* reported the event cautiously, and distanced itself from the news. One could, however, detect the implicit support of the coup the newspaper had after reviewing its coverage carefully. The *New York Times*, conversely, presented more comprehensive, and evaluative coverage of the event and actors, along with more news analysis and editorial opinions.

V. Discussions and Implications

By carefully examining the texts of the news reports, and at the same time relating them to the contexts from which they were developed, this study set out to analyze news discourse both at the macro-level (through studies of topics, thematic structures, and schematic structures of the news), and at the micro-level (through the analysis of styles). As was formerly discussed, because there is a determinate relation between linguistic process and ideological process, it is important and proper to use linguistic theories in such work (Trew, 1979).

Through discourse and quantitative content analysis of *Renmin Ribao* and the *New York Times*'s coverage of the Soviet coup, this study explored in some detail the relations between language and ideology in news reporting. There were more differences than similarities in these two papers' treatment of the event, both structurally and quantitatively.

Quantitatively, the *New York Times*'s response to the Soviet coup was extraordinary in volume. Altogether 185 news items and 122 photographs were found on the event during the week of the study (August 19 through 26, 1991), and for seven days (August 20 through 26) during that week, a special section of the newspaper was devoted to the reporting and analyzing of the event. Although *Renmin Ribao* showed its attention to the event by carrying five (5) of the 29 news items on the front page during the week, its coverage of the event was very distanced, neutral and cautious. The majority of its news sources were from the Government news agency Xinhua dispatches, while only two photos of Yanayev, the leader of the coup, were printed.

Contrary to one of van Dijk's (1988a) findings on international news structures which suggests that a "globally shared code of journalistic practices leads to a standardized description of the events" (p. 130), this study found the news structures of the two newspapers were rather different. News items from both papers did share the basic structure of carrying major information in their headlines and leads, but their thematic as well as schematic structures were different. The *New York Times*'s reports on the event were found to be far more complicated than those found in *Renmin Ribao*. There were more topics, actors, and more background and contextual information covered. *Renmin Ribao*, on the other hand, focused its coverage on the power transfer in the Soviet Union and on activities of the coup members, while omitting all background and contextual information and other actors. Structurally, the *New York Times*'s reports appear to be more complete with its inclusion of information on causes, consequences, backgrounds and contexts of the event.

The results of the stylistic descriptions of Gorbachev and Yeltsin by the two papers were illuminating. After reviewing the stylistic descriptions, one could easily detect clear ideological implications in the two papers' coverage of the two political figures. Yeltsin's intent in deserting the Communist ideological and political bonds and embracing more rapid capitalist reforms had apparently won over the support of Western governments and press. The *New York Times* described him as "an ex-Communist who has made a second career out of doing battle with the Communist Party." He was both the "most important remaining reformer" and the "most popular politician in the Soviet Union today." He also was a "champion of democracy." When compared with its positive coverage of Yeltsin, the *New*

York Times's coverage of Gorbachev was found to be especially negative. He was portrayed as indecisive and weak in characters whose "die-hard defense of the status quo placated the hard-liners, but cost him precious public credibility." One should not forget that not too long ago Gorbachev was also celebrated by the Western press as a true champion for democracy.

Throughout the short period of the coup, the Chinese government refrained itself from making comments on the incident and insisted that what happened was the internal affair of the Soviet Union. Likewise, *Renmin Ribao*, the official Chinese Communist Party newspaper, had also steered clear of making evaluative comments on the event and major actors, and treated both Gorbachev and Yeltsin neutrally as the Presidents of the Soviet Union and the Russian Republic, respectively.

There are complex historical, ideological, cultural, and political factors affecting the coverage of international news such as the failed Soviet coup. It may be concluded, however, that two possible factors could explain partly the differences in *Renmin Ribao* and *New York Times*'s coverage of the event, namely ideology and political interests. As mentioned earlier, although the Soviet Union and China reestablished diplomatic relationship in 1989, China was uncomfortable with the drastic political and ideological reform policies the Soviet Union was adopting. A successful coup by the hardliners would be a welcome news for the more politically conservative Chinese leadership. For the Americans, on the other hand, a successful coup would probably mean all the American political and financial supports to the Soviets and all the efforts and talks on the mutual nuclear disarmament going down the drain. Consequently, it was probably to the American interests, both politically and ideologically, to see the coup fail and to see the emergence of a more capitalistically inclined Soviet Union from the coup. For the Chinese, however, a successful coup would very likely make it easier to live, and cooperate, with a more politically hard-line neighbor, since China itself advocates economic reforms, but definitely not political ones.

In the analysis of news structure, be it thematic or schematic, it is important to take into consideration the different journalistic systems in which these news stories are constructed. Recent developments in China, especially those that took place in the past decade, have sent somewhat ambiguous signals to the outside world. Although a major part of the 1980s saw an improvement in press freedom in China due to Deng's successful open door policy and economic reform programs, the 1989 Tiananmen incident had unquestionably caused setbacks in the progress. But even at the peak of the reform period in 1985, the late Party Secretary General Hu Yaobang, one of the most liberal and well-liked leaders in China whose death triggered the 1989 student movements, had commented on the role of Party journalism as follows:

> The Party's journalism is the Party's mouthpiece, and naturally it is the mouthpiece of the people's government, which is led by the Party, and also the mouthpiece of the people themselves. (quoted in Lee, 1990, p.8)

Chinese journalism practices, therefore, have always followed the Communist Party's guidelines, with variations only in the degrees of strictness. With this in mind, one should not find *Renmin Ribao*'s low key treatment of the coup surprising, as it corresponded well to the Chinese Government's overall reactions to the event.

Despite that the Chinese Communist Party appears to have its ideological origins in Marxist-Leninist thoughts, its practices are culturally rooted. As Lee (1990) has noted, the Chinese Communist Party "supports Confucian ethos in Leninist disguise" (p. 7). Confucianism holds the tradition that the Chinese rulers are best qualified to take care of their subjects because of the rulers' heavenly mandate and presumed moral character. This tradition corresponds to the Leninist belief that the Communist Party is the vanguard of the proletariat (Lee, 1990). Being the Chinese Communist Party's official mouthpiece, *Renmin Ribao* plays the role of the Party's ideological apparatus in serving as the vanguard of the proletariat. Drawing on these observations, it seems reasonable to infer that the Chinese press' coverage of international news events is a product of ideology, politics, and culture.

To summarize, the coverage of the failed Soviet coup by the *New York Times* and *Renmin Ribao* was different both quantitatively and structurally. Important findings suggest that the press coverage of the event was ideologically, politically, and culturally situated.

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The Future of Public Service Broadcasting in Japan and the U.K. A Comparative Analysis

by

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The Future of Public Service Broadcasting in Japan and the United Kingdom: A Comparative Analysis

The decade of 1980s was characterized by major economic and technological challenges to public service broadcasting in many countries. Despite the universal nature of these challenges, however, their impact on public broadcasting systems in different countries has not been uniform. Rather, they have led to different, even contrasting, outcomes.

One the most striking cases of such contrast in outcomes is presented by Britain's BBC and Japan's NHK. Despite their comparability in basic organizational structure and financial support base, the two broadcasters face highly divergent prospects in the closing years of the twentieth century. While the BBC has continued to lose ground in the 1980s and faces the likelihood of being turned into a subscription-based service after the expiration of its current charter in 1996, NHK has continued to grow in power and prestige and is now poised to become a major international force in broadcast technology and program production.

The purpose of this paper is to conduct a comparative examination of the different elements in the organizational set-up, policy environment, and management strategies of the BBC and NHK which have been responsible for these divergent outcomes.

The decade of 1980s was characterized by major challenges to the future of public service broadcasting in many countries. The threat to the financial viability of broadcasting, which had originated with the stagnation of receiver fees in the face of rapidly escalating costs, was compounded by the economic-ideological challenges posed by the advent of new media technologies. Despite the universal nature of these challenges, however, their impact on public broadcasting systems in different countries has not been uniform. Rather, depending on the variations in the organizational set-up, policy environment, and management strategies of each system, they have led to different, even contrasting, outcomes.

One of the most striking case of such contrast is presented by Britain's BBC and Japan's NHK. Despite the commonalities shared by the BBC and NHK as receiver-fee supported systems operating in a dual broadcasting environment, the two broadcasters face highly divergent prospects in the closing years of the twenthieth century. While the BBC has continued to lose ground in the 1980s and faces the likelihood of being turned into a subscription-based service after the expiration of its current charter in 1996,[1] NHK has continued to grow in power and prestige and is now poised to become a major international force in broadcast technology and program production.

Against this backdrop, the purpose of this paper is to conduct a comparative examination of the different elements in the organizational set-up, policy environment, and management strategies of the BBC and NHK which have been responsible for these higly divergent outcomes. More specifically, this study will focus on analyzing the differences between the two systems in a) level of involvement in technological R&D, b) position vis a vis government policy-making structures and process, c) relationship with the government, d) advertiser pressures, e) ideological pressures, f) ethnic/cultural/geographic elements, g) relationship with the commercial broadcasters, and h) management strategy.

A brief overview of each system will precede the comparative analysis.

Historical roots and present structure of the BBC: An overview

The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) was established by Royal Charter in 1927, upon recommendation by a committee of distinguished citizens (the Crawford Commission) that the commercial broadcasting company originally founded in 1922 be turned into a public service broadcasting system.[2] Under the new arrangement, the BBC's system of funding continued to remain essentially the same as that of the original company, one based on annual fees paid by the public on their radio receiving sets. BBC's first director, John Reith, helped establish the BBC as a world-wide model of public broadcasting by articulating a distinct ideology of public service, which went beyond simple provision of nation-wide coverage, to include a strong commitment to independence from all corporate and political interests and to cultural and artistic edification of the public through quality programming.[3]

The BBC's monopoly was broken in 1955 with the establishment of Independent Television (ITV), a commercial television system subject to supervision by a statutory body, the Independent Television Authority (IBA). Despite an initial drop in the BBC's audience share to 30% as a result of the competition, the BBC was soon able to adapt to the competition and regain a 50% share of the audience. During the two decades following the introduction of commercial television, the British broadcasting system was placed under close scrutiny on two occasions, by the Pilkington Committee in 1960 and by the Annan Committee in 1974. The BBC's contributions to British broadcasting and the importance of its public funding system were endorsed on both occasions.[4]

A series of simultaneous trends and events, however, turned the 1980s into a decade of unprecedented challenge for the BBC. The first stress-point developed in the late 70s and early 80s as the BBC began to experience serious short-falls in its revenue due to stagnating receiver fee income in the face of rapidly rising production costs. Despite the BBC's efforts to supplement its income through the program sales and co-production activities of its commercial subsidiary, the BBC Enterprises, these ventures were only able to provide the Corporation with a small fraction of the one billion pounds per year needed to support the full range of its broadcasting activities.[5]

The BBC's financial dilemma was compounded in 1982 when the British government announced its plans to put the BBC in charge of operating the country's first DBS. The satellite was to be developed by a consortium of British electronic manufacturers, Unisat, and launched for use by the BBC in 1986. Under the terms of the agreement, which excluded any form of financial subsidy by the government, the BBC would have to lay out a minimum 250 million pounds to procure the satellite and another 250 million to develop appropriate programming.[6]

Despite an initially positive response, the BBC soon began to question the feasibility of its involvement in the DBS project in the face of diminishing income. In the meantime, not long after presenting its offer to the BBC, the government announced that it also intended to allocate two channels on the DBS to the commercial broadcasters. Following a further decision by the government to also allow a number of other businesses to take part in the DBS, the satellite project emerged in early 1985 as a joint venture between the BBC, ITV, and a consortium of other interested businesses.

While still grappling with its commitment to the DBS project in the face of worsening financial conditions, the BBC asked the government in 1984 for a major raise in its license fee from 46 to 65 pounds. The subsequent political controversy over the BBC's finances led to a major blow to the Corporations interests in 1985. After allocating a much lesser license fee to the BBC than requested (58 pounds)[7], the Thatcher government went on to announce its decision to establish a committee under the chairmanship of the country's foremost free market economist, Alan Peacock, to study the possibility of financing the BBC through advertising.[8]

Compounding the BBC's existing doubts about the high cost of the DBS and its fear of potential competition from low-power European satellites, these new developments finally led the BBC to pull out of the direct broadcast satellite venture. (The BBC's move was followed shortly afterwards by the ITV, leading to the takeover in 1986 of the country's direct satellite broadcasting plan by a consortium of several British businesses, BSB. After only three months of operation, however, BSB merged with its European rival, Rupert Murdoch's Sky Channel. Known as BSkyB after the merger, the channel is received by 2 million British households as of early 1992).

Although the Peacock Committee surprised the Thatcher government by advising against advertising support for the BBC, it made an even more shocking recommendation; that the BBC be turned into a subscription-based television service upon the expiration of its current charter in 1996.

Going far beyond its original mandate, the Peacock Committee also conducted a close study of ITV, concluding that the "comfortable duopoly" between the BBC and ITV had led to a broadcasting system in Britain in which the broadcaster, not the consumer, was sovereign.[9] To remedy this situation, the Committee recommended, among other things, the sale of the 15 regional ITV companies to the highest commercial bidders and the addition of at least one new commercial channel to the existing two.

The government White Paper, "Broadcasting in the '90s: Competition, Choice, and Quality," issued in 1988 in response to the Peacock Committee's recommendations, gave full endorsement to the Committee's vision for the BBC and ITV. Discussing the future of the BBC, section 3.10 of the White Paper addressed the subject of "Licence Fee and Subscription" as follows:

> As new television services proliferate, the system of financing the BBC television and radio services by compulsory licence fee alone will become harder to sustain. Though the Government accepts the advice of its consultants that a sudden, wholesale switch to subscription would be undesirable and damaging, there should be greater role for subscription. The Government looks forward to the eventual replacement of the licence fee.... The Government intends to encourage the progressive introduction of subscription on the BBC's television services.[10]

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Among recent efforts by the BBC to adapt to the new challenges facing it has been a plan to launch a television version of its external Radio service and to become a worldwide provider of television news via satellite. Due to its primary relevance to the BBC's international news function, however, this new venture, even if successful, is unlikely to have a major impact on the BBC's status as a domestic broadcaster.

Although the BBC was able to receive a further raise in its receiver fees in 1991, it experienced a set-back at about the same time, when it lost its monopoly over the advance publication of its radio and television schedules in the Radio Times, one of its most profitable operations.

Since issuing the White Paper in 1988, the British government has moved rapidly to implement the Peacock Committee's recommendations regarding the auctioning of ITV companies and the addition of a new channel to the existing four (BBC-1, BBC-2, Channel-3 and Channel-4). The new channel is refered to as Channel-5. The sale of the ITV companies was completed in 1991 and the bidding for Channel-5 is currently in progress.

The government's determined moves toward creating an increasingly competitive broadcasting market in Britain and the growing competition from satellite broadcasters outside British borders, have combined to present a major threat of their own to the BBC. By gradually eroding the BBC's audience base,[11] these competing services have not only further weakened the rationale for continued public funding of the BBC, but they have also made it less likely for the BBC to be able to emerge as a viable subscription-based service in the late 1990s.

Even if the BBC proves able to successfully convert to a subscription system, however, it is unlikely that it would be able to maintain either the organizational scope or the range and quality of programming it has been known for as a public service broadcaster. As the BBC itself has so often argued, an end to the Corporation's license fee support in 1996 also spells an end to the BBC's life as a long-cherished model of quality in public service broadcasting.

Historical roots and present structure of NHK: An over view

NHK was formed in 1926, when the Japanese government urged the three receiver-fee supported stations originally established in 1924 by the Japanese newspaper publishers and electronic manufacturers to merge into one nationwide network. Motivated by a desire to tighten government control over the system, this merger marked the beginning of growing government interference in the affairs of NHK, a control which reached its peak during WWII.[12] After the war, NHK was reorganized by the General Head-quarters for the Allied Powers (GHQ) based on a new Broadcast Law (1950) designed to insulate NHK from government control. The law provided for a 12-member board of directors, to be appointed by the prime minister. It also sanctioned the continuation of the same receiver fee-based system of financing, within which NHK itself had been responsible for collecting the receiver fees. In addition, the GHQ established a Radio Regulatory Commission, patterned after the FCC, to oversee and regulate broadcasting in Japan. Soon after the departure of the GHQ in 1952, however, the RRC was absorbed into the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT).[13] Since then, MPT has remained the primary authority responsible for regulating broadcasting and telecommunications in Japan. A fully commercial system of broadcasting was established shortly afterwards in 1951, with the licenses going to a handful of consortia dominated largely by newspaper publishing interests. Thus, the commercial broadcasting industry in Japan was founded, from the outset, as an extension of the interests of the country's newspaper industry. Both industries are currently dominated by five major media conglomerates, NTV-Yomiuri Shimbun, TV Asahi-Asahi Shimbun, TBS-Mainichi Shimbun, TV Tokyo-Nikkei Shimbun, and Fuji TV-Sankei Shimbun.[14]

Although the competition between NHK and the commercial broadcasters has been fierce, NHK has been able to maintain its position as the country's leading broadcaster. As the "senior" broadcaster (an important concept in Japan), NHK has been able to attract the country's best engineering, production, and programming talent and managed to remain highly popular with audiences, commanding over half of the Japanese viewership.

NHK's financial viability was threatened in the early 1980's, when NHK began to experience shortfalls in its budget due to the saturation of television sets and stagnating receiver fees. In view of the political difficulty of raising receiver fees, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) responded by authorizing NHK in 1982 to engage in a limited range of commercial activities through subsidiary companies to supplement its receiver fee income. NHK's first commercially-oriented subsidiary, NHK Enterprises, was established shortly afterwards, with the mandate to coproduce and sell NHK programs for domestic as well as international consumption.[15] NHK's involvement with subsidiary companies accelerated after a 1988 amendment to the

Broadcast Law authorizing NHK to invest its receiver fees (and not just outside income) in its affiliated companies, so long as the activities of such companies were "in harmony with NHK's character as public service broadcaster." NHK's activities through its subsidiaries have not only given a visible boost to its financial condition, but they have also vastly expanded the scope of NHK's domestic and international activities.

In addition to its involvement in such varied areas as commercial teletext broadcasting and international program co-production, NHK currently operates two medium-wave AM radio networks, one VHF-FM network, two television networks (General TV and Educational TV), and two of the three channels on Japan's second generation operational direct broadcast satellite (BS3). (The third channel, called Wowow, is run as subscription television by a commercial consortium, JSB).

NHK's involvement with direct broadcast satellites began in the early 1970s in conjunction with the country's Space Development Program. Japan's first experimental DBS program was initiated by the joint efforts of MPT and NHK in 1972. Launched in 1978, the experimental satellite (BSE) functioned until 1980 when a transponder failure brought a halt to the project. NHK, which bore 60% of the project's costs, used BSE to carry out various experiments including HDTV and multiplex sound broadcasting.[16] Launched in 1984, Japan's first operational satellite, BS2 was initially used by NHK in fulfilling its mandate of providing nationwide coverage of its programs and carrying out innovative technological experiments. Soon after BS2's launch, however, NHK began developing plans for a special 24-hour DBS channel and was authorized by MPT to begin broadcasting on the channel in July 1987.[17] With the launch of BS3 in 1990, NHK received government approval to begin charging a DBS fee from households with the technical capability to receive its signals.

The satellite service, offering multi-language news and sports on one channel, and movies and cultural programming as well as experimental HDTV and multiplex sound programming on the other, has had great success with Japanese viewers. As of September 1991, 4.5 million households were able to receive NHK's DBS signals, via cable as well as through dish antennas.[18] Because of NHK's ability to collect DBS fees from every household with the technical capability to receive its signals, the rise in DBS-equipped households has given a major boost to NHK's budget, averting the original threat posed by stagnating receiver fees.

Given the growing need in Japan for attractive programming to fill the increasing numbers of cable and DBS channels, NHK recently took bold steps toward becoming a dominant force in the area of program production. This new direction in NHK activities is exemplified not only in the program production activities of NHK Enterprises, but in a far more large scale venture (MICO) entered into in 1991 by NHK and over 40 of Japan's 'fortune 100' companies, including such major businessess as Itoh-Chuo, Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Marubeni, Daiichi Kangyo Bank, and Sumitomo Bank, to buy and sell programs and to produce programs for international as well as domestic production.[19]

NHK expanded the reach of its programs even further in April 1991 when it began beaming its signals to Japanese households in the U.S. and in Europe via INTELSAT.[20]

Currently, NHK awaits permission from MPT to begin operation of a television facsimile system, using a communication satellite.[21]

Roots of the contrast: A Comparative Analysis

It is clear from the brief overview of the BBC and NHK, presented above, that the two systems face highly divergent prospects in the closing years of the 20th century. In the following pages, this study will present a comparative analysis of some of the major differences between the two systems which have been responsible for these contrasting outcomes.

Level of involvement in technological R&D

Perhaps the most decisive reason behind the difference between the prospects faced by the BBC and NHK is the differential level of involvement by each in technological R&D. While the BBC has traditionally had little involvement in research and development, NHK has, from the outset, functioned as a leader and standard-bearer in all areas of broadcast technology. Since its establishment in 1928, NHK's technical research institute has been the site of a variety of innovations, including the latest advances in HDTV technology and multiplex sound broadcasting. NHK's "Hi-Vision" standard (1125-line, 60 fields per second, 2:1 interlace) which makes use of a DBS band compression system called MUSE was strongly endorsed by the majority of U.S. program producers and broadcasters in a 1985 recommendation to the ATSC in preparation for the International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR) discussions on a world standard.[22] Although the economic and technological rivalries between the European Community, Japan, and the U.S. have dimmed the prospects for the adoption of a world standard, NHK continues to remain a top contender for the position. Since 1989, NHK has been broadcasting in HDTV on its DBS channels on an experimental basis and has cooperated with Japanese manufacturers in developing HDTV television sets, making Japan the first country in the world to put high-definition television into full operation.

The importance of the level of involvement by NHK and the BBC in technological research and development in determining their status and prospects in the closing decade of the 20th century is also clearly evident in the experiences of the two broadcasters with DBS technology.

While in the absence of R&D involvement, the BBC has had to react, unprepared, to the emergence of DBS technology, NHK has been able to preempt the competition posed by the technology and control the pace and direction of its development to its own advantage. As a result, while the BBC faces an uphill battle against its DBS competitors to obtain subscribers for its service, NHK remains the dominant DBS broadcasting entity in Japan and a formidable competitor to its late-coming commercial counterparts. NHK's decisive advantage in this area is clearly reflected in the number of its subscribers which, as of 1992, exceeds those of the commercial broadcasters by nearly 4 million households. (As of early 1992, the commercial DBS channel, Wowow, had 700,000 subscribers,[23] while NHK had 4.5 million).

Position vis a vis broadcast policy-making structures and process:

While NHK's involvement in R&D has given it a notable measure of control over the pace and direction of new media development, its favorable position vis a vis broadcast policy-making structures has given it a considerable level of control over policy decisions affecting its future.

In contrast to the U.K., where broadcast policy decisions are arrived at either independently by the government, or in response to reviews carried out by independent commissions composed of distinguished citizens, broadcasting policy in Japan is developed in the context of semiformal advisory committees, appointed by the political and/or the bureaucratic elite, and represented by all of the elite power groups holding a vested interest in the policy outcomes.[24] Even in cases where, because of the need for a change in the law (as opposed to a change in administrative regulations), the policy needs to be ratified by the Diet (i.e., the Japanese parliament), the actual bargaining and decision-making takes place within much more informal surroundings; that of Liberal Democratic Party "study groups" to which NHK and the commercial broadcasters have ready access.[25] In contrast to the U.K., therefore, broadcasting policy in Japan is developed, not by independent review committees, but in a process of negotiation and compromise among all elite power groups affected by the policy outcomes.[26]

Unlike the BBC, whose future has been largely determined by external review committees -- from the Crawford Commission which brought it into existence to the Peacock Committee which recommended an end to its life as a public service broadcaster -- NHK has been represented at every advisory committee formed to consider the future of broadcasting in Japan and has exercised considerable influence over the policy outcomes.[27]

Relationship with the government:

Another important difference between the BBC and NHK is the nature of their relationship with the government.

Although NHK enjoys a considerable level of independence from the Japanese government and cannot be considered a "government-controlled" broadcaster, it has generally avoided moves which would alienate the government in power.[28] The BBC, on the other hand, has walked a tight-rope which has quite frequently landed it in controversy and on the opposite side of the government on a number of issues.

The incidence of clashes between the British government and the BBC rose dramatically under the Thatcher government and at a time when, given the economic and technological challenges facing it, the BBC most needed the government's support. Among some examples of BBC coverage which drew angry criticism from the Thatcher government were the BBC interviews with members of terrorist groups in Northern Ireland in the early 1980s , the "Real Lives" documentary on the lives of two Northern Ireland extremist leaders in 1985, and the BBC coverage of the Falklands war.

Aside from the threats posed to the BBC's future by reason of its independence, the BBC has always faced a certain level instability in its relationship with the government resulting from the relatively frequent changes in British government leadership and policy.

The situation has been quite the opposite for NHK. For more than 35 years, Japan has been ruled by the powerful Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), whose policies have continually favored a dual broadcasting system and a strong NHK. This policy of support has been reinforced by the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), which as NHK's primary supervising authority has tended to consider a strong NHK as a sign of its own prestige.[29]

NHK's generally stable relationship with the government has thus been a decisive factor in its continuing viability as a public service broadcaster. In this respect, the BBC has been, at least in part, a victim of its own independence.

Advertiser pressures:

A major impetus behind the constant scrutiny of the BBC's license fee system has been the continuing pressure brought to bear on British policy-makers by advertising interests to commercialize the BBC. In large part, these advertiser pressures have stemmed from their dissatisfaction with the high television advertising rates in Britain arising from restrictions on ITV commercial time.

Among the formal efforts by the British advertisers during the 1980s to open the broadcasting market to more competition and lower advertising rates was a highly publicized 1984 report by IPA Media Policy Group, an affiliate of the Saatchi and Saatchi advertising company.[30] Preceding the establishment of the Peacock Committee by only a few months, the report urged the government to take steps toward commercializing the BBC. Although it is difficult to determine the exact weight given to such advertiser demands by the Thatcher government in its decision to establish the Peacock Committee, they clearly added another element to the many other forces which were shaping the BBC's demise throughout the 1980s.

In contrast to the BBC, NHK has never faced such advertiser pressures, largely due to the fact that, unlike the U.K., there were no restrictions placed on commercial time on television in Japan.

The generally low levels of demand for additional advertising time in Japan have made any suggestions of on-air commercial activity for NHK subject to fierce and effective competition by the commercial broadcasters.[31] [For a brief period in 1985, NHK itself contemplated the possibility of accepting a limited amount of institutional (as opposed to product) advertising to supplement its receiver fee income. The suggestion, however, was quickly dropped in the face of fierce opposition by the commercial broadcasters and their campaign of complaints to the government and to NHK itself.][32]

Ideological pressures:

In the sharply defined dual Liberal vs. Conservative political climate in Britain, the BBC has always been under a certain amount of pressure to justify its existence to the conservative Tory governments whose ideological preference for "market competition," and "consumer sovereignty," has always been inherently at odds with the ideology of public broadcasting. At no time in the BBC's history, however, were these ideological pressures more visible than during the Thatcher era. Coupled with advertiser pressures, whose vested interests could easily be translated into the terminology of the "free market" ideology, these ideological pressures became a critical determinant of the BBC's fate in the 1980s.

In sharp contrast to the British political culture, the Japanese political culture is highly pragmatic. In most cases, Japanese policy decisions are a product of a case by case consideration of the conflicting interests involved, rather than a reflection of ideologically-driven reforms.[33] Subsequently, unlike the BBC, NHK never faced ideologically-driven challenges to its public service character. And to the extent that ideological pressures tend to flow from vested economic interests and pressures, in the absence of such economic pressures there has been little reason for any interest group in Japan to avail itself of the ideological terminology in favore of privatization and competition in the broadcasting market.

Ethnic/Linguistic/Geographic elements:

A further advantage of NHK over the BBC stems from the differences in the geographic position and ethnic make-up of their respective countries. Operating in a diverse ethnic and linguistic environment, the BBC has had to be constantly cognizent of the need to respond to a variety of minority tastes and requirements. While contributing to the wide range and high quality of programming offered by the BBC, these pressures have tended to make it more difficult for the BBC to attract a majority of the British audience. Due to the higly homogeneous ethnic, cultural, and linguistic environment of Japan, on the other hand, it has been much easier for NHK to maintain its leading share of the audience in Japan and to become a "ratings" power house with several highly popular programs.

Japan's geographic isolation from culturally and linguistically compatible neighbors, on the other hand, has given NHK a further advantage over the BBC in that it has made it less likely for NHK to face broadcasting competition from satellites in neighboring countries. The potential competition from neighboring countries became a major factor in shaping the BBC's future when the Corporation decided to drop out of the DBS race, due in part to the threat of competition from low power European satellites.[34] That same competition remains a major threat to the BBC's prospects as a subscription-based service.

Position vis a vis the commercial broadcasters:

Another major difference between the BBC and NHK concerns their relationship with their commercial counterparts.

As also noted in the Peacock committee report, the traditional relationship between the BBC and the commercial broadcasters has long been one of a harmonious and "comfortable duopoly." Aside from a brief period of fierce competition for audiences after the introduction of ITV in 1955, the relationship between the BBC and ITV has been largely amicable and based on a shared assumption that the dual system, in which the BBC and ITV have competed for the same audiences but not for the same source of revenue, has given Britain the best broadcasting in the world.[35]

The case has been considerably different for NHK, whose interests have come into increasing conflict with those of the commercial broadcasters in the course of the last decade. Despite its many advantages over the BBC, NHK still needs to operate within the limits placed on its ambitions by the country' powerful media conglomerates.

The competition between NHK and commercial broadcasters became particularly intense during the 1980s when NHK began its bold inroads into direct satellite broadcasting.

NHK's close invovement in the development and exclusive use of Japan's first two direct broadcast satellites (BSE and BS2) proved from the beginning to be a source of great anxiety for the country's commercial broadcasters, an anxiety which did not seem to be relieved by NHK's repeated assurances that it intended to use the satellite only for nation-wide coverage and experimental purposes. During the early 1980s, NHK's domination of the DBS and the potential threat posed by DBS technology to the reason for existence of the local stations, led to a series of protests by Japan's commercial broadcasters against direct broadcast satellite development in Japan.[36] Faced with MPT's determination to move ahead with the technology, however, they finally consented to participate in MPT's plans for allocating one channel on BS3 to a variety of commercial interests.[37]

The first blow to the interests of the commercial broadcasters came in the course of the BS3 negotiations, during which the commercial broadcasters were allocated a mere 19% share in the commercial DBS channel.[38] The discrepancy in DBS shares between NHK (2 channels) and the commercial broadcasters (19% of one channel) would have been of little consequence, had NHK continued to use the DBS for nationwide coverage of its terrestrial programs. This discrepency, however, turned into a major blow to the interest of the commercial broadcasters in 1985, when NHK began considering plans to use one of two DBS channels allocated to it to start a new channel devoted to special DBS programming. The sudden change in NHK's plans created a formidable threat of competition for commercial broadcasters, a competition which would be especially difficult to beat because of NHK's ability as a public broadcaster to automatically count the DBS-equipped households as "subscribers" to its DBS service, leaving the commercial broadcasters with the task of soliciting additional subscriptions from the same pool of households. By the time BS3 was launched in 1990, NHK had already established itself as the country's premier DBS broadcaster with more than 2 million people able to receive its signals.

In view of these accumulating disadvantages, Japan's commercial media conglomerates went on a major offensive in the course of the 1990 negotiations for the launching of BS4 in 1997. Still discontent with their minimal share of BS3, each of the five major media conglomerates claimed the right to be allocated a minimum of one DBS channel out of the eight on BS4.[39] They also opposed NHK's bid to gain at least one additional channel on BS4, to bring its share from two to three channels.[40] As the bitter fight over BS4 continued with no resolution in sight, MPT decided to allow the commercial broadcasters to jointly invest in a CS in place of a direct broadcast satellite,[41] thus leaving NHK out of the arrangement. NHK responded by trying to secure a direct broadcast satellite of its own, thus preempting the commercial broadcasters' efforts to frustrate its DBS plans. Finally, in the explosive atmosphere of the Spring of 1991, the commercial broadcasters and their parent corporations, the country's newspaper publishers, were given an opportunity to strike back.

On April 24th, an NHK back-up satellite, purchased from an American manufacturer (G.E.) and launched from the Cape Canaveral Air Force Base, failed to launch into orbit. When reporting on the matter to the Telecommunications Committee of the Japanese Diet, NHK president, Keiji Shima, was asked, as a matter of course, where he had been at the time of the launch. In response, Mr. Shima indicated that he had been at the General Electric Co. headquarters in New Jersey. He later changed his initial response, however, by saying that he had actually been at Hotel New Otani in Los Angeles, directing the operation via telephone.[42] The contradictory statements by Keiji Shima, the man responsible for NHK's aggressive strategy for much of the 1980s and early 1990's, gave the Japanese commercial media the story they had been waiting for. United in their interests against NHK, the Japanese media succeeded in orchestrating the incident into scandalous proportions, leading Shima to resign his post as NHK president.[43]

The new president, Mikio Kawaguchi, acknowledged the limits placed on NHK's ambitions by the interests of the commercial broadcasters very clearly in his inaugural address when he said :"...Harmony and progress is important. We must maintain a friendly and harmonious relationship with commercial broadcasting networks and other related circles, while striving to achieve steady growth of our public broadcasting activities."[44]

Differences in management strategy:

Another major element responsible for the contrast in the prospects of NHK and the BBC has been the difference in the management strategies pursued by each in response to the challenges posed to them in the 1980s.

In general, the managment strategies pursued by NHK have been far more aggressive than those pursued the BBC. While the BBC has tried to *protect* its public service status and license fee support base on the basis of a series of logical/ideological arguments and "propositions," NHK has acted aggressively to preempt the potential competition and to try to turn every new development to its own advantage.

This notable difference in management strategy between the two broadcasters is reflected not only in the actual responses made by the BBC and NHK to the critical developments of the 1980s, but also in the policy statements made on various occasions by their top executives.

In a 1985 speech to the Royal Television Society shortly after the establishment of the Peacock Committee, BBC Chairman, Stuart Young, gave the following assessment of the BBC's approach to the economic and technological challenges facing it in the latter half of the 80s:

> In the next few years, we are likely to see a massive expansion of new broadcasting technology, such as cable and satellite...The BBC does indeed hope it will be able to consolidate its present public service activities, but it would like to see the new commercial operators taking their place alongside the existing broadcasters. In the same way that ITV, ILR, and Channel Four have been added to the national broadcasting structure over the years, so the BBC hopes that cable and satellite can be brought into that structure without the general loss in programme quality that would result from a national system of funding that was wholly commercial.[45]

It is clear from this statement that by 1985 the BBC was resigned to competition from the new media technologies, and hopeful that, as it had been the case in the past, such a competition would not result in a disturbance of its public service character.

During the same years, on the other hand, the statements made by

NHK president, Keiji Shima, repeatedly affirmed a determination on the part of NHK to aggressively exploit the full range of opportunities provided by new technology. In a 1988 trip to the U.S. to investigate joint venture opportunities for direct satellite broadcasting and program production, Shima told a Broadcasting magazine interviewer that he had come to encourage the American media companies "to attack with the aggressiveness they are used to" in the realm of DBS and HDTV.[46] American broadcasters, Shima said in another interview, were too busy trying to protect their present status and not doing enough to take advantage of new technology.[47] When asked why he had reshuffled the high-level management of NHK upon taking office, he answered that the purpose was to make NHK "more youthful" and to "reactivate" it.[48]

It is important to point out here, however, that the management strategies pursued by NHK and the BBC cannot be considered or evaluated in isolation from the previously discussed organizational, economic, and political elements. Obviously, every organization's management strategies are developend within the constraints of what is perceived to be feasible within the given policy environment. There is little doubt, therefore, that a major determinant of NHK's ability to pursue an aggressive management strategy has been its highly favorable and "cushioned" policy environment. Operating in a far more hostile environment, on the other hand, the BBC's vision of its own future has, of necessity, been less ambitious and more constrained.

It may still be argued, however, that the differences in strategy between the BBC and NHK are not completely a function of the contrasting policy environments in which they have operated. At least to a certain extent, these differences in strategy reflect just that, a difference between the two broadcasters in management traditions

Summary and conclusion

This paper has focused on a comparative analysis of the forces shaping the future of two of the world's most celeberated public broadcasting systems, Britain's BBC and Japan's NHK. Despite their comparability in basic organizational structure and financial support base, the two broadcasters face very different prospects in the closing years of the twentieth century. While the BBC is likely to be turned into a considerably scaled-down subscription television system. NHK remains likely to emerge as a leading international force in program production and broadcast technology. These strikingly divergent outcomes, this study has argued, have been due to a number of important differences between the two systems in such areas as level of involvement in technology, position vis a vis policy-making structures and process, relationship with the government, advertiser pressures, ideological pressures, cultural/geographic elements, position vis a vis the commercial broadcasters, and management strategy.

At the theoretical level, the findings of this study present a case against the prevailing technological determinism in the field, which tends to automatically view the advent of new technology as anti-thetical to public service broadcasting and consider a public service system of broadcasting as a barrier to technological innovation.

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1st Place Markham Award Paper

REINVENTING FREEDOM OF THE PRESS:
THE SEARCH FOR A POST-SOVIET MODEL
IN THE NEW RUSSIA

Presented to the International Communication Division of the
Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication
75th annual convention, Aug. 5, 1992, in Montreal, Canada

by

Lisa W. Holstein
Indiana University

ABSTRACT

As the Soviet Union reinvents itself, so too must its press. But the assumption that the U.S. media represent an ideal toward which it should strive may have the proposition backwards. Perhaps the U.S. press ought to recognize its own weaknesses in such Russian concerns as how advertising and private ownership might threaten rather than enhance independence. The different Soviet understanding of "objectivity" also challenges traditional American mythology, which may obscure more than it reveals in the pervasive hidden frame that implicitly supports the status quo. The Russian concept of "objectively" expressing an explicit viewpoint may be a more honest form of journalism. It recalls an earlier era of American journalism, but also has its own historical dynamic that must be understood in a Russian context, not by superimposing U.S. presumptions. Current debates about the shape of Russia's reinvented news media offer a fresh vision that could define a new standard for the role of a free press in a democratic society -- one that assumes citizens, not consumers, as its audience.

1st Place Markham Award Paper

REINVENTING FREEDOM OF THE PRESS:
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IN THE NEW RUSSIA

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Lisa W. Holstein
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As the worn-out Soviet state transforms itself with Russia as the core of a new Commonwealth of Independent States, its news media also must be reinvented in tandem with emerging new political, social and economic structures. The historical central role of the press in the former Soviet Union, the archetype of the world's first "propaganda state,"[1] and the pivotal position of glasnost in the revolutionary change underway, offer an unparalleled opportunity to consider the role of news media in a society where control of the press has long been candidly acknowledged as a fundamental operating principal of government.

What will the news media so recently freed from more than 70 years of strict censorship become? Moreover, what should it become? From the perspective of Soviet[*] journalists, "objective" and "independent" seem to be the key words for their future direction. The U.S. press system frequently appears as a referent against which they measure themselves. The head of former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's press service, V.N. Ignatenko (recently named director of TASS), said last year that "Our press is beginning to claim the status of the fourth estate *also*,"[2] his "also" clearly referring to the Western concept. After the failed coup of August 19-21, 1991, when the minister of information for the Russian Republic addressed the reorganized labor collective of TASS, he appealed to them in the same Western idiom: "Let us get together and create a 'fourth estate.'"[3]

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[*] The term "Soviet" is used to encompass the emerging post-Communist press of the former U.S.S.R. from 1917 through the present; while no longer altogether accurate, it remains readily comprehensible for what is being described.

From the U.S. perspective, there certainly is an expectation that an opportunity has arisen to export the First Amendment -- as it tried and failed to do after World War II.[4] The continuing assumption that the U.S. media offer an ideal role model for the news media in a democratic society was evident in the attitudes of a delegation of prominent Western journalists who visited Eastern Europe in the summer of 1990. They expected the leaders of newly democratic governments to "realize that the press was now free to chart its own course -- in the direction of the American model."[5] It is possibly an arrogant view, but a nonetheless common one.[6] The general attitude is clear from the mission statement of a member of a World Press Freedom Committee running seminars for post-Soviet newspapers in Eastern Europe: "We will describe how journalism is practiced in Great Britain and the United States. Bits and pieces you can use now; other pieces you can use as the economy grows, and with it a reason for advertising."[7] Advertising is blithely assumed as the future basis of the press that is newly free -- and thus presumably soon-to-be commercial.

Instead of accepting such assumptions, those who propose the U.S. news media as a model -- as the ideal of press freedom toward which the media of the former U.S.S.R. and its post-Communist satellites should strive -- should consider that this view might simply have the proposition backwards. Perhaps the U.S. media ought to be looking to the media of its old Communist nemesis for fresh ideas about its own reinvented future. The debates on the future of the Soviet press suggest what authentic journalistic independence might mean. Similarly, they offer a framework in which the American ideal of "objectivity" might be reconstructed to give meaning to the myth -- to reinvigorate the empty rituals[8] to which objective reporting has been reduced today as an "unfortunately dim silhouette of journalism's foremost practice."[9] Not only Soviet history, but the ancient heritage of Russian history and culture as well, offer the outlines of an alternative vision for the potential of its modern news media. Removed from a context of repression, the post-Soviet press of the former U.S.S.R. could define a new standard for the role of a free press in a democratic and broadly participatory society.

--STRUCTURING THE DEBATE--

Finding answers about what the Soviet press is becoming starts with looking at journalists' conversations among themselves. This review relies primarily on the Daily Reports of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service and the Joint Publication Research Service, covering all national and major regional mass-audience newspapers, state broadcasting, TASS, and providing texts of interviews that appear in the international press. These were reviewed for all of 1991 through June 1992, along with issues of Current Digest of the Soviet Press, a similar media-in-translation overview, back to early 1989. These reports are authoritative standard references and provide a comprehensive representation of what is being said in Moscow and St. Petersburg, the focus of this study of the nationally distributed (formerly all-Union) press. Expanding on these verbatim translations and summaries of news stories, numerous journalists who spent their careers under the Soviet system have been publishing essays in journals ranging from the Democratic Journalist and Index on Censorship to Editor & Publisher and Columbia Journalism Review, supplementing news stories by Western observers in such publications as The Nation, The Economist, and The New York Times. More recent commentary as the economic crisis deepened can be compared to comments from an assemblage of prominent journalists and politicians interviewed by Cohen and vanden Heuvel in 1988 and 1989. Their compilation provides invaluable assessments of what glasnost meant to Soviet society in its earliest iteration. It is a bonus that the number of changes in editorial leadership of newspapers in Russia in the past several years has provided the occasion for in-depth interviews in which new editors outline their philosophy of the role of the press.

The result of such a review is to illuminate the hazards of superimposing U.S. media mythology on an utterly different reality. This analysis will focus on two central issues that have in the past year dominated commentary by journalists about the press in the emerging Russian democracy -- objectivity and independence -- in the context of a deepening economic crisis.

Concerning objectivity, the U.S. assumption that professional distance and "objective" reporting represent evolutionary "progress" that over time supersedes a polemical press is explored to show its inapplicability to the Russian historical context, in which such a development could be viewed as an abdication of professional responsibility. While Western critics, including working journalists, have often charged that the U.S. standard of objectivity masks a hidden framework which implicitly supports the status quo, the impression that objectivity exists or should at least be assiduously pursued seems nonetheless to persist as a professional norm. This supposedly value-neutral ideal of journalism is contrasted with the Russian disposition to make an overarching point of view explicit. Journalists in the former Soviet Union tend to answer a question the U.S. press doesn't even ask: objectivity from what perspective? The phenomenon of glasnost also is reviewed in an historical context that challenges the common Western misperception equating its emergence with "press freedom." Changing media content in the Soviet Union did not necessarily signal a concomitant change in the underlying operating philosophy.

Concerning independence, the post-Soviet recognition that economic and ownership questions are as significant to journalistic independence as freedom from state control is considered as a question of whether the birth of "market" forces signals the end of the short life of a diverse and independent press in Russia. The decisions now being made about the role of the state as a guarantor of press diversity, as well as different concepts of professional responsibility among journalists, are critical for the future of the post-Soviet media. As evident in the apparent differential treatment accorded "friendly" versus "opposition" newspapers, the new democratic state already seems willing to make political use of its continuing control over newsprint prices and supply in rewarding its friends and starving its enemies; while the emergence of commercialism has created not only competition in the free marketplace of ideas, but also such dubious contributions to press diversity as a Russian version of sensationalized 'yellow journalism,' complete with soft-core pornography.[10]

Focusing on the often contradictory definitions of these two key words as the post-Soviet press reinvents press freedom calls attention to the need for reassessing the status of objectivity and independence in the U.S. media. Liberal democratic journalists feeling their new power in Russia seem to accept American mythology as an unexamined assumption -- but at the same time are subtly redefining the central tenets of U.S. journalism on their own terms.

--OBJECTIVITY FROM WHAT PERSPECTIVE?--

On the surface, it appears that U.S. standards provide the post-Soviet referent. "Independent" and "objective" are favorite words. A statement by the collective of Mayak radio, the second all-union channel, shortly after the coup was defeated, declared that journalists have a "professional duty of imparting honest and objective information about the events in the country."[11] Also shortly after the coup, Yegor Yakovlev, as the new head of the All-Union Television and Radio Company (and the former editor of the weekly newspaper Moscow News, often called the "flagship of glasnost"[12]) told an interviewer: "The main thing is objectivity, to provide the news objectively is so essential." In response to a question on what he thought should happen to Pravda, Yakovlev said its reconfiguration should be "the same as for television: to be concerned in every way possible with news objectivity."[13]

But most Soviet references to the primacy of "objectivity" as a goal in the reinvented news media almost always come with a caveat:

-- The post-coup director of TASS stated that objectivity is "the prime and main demand of any news agency," but at the same time said past criticism of TASS is legitimate because it "*failed to carry out the progressive, democratic role which our public -- in the tumult of perestroika processes -- expected from it.*"[14]

-- Rabochaya Tribuna, formerly the organ of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, has re-registered under the auspices of the Russian trade unions federation and claims it will "gain genuine independence and become a mouthpiece of impartial information" but at the same time be "*a sharp weapon of independent trade unions.*"[15]

-- The newly re-registered agri-business oriented newspaper Selskaya Zhizn says it will from now on "objectively report on processes in the agro-industrial complex of the country" and at the same time "*stubbornly protect and defend the interests of the peasantry and all who live and work in the countryside.*"[16]

Clearly, journalists in Russia do not use the term "objectivity" as Americans do. For the U.S. news media, objectivity is journalism's presumed prime directive. But dedication to this ideal represents more of a shared belief system than the reality of what is achieved daily in the newsroom. The pursuit of objectivity was described by Gaye Tuchman twenty years ago as the journalist's self-protective "strategic ritual."[17] Journalists are able to believe they are keeping their values out of the news by relying on "facts" gathered from standard sources who reinforce each other's quotes -- or who are selected to establish a simplistic pro-and-con juxtaposition, creating an impression of objectivity because "both" sides are presented. This process of creating a "web of facticity"[18] ultimately conceals more than it reveals; the role of the journalist's values -- whether personal or organizational -- in selecting which sides and which sources to cover in a story is obscured as long as the rituals of objectivity are followed. In Schiller's words, "Lack of bias or news objectivity has been *attributed* to newspapers in American culture" leading to "the cultural configuration that permits readers to indulge their belief that bias indeed is present or absent."[19] What is most pernicious about the myth of objectivity is its role in creating an "invisible frame" that "masks the patterned structure."[20] Although the myth of value-free objectivity seems to continue unabated, at its core, "the objective posture is just another point of view."[21]

Contradictory post-Soviet definitions of "objectivity" may suffer from the same sort of fuzziness as the U.S. notion. But fundamentally, they achieve a greater degree of candor in recognizing that "all news is views."[22] Soviet journalists did not, and still do not expect the frame to be invisible. Their historical conception of the role of the media in society flows from a propaganda model; their central question is what views are the correct ones to disseminate. They do not share the understanding of propaganda as a pejorative term that has developed in modern Western history. Propaganda does not mean lying or deceiving on its face, although Soviet history is certainly filled with the impact of the totalitarian extension of distortion and omission into information control. But with those negative elements removed, post-Soviet journalists accept the role of the media to act as a propagandist under the broad definition, "the attempt to transmit social and political values in the hope of affecting people's thinking, emotions, and thereby behavior."[23] With this in mind, Gaunt has suggested that work of the Soviet journalist was more appropriately compared to a corporate public relations department.[24]

--ROOTS OF THE PROPAGANDA MODEL--

To understand how this conception of the media's role in society emerged requires understanding the historical tradition in which Soviet journalists have been trained and under which they have worked -- a comprehensive indoctrination from which is difficult to disassociate entirely. No matter how liberal or democratic or dissident they may be, every journalist in the former U.S.S.R. today is the product of Soviet society and its Marxist-Leninist presumptions and training.

On the surface, it would appear that the critical historical tradition began 75 years ago, with the triumph of the Bolshevik coup of October 1917 and a Leninist interpretation of Marxism as its founding philosophy. The press was fundamental to the establishment of Soviet authority in what Kenez has called the first "propaganda state,"[25] based on instrumental use of the press. An activist role for the press in social construction was inexorably embedded in the nature of the new political system. The new paradigm reflected an ideology that "unmasked" Western Enlightenment-based assumptions about the role of a free press in society. In Lenin's definition, "Freedom of the press of a bourgeois society consists in freedom of the rich systematically, unceasingly and daily in the millions of copies to deceive, corrupt and fool the exploited and oppressed masses of the people."[26] The role of a free press in Lenin's view was to speak for the people (as Marxism defined their best interests) by telling "socialist truth" -- and only socialist truth.[27] It is no accident that the Bolshevik newspaper he founded was named Pravda -- "truth" in Russian.

The creation of a newspaper by Lenin was originally viewed as the fundamental building block of a revolutionary party, and later as the method for building a "new Soviet man." In the construction of a new society, the press was expected to openly acknowledge its allegiance to a specific form of government and promote its progress along the road to the Communist utopia. Both Ehrenberg and Resis have looked separately at different aspects of the enormous early influence of Lenin, providing helpful additions to analysis and context for Lenin's own extensive writings on the press; as Ehrenberg puts it, "The press stands at the very center of the whole *corpus* of Leninism."[28] The Washington correspondent of Izvestiya unabashedly proclaimed in a 1935 article written expressly for an American audience that the press is "intimately connected with the construction of a Socialist society."[29]

However, one of the enduring debates in Soviet social and political history has been how much of the character of the Communist system that evolved in the U.S.S.R. was "Soviet," growing out of Lenin's interpretation of Marxism, and how much of was indigenous to Russia, and therefore "authentic" to the pre-revolutionary national culture. The question is further subdivided by whether the totalitarian state was inherent in Leninism; an inevitable outcome of Marxism; or a corruption by Stalin. Several alternative political visions existed after Lenin's death in the years leading up to Stalin's consolidation of absolute power, alternatives under which a repressive totalitarian state could presumably not have been the result.[30] In much of the debate, the roots of a position often seem to be based more on an author's politics than an outcome of reasoned opinion -- as "prosecution" of history rather than illumination of it.[31] Some prominent dissident Russian authors, most notably Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, see a glorious Russian past as having been corrupted by Communist rule;[32] others, such as Roy Medvedev, believe the Soviet state was Stalin's corruption of a democratic vision under Leninism.[33]

This paper argues that Russian cultural roots and historical tradition have had an impact as strong as any vestiges of Communist ideology not only on society, but specifically in giving the Soviet press its operative philosophy that continues to this day -- as an active participant in social creation. This inherent tradition, as reinforced by Lenin's explicit view on the role of the press, leads the post-Soviet media in a direction distinctly different from the U.S. model, where the commercialization of the newspaper press was considered a progressive development.

The evolution of early U.S. newspapers away from a polemical press is commonly viewed as part of a linear development "governed by a self-explanatory evolutionary dynamic."[34] This evolution was clearly outlined by Walter Lippmann in 1931 as a series of "epochs" characterized first by a government monopoly, followed by control by political parties, followed by "independence," which he defined as a commercial orientation in which "newspapers became politically independent of government and party."[35] Lippmann characterized the final epoch as being in sight in 1931: the emergence of a "professional" press practicing "the new objective journalism."[36] Although Nerone has convincingly challenged the concept that a partisanship model is sufficiently descriptive of American newspapers before the 1830s,[37] he notes that this understanding of the how the penny press "replaced" the partisan press and thereby revolutionized journalism, is "perhaps the single most persistent characterization"[38] of American newspaper history. Schudson, although he disagrees with the assumption of "inevitability[39]" in the evolutionary model, describes a Lippmannesque "natural history" as "what would most probably be the standard explanation of the history of American journalism."[40] In this paradigm, the polemical tone of the current post-Soviet press is viewed as natural "phase" which it presumably will outgrow as it achieves the "higher" journalistic level of an objective stance, after acquiring commercial characteristics along the way. Just as "modernization theorists ascribe ideology to an identity-seeking stage in the development of a political system equivalent to that of adolescence in the development of the individual,"[41] so too, in the realm of journalism, "objectivity itself is credited with having a distinctively evolutionary character, as it matured in tandem with the gradual passing of 'the dark ages of partisan journalism.'"[42]

But it is significant that the rise of commercialism as exemplified in the penny press is so inexorably linked to the origins of the U.S. myth of objectivity. As newspapers "were turned into consumer products to be sold for profit in the marketplace along with the other new products of the industrial revolution,"[43] the construction of a norm of objectivity "was the fundamental contribution of a thoroughly commercial newspaper press."[44] If "objectivity" as defined in the U.S. is rooted in commerce, and the post-Soviet press finds ways to evolve without the commercial imperative, there is no reason to expect "linear development" along the same supposed continuum. The evolving role of the new media being created on the rubble of the Soviet system must be understood on its own terms, not by superimposing Western or, more specifically, American definitions on an utterly different context. The development of the post-Soviet understanding of "objectivity" and a new perception of the role of the media in society has its own internal dynamic, both historically and in light of current events.

These historical roots pre-date Lenin and can be traced back to the expressly educational purpose of the earliest Russian newspapers. Brooks' account of the development and spread of literacy in Russia finds education as directed from central authority a prevalent theme from the earliest days of print development. While his research has focused on popular literature, his mass culture perspective[45] offers a different and valuable emphasis on how the press was used by the Bolsheviks as a means to create a generally literate public in addition to disseminating ideology: "The press served as a primer, and the inspirational sphere of the mass newspapers contained explanations and texts for study."[46] Jensen and Bayley found similarities in the rise of a Russian commercial press in the 18th century to contemporaneous Western newspaper development, but at the same time identified deep-rooted differences, suggesting that the potential existed for a different development line from the expanding commercial nature of the newspapers of the West. Periodicals that acted as educators and "social conscience" were a long-established tradition. "The Bolshevik Revolution did not alter the basic character of the Russian press," which had grown out of "an originally official policy of public enlightenment"[47] that they date to the first Russian newspaper, published (and personally proofread by) Peter the Great beginning in 1703.[48]

In a reversal of the U.S. pattern, the specifically political press in Russia developed only *after* the emergence of a mass-circulation press, as McReynolds has described. It was not until 1905 that political parties were legalized, following the revolution that forced the tsar to establish a Russian parliament, the Duma, and parties began to publish newspapers to reach newly enfranchised voters.[49] In reviewing the Leninist roots of Soviet views of the press, Mickiewicz distinguishes between Lenin's definitions of the complex theoretical content of propaganda aimed at "small numbers of 'politically literate' individuals" while simplified agitation messages were "directed to a mass audience,"[50] but both continued the tsarist tradition of using newspapers to serve a specific educational function; the propaganda/agitation distinction was lost under later Soviet rule as the mass audience became more literate and the propaganda machine more sophisticated, but the educational purpose inherent in the tsarist view of the press was maintained.[51]

The source of Gorbachev's glasnost also is found under the tsars. Use of the term and the concept dates to Tsar Nicholas I in the mid-19th century, and represents a tradition of "permitted dissent" that was continued under all Soviet rulers before Gorbachev. These linkages to the Russian and Soviet past are explored most usefully by Gross[52] and Woll.[53] Spechler's analysis of the Russian concept of permitted dissent from the death of Stalin through the Brezhnev years adds a helpful theoretical framework as well as lucid example (although her focus is on a journal of literature and culture rather than Soviet newspapers) of how this "within-system opposition" ebbed and flowed and evolved during various periods.[54] Ruud's documentation of imperial censorship in the 19th century emphasizes the growth of independent authority among publishers and claims that the early private press in Russia was "much freer than Westerners today generally realize."[55]

Much of the outcome of a historical review beginning with the press under the tsars is to see that however much things appeared to change, they also stayed very much the same under Soviet rule. (Even the tradition of samizdat, or an underground press, dates to the seventeenth century, when seditious letters were nailed to a post in villages or read aloud to illiterates to incite revolts.[56]) The centralized top-down imperial censorship, ended by the Provisional Government when Tsar Nicholas II was overthrown in February 1917, was reimposed and even broadened six months later by the Bolsheviks after their successful October coup.[57] Although Hopkins attempts to distinguish "three concepts" of the press under Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev, the distinctions he makes are in the end superficial. The purpose of the media was unchanged throughout the timeframe he covers, with top-down, paternalistic control maintained even under the most liberal of the troika, Khrushchev, as Hopkins himself notes.[58] Mills documents changes in the press under Brezhnev and finds more focus on "facts," but sets this up in comparison to an assumed existence of "objectivity" in the American press. His conclusion stops short of examining what the presumption of objectivity means, which substantially undermines the core of the argument.[59]

McNair takes a theoretically more complex view, recognizing that observed change in the Soviet media, even under Khrushchev's "thaw," did not alter the basic relationship between the media, the party and the state.[60] As he notes, change was in the *type* of discussion that was permitted. Gorbachev's glasnost meant a similar change in the type, and certainly in the extent of criticism, but this was still in the context of "permitted dissent." Emphasizing Gorbachev's frequent references to precedents for glasnost under Lenin, McNair further concludes that glasnost was an attempt "to 'restore' and 'purify'...the 'revolutionary essence' of Soviet Marxism."[61]

This view of Gorbachev's motives represents a preponderance of opinion among political scientists and analysts as well as mass communication specialists. Remington, who examined the Soviet media as an instrument for spreading ideology in an important book-length work, takes a broader view in a recent article that goes beyond ideology.[62] He assesses Gorbachev's political and economic instrumental purpose in implementing glasnost and making it an essential element of democratization under perestroika. Although Soviet comments such as a TASS journalist's statement that "Freedom of speech is the basis and yardstick of true democracy"[63] became commonplace slogans, glasnost was never intended as a synonym for "press freedom" in the Western understanding of the term. Gorbachev gave the orders and the press carried them out, acting more as an affirmation that change had taken place than as an agent of change itself.[64] Remington and others have suggested that Gorbachev simply lost control of the change he had intended to direct from the top down[65] or, as the journalist Hedrick Smith puts it, the genie could not be put back in the bottle.[66]

Overall, most studies since the launching of glasnost in 1985-86 have been designed to document "change" by addressing the question of content specifically. But what they demonstrate is more that the *impression* of change in the Soviet media far exceeded the *actuality* of change. Even under glasnost, traditional Russian understandings of how the press and politics functioned together to affect society were still operative. Both Schillinger's study of two Moscow newspapers in 1989[67] and Zhou He's more recent, as well as more extensive content analysis, documented content change -- in timeliness, in negative news, in human interest stories.[68] But the conclusion that "change" had occurred in the Soviet press overlooks the more fundamental fact that the purpose of the press had not changed at all. The media response to glasnost was in keeping with orders from the top, when they were directed to express a "democratic" point of view, to actively promote perestroika and to root out its enemies. In following these directives, it is not at all clear that Soviet journalists considered this in conflict with press freedom. Even today, when post-Soviet journalists speak of objectivity, they are implicitly assuming a point of view.

With the propagation of an express viewpoint as the basis, the question for the news media becomes simply one of what views are to be propagandized, in the post-Soviet context of a new concern for honesty. With this in mind, state television director Yegor Yakovlev has announced plans to create a Council of Guarantors as a sort of "supreme court of information" to "protect society from airborne falsehoods."[69] "Authoritative and respected" private citizens will verify the authenticity of statements made on television.[70] Post-Soviet journalists believe there should be no lies -- but not that there should be "no views." Even the deeply liberal politician Aleksandr Yakovlev, known as the "architect of glasnost" as an early member of Gorbachev's original inner circle,[71] in introducing a new, post-coup head of TASS to the press, off-handedly discussed how work collectives should use democratic methods in selecting a "tendency" for a newspaper. The key point is the casual assumption that a "tendency" is something a newspaper ought to have.[72]

--THE PRESS AS SOCIAL ACTIVIST--

The societal role of the press envisioned by Russian journalists today remains as far-reaching as when Lenin expected the press to play an active part in the transformation of society, as his famous 1901 definition made plain: "A newspaper is not only a collective propagandist and a collective agitator, it is also a collective organizer."[73]

Two weeks after the coup attempt, Yegor Yakovlev of state television and radio stated, "Now that...the union is in danger of falling apart, radio and television are among the few instruments still capable of keeping it together."[74] He clearly had a sweeping political goal in mind -- although events of the following months showed that his hopes for television to save the union were misplaced. The Russian minister of information, following the coup, assigned the media an equally grand role in the future: to "be a guarantor of freedom that would prevent any putsch."[75] The goals expressed by Rabochaya Tribuna in its post-coup registration were typical of the idealistic and instrumental declarations made in newspaper program statements: it will henceforth be "a truly all-people's forum for the social protection of the working people and furtherance and advocacy of the civil rights and freedoms of each person and each collective."[76]

Protecting rights and freedoms, of course, has importance in U.S. journalism history in its linkage to democracy and the First Amendment, with an implicit assumption that the role of a watchdog press is the guarantor of all other freedoms. Expression of this role emerged rather dramatically in the history of the penny press, when the muckraking American press of the 19th century "spoke for the teeming masses and began to champion the people's causes."[77] Newspaper "crusades" that emerged as a journalistic form during the Jacksonian Era were designed to improve city life and reform government abuses, although Schudson also makes explicit the connection between these higher goals and how the crusades were "linked to the possibilities the stories afforded each of the papers for self-promotion."[78]

The Soviet press has had its own muckraking tradition in which it was expected to function as something of a watchdog. Newspapers regularly attacked slackers, corruption, or instances of abuse of privileges, often in orchestrated national campaigns reflecting directives from centralized state authority; but also in response to authentic complaints from ordinary citizens. "Letters to the Editor" were a major part of the role of the press,[79] in which ordinary people could make complaints heard and receive answers or solutions -- along the lines of "consumer hotline" columns in U.S. newspapers. But the complaints addressed were always in a context of "permitted dissent," attacking specific problems that kept the system from working, but never challenging the system itself.

This context is notably similar to the underlying nature of the crusades of the early U.S. newspapers. The muckrakers were "a rather conservative bunch....they did seek changes of various sorts and in various degrees -- but, with minor exceptions, they wanted to conserve capitalism and private incentive."[80] In Schiller's view, both the "conventional cultural forms" of objectivity and the muckrakers' claims that they defended "natural rights" of citizens in reality "lent support to the state as well as to developing capitalist social relations."[81] As in the Soviet press, "While chastising particular abuses, the commercial U.S. newspaper consistently supported the state itself."[82] This remained true even in a more contemporary context of the advocacy or "new" journalism of the 1960s that arose in reaction to dissatisfaction with the "hidden" tenets of objectivity (particularly in reporting on Vietnam[83]). U.S. investigative journalists of today may believe fervently in the importance of expressing an advocacy point of view in exposing abuses, but still work primarily within the system itself and, incongruently, accept the existence of a strict demarcation between objective fact and opinion. As members of a subset of American journalism reserved for a special reporting elite, investigative reporters still consider "objectivity" the most fundamental lesson a young reporter must learn."[84] This artificial separation of supposedly "objective" reporting from "advocacy" results in investigating and exposing "bad apples" in the existing structures of government or business, while leaving the basic system generally unexamined. Under Soviet rule and continuing into the emerging post-Soviet press, the role of newspapers in defining and supporting a *system* is made explicit -- a fundamentally more candid approach than assuming that the posture of objectivity is by its nature value-free.

The particular system that most of the post-Soviet media generally seek to promote today is democracy. "We wholeheartedly wish the leadership of Russia and of other republics success," says the editor of Moscow News. "But, alas, unfortunately, in this leadership, too, shortcomings and omissions will undoubtedly be found.... We need to adopt a new opposition point of view... *on the platform of general accord with the aims of democracy.*"[85] But there also are elements of the post-Soviet press, reflecting the differences in society as a whole, that seek to promote other priorities: law and order; Russian nationalism with an anti-Semitic and xenophobic undertone; even a revival of the cult of-Stalinism.[86] A new radio station is dedicated to expressing the "holy patriotic experience" of Russia's past.[87] The editor of the U.S.S.R. Union of Writers' newspaper, Den, has charged that "freedom of the press is concentrated in the hands of narrow intellectual political groups... I mean democrats, representatives of the liberal intelligentsia."[88] He is one of a significant number of "law and order" conservatives who want a return to "true" Marxism; Den in fact has been accused of serving as the mouthpiece of the organizers of the August putsch in the weeks leading up to the coup attempt.[89] This tendency to declare support for various overarching political ideological systems includes support for a rebirth of the Communism, this time as a democratic party.

Pravda, the historic press organ of the Communist Party, "temporarily" suspended publication[90] on March 13, and when it resumed three weeks later, it was three times a week at four pages -- half its former frequency and size.[91] It may not survive the current realignments in political support from the top and access to subsidies and distribution networks. Rising costs may end its intention to re-live the role it played at the turn of the century, when Lenin used the newspaper as the organizing base for his Bolshevik revolutionary party. But the goals expressed in a Pravda political column are exemplary of the potential importance assigned to newspapers in Russian society: "What is needed is a central point for the practical exertion of effort and for cohesion.... I believe...Pravda could play this role. It can become a fulcrum for the party's revival and, essentially, for the creation of a new party."[92] A letter to the editor appealed to "democratic" Communists: "In line with its historic purpose, Pravda could and should help these people to find one another, rally them...."[93]

Expressing cynicism at the concept of the press as a "fourth estate," Pravda claims its role remains the same as in the past: "Those who work on our newspaper do not believe in the primitive tale of a fourth power, so they are prepared to serve rather than rule. Only they will not serve party leaders as before, but the cause of bringing prosperity to our country and its citizens."[94]

Whether Pravda and its colleagues in opposition, including (most prominently) Den, Sovetskaya Rossiya, Glasnost, and Rabochaya Tribuna,[95] will be given the opportunity to continue to promote a position philosophically critical of the current administration remains to be seen. It may depend on the government's commitment to the subsidies that currently are critical to maintaining press diversity as much it depends on the exigencies of the "market," which remains partially state-controlled and in which all newspapers are struggling with huge increases in newsprint and distribution prices. "The jingle of silver coins at the journalists' charity ball should hardly be interpreted as a hymn to freedom of the press," Pravda has charged. "Glance at the list in the mayor's office, and you will see for yourself that, as a rule, the handouts are given to those who are submissive and ready to oblige."[96]

While taking into consideration the self-serving agenda in such accusations, there is evidence of some truth in Pravda's charges of political favoritism (as well as favor-currying among its democratic press rivals). Even among new leaders philosophically committed to democratic pluralism, the instinct to try to control any media with a viewpoint different from their own has not been easy to avoid. Pravda was being shut out well before its financial difficulties reached the crisis stage. When Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his minister of the press and information called a briefing for selected newspapers after Yeltsin's return from his February visit to the U.S., Britain and Canada, they pointedly omitted an invitation to Pravda and what Pravda called other "undesirable" publications in a published complaint about their exclusion.[97] More dramatically -- and echoing its revolutionary past, when it was closed 13 times under the tsars and the short-lived Provisional Government of 1917[98] -- Pravda was among the newspapers shut down when, in one of his first acts in the heady days after the coup was overturned, Yeltsin banned several newspapers that had either appeared to support the coup or failed to take a strong enough stand against it. It should be noted, however, that within a week, the ban was lifted and the half-dozen affected newspapers had reorganized, generally with their labor collectives as founders, and declared their intention to continue publishing as independent newspapers.[99] Significantly, just as Pravda was able to publish its complaint about its snub by the president in the current media climate, the banning order also was challenged even by journalists who share the new Russian administration's distaste for Pravda's politics:

"Initially, I gloated: it serves them right!" confessed Pavel Gutiontov, secretary of what was then the U.S.S.R. Journalists Union. "But the closure of a newspaper -- even on the most noble pretext -- is pernicious."[100] The Union also issued a statement that "the question of closing down any publication, regardless of its party orientation, can only be done according to a procedure laid down by law"[101] and the workers collective of Mayak radio network broadcast their opposition: "One of the most important lessons of the putsch is that freedom of speech must be guaranteed."[102]

--INDEPENDENT FROM WHAT?--

While the potential power of the state to silence "undesirable" newspapers represents a continued risk, at the same time it seems logical to many Russians to place the state in charge of monitoring press freedom. Less than a month after the coup, the Russian Press Ministry -- a government agency -- had formed a "state inspectorate for the protection of press freedom."[103] The U.S. understanding of "independence" as meaning, above all, freedom from government ties is not as hallowed in the former U.S.S.R. Many believe the government *ought* to intervene where necessary as a logical guarantor of independence -- particularly in an economic context.

"My aim is to transform television during the transitional stage to make it independent from politicians and presidents, from the economic viewpoint, too," Y. Yakovlev told an interviewer a month after the coup.[104] At a post-coup conference of the U.S.S.R. Union of Journalists, economic independence was described as "necessary above all" to guarantee press freedom, for as one speaker noted, "There is no freedom without funds."[105] This is perhaps an outgrowth of their Marxist, and therefore economically grounded, theoretical orientation, but the state was considered a potential ally in achieving freedom in a Council of the Journalists's Union statement issued in June 1991, well before the shock of the coup ended Communist rule: "Only the state can protect subscribers and ensure their legitimate right to information." The Council recommended that the Supreme Soviet adopt laws and undertake "the creation of state funds to support noncommercial publications and of sources of finance."[106]

The decision to embark on a rapid transition to a market economy has moved such questions about the appropriateness of state subsidies beyond philosophical debates and made it fundamental to many newspapers' survival. As noted in a television report on increased subscription prices (which was announced for all newspapers and journals on the same day, a continuing vestige of the centralization of all things): "In a word, glasnost is becoming more expensive every day."[107] The legalization of private ownership has allowed foreign conglomerates to enter the market competition, especially in Eastern Europe, and a few wealthy entrepreneurs have registered as newspaper founders in the former Soviet Union, both developments that raise concerns about how the press will be used by the new owners. The new publisher of Sovetskaya Rossiya, who made his fortune repairing and installing computer equipment, candidly admitted to being a future presidential candidate when he assumed ownership of the newspaper.[108]

But the "market" forces ostensibly being allowed to operate in the new Commonwealth of Independent States are not a market any Western capitalist would recognize. The hybrid of state control of some prices and "free market pass-alongs"[109] of others has spurred skyrocketing prices. Newsprint costs at Russia's largest newspaper, Komsomalskaya Pravda, rose in the past year from 300 rubles per ton to 13,000 rubles[110]; while the state Ministry of Communication unilaterally raised prices for distribution of periodicals by 400 percent.[111] Newspapers have cut back from daily publication schedules and many have closed, seemingly unaffected by Yeltsin's February 20 decree declaring newsprint manufacturing and other printing-related concerns as "monopoly enterprises," setting controls on their prices and also providing subsidies for the press and book printing.[112] Within two weeks of its promulgation, the president of the Russian Paper Exchange was predicting the decree would be "unfulfilled," declaring that, "It is easier for us to stop production than to operate at a loss," and blaming a lack of timber for the price rises -- a problem he says requires state aid to solve.[113] Promises of press subsidies did not prevent the closure of Pravda within a month of the decree, even if only "temporarily." Now heavily in debt, Pravda's editor claims to be losing a million rubles with every issue.[114]

Not that exceptions to the financing crisis do not exist. The re-born Izvestiya, having declared its independent stance after the coup, appeared to embrace the commercial imperative in a play on Lenin's words: "We must get accustomed to the idea that a newspaper is not a collective organizer or a collective agitator, much less a collective propagandist, but a commercial venture providing the population -- or, more accurately, various social and class strata -- with a service."[115] The former flagship newspaper of the Soviet government became the first major daily newspaper to introduce advertising and has adopted a variety of reforms, including entering a joint venture to publish a Russian-English newspaper with the American Hearst Corporation.[116]

Despite the example of Izvestia's apparent success with this formula, the tendency is for post-Soviet commentary to be stated in terms of wanting to avoid commercialism and worrying that financial imperatives will make it impossible to resist. "We are against our society's becoming...a voluntary captive in the trap of commercialist consumerism that promises the luxurious life of alien, all-pervasive advertising," proclaimed a former Communist Party leader, articulating a message that appeals both to the unreconstructed left and a new ultra-nationalist right in Russia.[117] Even among liberals, there is sincere questioning of the wisdom of adopting the commercial model -- of trading one form of control for another. As Vaclav Havel, former President of Czechoslovakia, said to an East-West Conference of journalists sponsored in Prague by the Nieman Foundation last summer, he saw no advantage in exchanging the restrictions on independence created by "the tension between a political party and its press" for a new kind of limitation that could be caused by "tension between millionaires and journalists."[118]

The greatest danger may be less from the implied risks of inappropriate editorial interference by powerful owners than from what Colin Sparks has described as the "powerful factors in the production of newspapers that lead the market to monopolization as a matter of course,"[119] and the concomitant dissipation of the democratic function of the press as a critical source of public information. Many post-Soviet journalists are seeking models other than the commercial U.S. system to guarantee true press independence, including freedom from both government and excessive commercial pressures. Yet even Sweden, the much-touted example of a successful subsidized press, is being drawn into an increasingly commercialized press system.

Sweden "seems to be drifting away from its traditional political context"[120] with the decline of the Social Democratic political consensus and rise of Conservative party leaders who have traditionally opposed government subsidies to the press. The new political leadership favors allowing the primacy of market forces in measuring newspapers' success, despite the loss of diversity that results as larger newspapers buy out smaller ones unable to sustain themselves economically without assistance. On the positive side, however, the subsidized Swedish press has been generally free of the perception of government control of its content.

Similar trends have been observed in the history and current tendencies toward increased importance of market forces in the subsidized press of Finland, Norway and Denmark (Iceland does not have a system of direct press subsidies).[121] The current situation suggests caution in using the Nordic nations as a financial model of anything but the seemingly inexorably progress of Spark's paradigm of the natural monopolistic tendencies of newspaper economics. But the Scandinavian nations do offer evidence that a press might remain *politically* free, despite accepting government subsidies.

The key to avoiding government control may lie in the political strength and legitimacy of the journalists themselves. "The strongest defense against both state and owners has always been the independent organization of those who work in the press, both journalists and production workers," as Sparks noted in a recent defense of how subsidies might work as the potential salvation of a diverse press serving democratic public life in the post-Soviet Eastern European nations.[122] Indeed, in Sweden, 95 percent of journalists are organized in labor unions and are "very active regarding press policy and abuses of power by newspaper owners."[123] Acting as an interest group and championing their professional identification with serving a public purpose, journalists may have slowed -- although they have not halted -- the progress of what the Norwegian Association of Journalists called "neo-commercial journalism" when they proclaimed that they are "in the first instance responsible to the public."[124]

In the spirit of the old saying that "freedom of the press belongs to those who own one," Russian journalists themselves have sought control of production capacity. Pravda's journalists made their appeal (so far unsuccessfully) on the Marxist basis that "every collective is entitled to property that has been created and multiplied by his or her labor," warning that privatizing the ownership of technical capacity could lead to "a new press monopoly tomorrow."[125] The labor collective of Moskovskaya Pravda Publishing House used a similar logic in its demand that "the basic funds, building and equipment be transferred to the ownership of the labor collective."[126] Labor collectives frequently appeared as founders registering newspapers after the coup (along with government councils, political parties, and professional unions), including at the failing *Pravda*[127] and the thriving *Izvestiya*, which also voted to dismiss its prior editor-in-chief for collaboration with the coup.[128] A favored form of "private" financing is the open joint stock collective, in which the journalists share ownership. Journalists also are seeing expansion of their rights as workers -- and their responsibilities as professionals. The charters of newspapers tend to provide for the election of editors, such as the "editorial collegium" elected after the coup by the staff of *Izvestiya*, whose decisions are binding on the chief editor with a three-quarters majority vote.[129] The staff at *Rabochaya Tribuna*, formerly the mouthpiece of the Communist Party's Central Committee, disbanded the board that had supported the coup before electing its own editor-in-chief.[130]

As an even earlier example of a new Soviet understanding of the role of the press, "independence" was extended to individual journalists' rights in the Law on the Press of 1990, which specifically stated that no journalist could be required to write against his or her convictions,[131] a principle reaffirmed in the Russian Press Law that became effective Feb. 6.[132] Individual journalists -- not just designated political columnists -- not only can express their own views, it is expected that they will. "TASS journalists have the right to give a personal evaluation of developments and society will only profit from this," says post-coup TASS director Ignatenko. This includes views "that might differ from the official position."[133] The chairman of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet made his expectations clear as early as February 1991 to a Congress of the Union of Journalists: "We are talking about the destiny of Soviet power and the Soviet system -- what kind of organs should our structures of authority be? Journalists must have a clear and precise position on these fundamental issues."[134]

As with Soviet statements about objectivity, however, journalistic "independence" comes with a caveat: "I would like journalists to have the maximum of rights," says Yegor Yakovlev, commenting on his goals as the new head of the state broadcasting company. "But I am most concerned about the problems of the moral responsibility of journalists.... We will work more on issues of moral responsibility than on the issue of independence, although the issue of journalistic independence is of course held dear."[135]

While president of Czechoslovakia, the one-time dissident writer Vaclav Havel put this concern succinctly when he told the Prague East-West Conference that "responsibility" needs to be considered an indivisible part of freedom[136] -- and ended up sparking a controversy with the Americans that tarnished Havel's reputation with the American media and led to a public apology from Havel's press secretary, Michael Zantovsky, along with Zantovsky's offer to resign after he suggested that journalists who violated the rules of responsibility should be jailed. But what was anathema to U.S. press seemed perfectly normal in the context of the post-Communist press, as Horvát and Rosen have concluded after witnessing the exchange. There is a wholly different understanding of the standing of journalists -- one group "supremely confident" and the other used to "meekness"[137] -- but it is most significant that the Soviet-bred journalists understood "the trouble that a lingering past might yet cause in their own countries,"[138] and accepted a professional obligation to avoid creating new problems in a fledgling democracy.

The Russian minister of the press and information, Vice Premier Mikhail Poltoranin, also has called for sanctions to promote "responsibility" in the press corps. "The general standards of the press depress many of us," he wrote in a speech intended for the Sixth Russian Congress of People's Deputies in April. "People are indignant about cases of disinformation, shamelessness, calls for violence, and its kind of maniacal attraction for demeaning human dignity. This is particularly typical of the so-called opposition publications... the cruder and more loutish their style, the more patriotic a newspaper they are considered to be.... Why has this chaos become possible? Because there are no norms establishing journalists' responsibilities." Legislation on criminal and administrative penalties, he noted, is essential to enforce responsibility, but "Legal backup for the Russian Supreme Soviet's reforms is still wanting in all spheres."[139]

An Izvestiya article has implied that "frenzied journalists" are the primary source of public fears of another coup, by reporting unsubstantiated claims about the support and supposed power bases of self-proclaimed neo-communists; and counseled that the media ought to take responsibility for calming rather than feeding such fears: "None of the top officials whose job it is to protect the state system has any facts or is expressing any serious fears about Bolshevik activity. The press and television, on the other hand, have sounded the alarm. Why exaggerate these yesterday's men? Why give them political weight?"[140]

Such a suggestion in a leading democratic newspaper points to a fundamental difference in the Russian and American philosophies of the press embedded in the different cultures. While similarities that have been found in the norms of day-to-day newsgathering routines[141] can lead to an erroneous impression of parallel roles, even under glasnost Soviet journalists were expected to "act as an extension of the party apparatus."[142] The news media have traditionally felt a responsibility for the functioning of the state in both societies. But where the U.S. press concept is that of a watchdog on the outside guarding the people against specific abuses, the Soviet concept has been that of an active lever of state power in support of broad social goals. As the now-infamous Havel episode showed, even the East European media -- which had a head start on the media of the U.S.S.R. in developing a post-Communist definition of itself -- retained a concept of professionalism in the transformation to a new society that accepted responsibility for supporting "something higher" than mere journalistic goals.[143]

--CONCLUSIONS--

The overall picture that emerges from the Russians' own lively and wide-ranging appraisal of their future direction is a clear recognition that news selection has an inherent point of view that ought to be acknowledged. This is linked with a broad definition of independence that recognizes the potential threat to freedom in private economic ownership as well as in government control, but so far seems to choose government involvement over loss of diversity. And it incorporates a philosophy of personal journalistic responsibility for building a new society. The issues being raised illuminate for the U.S. media an example of the road not taken.

The era in which the penny press arose and became the nexus of U.S. newspaper history also offered an alternative model of a pluralistic press. The penny press beginning to emerge had not achieved its commanding position when the U.S. press was described by Tocqueville as an ideal vehicle for democratic pluralism. As Nord has described this period, "It was a fleeting glimpse of what democratic journalism might have been in America -- but never was."[144] His study of the abolitionist newspaper of William Lloyd Garrison offers an illustration in an American context of how "personal, even fanatical, editorship was not inconsistent with the democratic function of journalism."[145] More than a propaganda organ for emancipation and individual rights, Garrison's Liberator also provided an open forum for discussion among "a community of reformers."[146] Such examples of pluralism in the press provided access to broad democratic participation -- a role in which "the press serves as the equivalent of the town meeting."[147] The commercialized penny press was "inherently inimical"[148] to this form of journalism; it eventually subsumed the public forum character of early American newspapers.

This concept of the press as a center for democratic pluralism is one that post-Soviet journalists appear to understand. Whether they can avoid the commercial imperative is more problematic. Changes underway in Russia include a commitment to a market economy -- and its concomitant requirement of building a consumer base, a fertile field for the growth of advertising. Foreign media conglomerates see a vast new arena for expansion, once the dust has settled and someone has decided exactly who is in charge of exactly what over there. Their interest is naturally in profits, not in social responsibility to the evolution of a new society.

But an essential difference between the post-Soviet media today and U.S. journalism at its critical turning point in American history is that the formerly Soviet media, now at its own critical turning point, have seen the future. They can observe what the commercial imperative has wrought -- from the worst excesses of sensationalism, to the more mundane dilemma of bland sameness, to the larger concern that is evident through its absence: the U.S.

press has by-and-large abdicated its pluralistic role as the conductor of vigorous debate over vital social issues. Post-Soviet journalists who see the role of the press as actively contributing to the public sphere have an operating model for what they do *not* want to become. The evolving debates about the kind of news media that will survive the current crisis in Russia provide a fresh vision that could define a new standard for the role of a free press in a democratic and broadly participatory society -- one that assumes citizens, not consumers, as its primary audience.

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GLOBAL TV NEWS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: CNN'S EXPANSION TO EGYPT

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ABSTRACT

Since 1983 when the Cable News Network (CNN) began an international service, global television news has spread to more than 125 countries. Today, both CNN and the BBC World Television Service are growing rapidly, serving as an information source for elites in government, business, and journalism, mostly in the industrialized world. At a much slower pace, global news networks are moving into developing countries trying to build an audience for their product at a price the market will bear. While the potential markets for such a service are huge, the obstacles to success are formidable. This paper is a case study of the efforts to bring the Cable News Network to a developing country in the middle east--the Arab Republic of Egypt.

This study examines the introduction of CNN to Egypt in 1991, first as a test signal available to all viewers during the Gulf War and secondly as an encrypted subscription service. It traces the development of Cable News Egypt (CNE), the Egyptian-controlled company founded to bring CNN to Egypt, and explains how the presence of CNE prompted changes in the format and journalistic standards of Egyptian television news.

GLOBAL TV NEWS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
CNN'S EXPANSION TO EGYPT

As television news increasingly crosses national boundaries, the effect of transnational communication on news institutions, news sources, and audiences becomes more important. When a broadcast news organization can reach audiences throughout the world, the impact can be particularly significant. Within the next decade, as many as four global news networks could become the world's primary broadcast information sources, eclipsing the power and prestige of major national networks. The emergence of these global electronic powers will have significant ramifications for the way news is gathered, transmitted, and received. They will also influence the behavior of the national and international institutions they cover.

Currently, global news networks are in their first phase of maturation, serving as an information source and "party line" for elites in government, business, and journalism. It is in this infant phase that global networks facilitate diplomatic contact by acting as conduits for the flow of high level information. Major international events such as the Tiananmen Square massacre, the fall of communism in eastern Europe, the Gulf War, the failed Soviet coup, and superpower summitry have provided ample evidence of how governments have used the global reach of the Cable News Network to communicate their messages to each other. Global news networks also link together elites in business and other fields where access to instantaneous information is at a premium.

Today, two established news networks, the Cable News Network (CNN), and the British Broadcasting Service World Service Television (BBC), have global reach. Together, these networks already reach, in at least a limited way, more than 125 countries of the world. In 1993, the Euronews service is scheduled to be launched serving eleven European countries. The purchase of UPI by the London-based Middle East Broadcasting Centre signals the possibility of a global network emerging from the Middle East.

A more interesting and challenging phase of global news broadcasting will occur when global news networks expand their reach beyond the elites to mass populations in developing countries. It is in this more mature phase that global networks will have their most profound impact, providing mass audiences with instantaneous access to breaking news.

Because this blizzard of information will come mostly from industrialized countries, charges of cultural imperialism will surely abound. Already, leaders worry about the breakdown of nationalism in a transnational communication environment. There is also the fear that global networks will change the entire broadcasting structure of the country, limiting the influence of government-controlled national channels.

In Greece and Pakistan, CNN is available via over-the-air television for all viewers to see. We can get an important glimpse of the impact global news networks might have on the world in the next century, especially in countries where viewers have previously had access to only one, government-controlled channel. In such environments, viewers are exposed not only to their first international signal but their first alternative to the national status quo.

This paper examines the impact of a global news network signal on a developing country--the Arab Republic of Egypt--where CNN was given for a limited time to all viewers. It will trace the development of the Cable News Network's expansion into Egypt, examine the formation, development, and economic viability of Cable News Egypt (CNE), explore the effect of CNE on television audiences in Egypt, and document how the arrival of CNE changed the standards of journalism on Egyptian television. The study will also provide a brief history of global journalism and the development of CNN International.

Information for this paper was collected mainly through a series of personal interviews in Cairo during 1991 and from articles published about CNE in the Egyptian and American trade press. Feasibility reports and proposals for CNE were made available to the authors by Abdullah Schleifer, Director of the Adham Center for Television Journalism at the American University in Cairo. Material in this paper attributed to Schleifer but not footnoted came from comments he made on a draft of the paper in June 1992.

Global News Background

While the trend towards global media has been growing throughout the twentieth century, particularly with wire services, magazines, and newspapers, the advent of global television in the 1980s rapidly accelerated that trend. As more countries opened their borders to imported signals, both news and entertainment, the issues associated with global media took on greater importance.

Communication satellite networks, however, were no panacea for worldwide distribution; economic, political, and cultural barriers were inhibitors to global growth. As with all new media penetrations, economies of scale, transmission spectrum limitations, high start-up capital requirements, and regulatory problems can impede development.[1] Direct broadcast satellite technology was expensive and difficult to sell to the consumer. The most attractive option was to market the signal to individual cable companies, hotels, and businesses, but this approach required negotiating individual marketing agreements with each entity in the global marketplace, a tedious prospect at best.

There was also the problem of global signals invading the turf of a country which had but one national signal. Only when privatization captivated Europe in the 1980s did the government-controlled national channels begin to yield ground to new outlets. The ripple effects of the European privatization were felt throughout the world as countries with single-channel broadcasting systems began to rethink their policies. This move towards privatization created a market for increased amounts of foreign programming, including global networks. Almost any nation that had multiplied its channel capacity was receiving a megadose of imported programming, mostly from the United States.

There was considerable uncertainty concerning who would control these global networks and whether they would lead to a monopolistic system in which few diverse voices were heard. As a consequence of the rush toward globalization, many smaller and less powerful nations worried that the growth of huge, global entities would be at their expense and to the peril of their ethnic and political pluralism.

Anthony Smith asked whether the globalization of media by a handful of giant purveyors was a move towards the end of the nationalist phase of world history and whether the anxiety over that trend was based on a "nostalgic, sentimentalized and patronizing view of popular culture":

> Such an anxiety is rooted in the belief that the world is losing its logic of indigenousness and therefore a kind of authenticity; that, where our hope was that the media would act as a means of reconciliation, they are turning into instruments of homogenization; and that technology will, in the forms it has actually taken, deprive us of a home under the pretense of giving us a larger one.[2]

In the debate concerning global media, there is the inherent notion of a seamless network signal blanketing every household in the world simultaneously. Yet, the state of global media leaves us far short of that reality. In this infant stage of international media, the greatest challenge now is how to forge the structural links to make them operable according to what is "technologically possible and industrially congenial."[3] Global media are spreading city by city, country by country and facing significant impediments along the way.

The Competitive International Environment

By the 1980s, the world had developed a ravenous appetite for television programming of all kinds, including news and information. Into that void stepped Ted Turner who took his fledgling Cable News Network international in 1983. What began as a lease of its signal to a broadcaster in one country and the carriage of CNN by a few hotels in another led to a worldwide empire in less than a decade.

Analysts believe that by the year 2000, CNN International will have eclipsed its parent service in both revenue and viewership, becoming the crown jewel of the Turner empire.[4] CNNI posted its first profits in 1991 and is preparing an ambitious four-pronged effort to keep its domination of global news broadcasting. CNNI has announced plans to expand its internationally-oriented programming, upgrade its satellite carriage, expand its newsgathering capabilities, and reorganize its sales force.[5]

With CNN, the era of the global news networks had begun. Rupert Murdoch's SKYNews channel was launched during the late eighties, but the service had a small subscriber base limited to the United Kingdom and Europe. The strongest competitor to CNN appeared in November 1991 when the British Broadcasting Corporation launched its 24-hour service in Asia. The BBC had previously run a limited European service, but the Asian initiative made it a full-fledged competitor to CNN. Rather than investing its own money in a distribution and marketing service, the BBC contracted with STAR-TV, a direct satellite broadcasting service originating in Hong Kong that also offered music, entertainment, and sports channels.[6] The BBC's alliance with STAR-TV had the dual advantage of giving the BBC instant exposure throughout Asia and avoiding any capital risk. In its first year of operation, STAR-TV had a circulation of 500,000 homes.[7] By 1992, the BBC World Service had expanded its reach to Africa through an arrangement with a South African-based Pay-TV operator, part of the M-Net group,[8] and to Japan with Nissho Iwai as a partner.[9]

The European Community was scheduled to launch its own news network called Euronews in 1993. Euronews will be headquartered in Lyons, France and be supported by broadcasters from France, Italy, Germany, Spain, Belgium, Greece, Finland, Monaco, Yugoslavia, and Egypt. The European Community will provide a quarter of the budget with the balance coming from advertising and sponsorships.[10]

In June, 1992, The Middle East Broadcasting Center (MBC), based in London, purchased UPI for \$3.95 million.[11] It was widely speculated that MBC would use the resources of UPI to strengthen its newsgathering capability as the forerunner for a global television news channel.

Japan's NHK proposed an ambitious global news network in 1990 as a consortium with a European and American partner, but that idea died when NHK's Chairman who promoted the idea became involved in a personal scandal and resigned in 1991. Other efforts at global news broadcasting included a spanish language service called Galavision owned by the Mexican network Televisa and a German-owned 24-hour news network.

Although the audiences were quite small and heavily skewed towards a high socio-economic group of elites, competitors saw visions of a vast untapped international market. The rest of the world's broadcasters were not going to cede world leadership to Ted Turner and his CNN band. An age was beginning where the transcendence of sacred national boundaries to carry global information would become an ordinary occurrence. The way the world perceived news and information had been irrevocably changed.

Egyptian Initiative

Until the 1990s, the spread of CNN was confined to the industrial world with Europe, Latin America, and the Pacific rim the principal markets. Developing countries were thought to have positive symbolic value but little immediate profit potential. CNN's early success in Central and Latin America and STAR-TV's impressive circulation figures in South Asia, however, showed that distribution of global signals in developing countries could be viable economic enterprises.

By the late eighties, CNN executives were ready to take a fresh look at secondary markets where growth might be slow, but long-term rewards great. Such was the case with Egypt, a nation with close ties to the United States and a huge tourism industry. The impetus for bringing CNN to Egypt came from a small group of entrepreneurs who began to court CNN International executives in the fall of 1988. The project appeared feasible because of demand for the service from the expatriate and tourism community and because Egypt's state-run broadcasting system had spare transmitter capacity that could be used to send CNN over the air using a scrambled signal from Cairo. Egypt was to become the first nation in the Arab world to have access 24 hours a day.

CNE Development

Government Approval

The driving force behind CNN's Egyptian initiative was Abdullah Schleifer, an American who headed the Adham Center for Television Journalism at the American University in Cairo. Schleifer first approached CNN's Vice President for International Development, Robert Ross, in London about the feasibility of bringing CNN to Egypt.

Having been encouraged by CNN, Schleifer, who had previously been NBC bureau chief in Cairo for many years and was politically well-connected, floated the idea informally in Egypt. Schleifer understood the culture and politics of the middle east well, especially the risks involved with importing an American news channel into a predominately Muslim country sensitive about cultural imperialism. Despite Egypt's strong tradition of tight media control, both the American Ambassador and high-ranking Egyptian officials encouraged Schleifer to go forward with his idea.

Schleifer at first discussed providing CNN to hotels only, but was surprised to find that the Egyptian government was not as opposed to consumer distribution as he had thought. In October, 1989, after several months of negotiations, Schleifer and his partners reached an agreement with the Egyptian Radio and Television Union (ERTU) to support the distribution of CNN publicly. Under the preliminary agreement, Cable News Egypt (CNE) would be granted a license to receive and distribute the news service in Cairo. The original proposal limited ERTU's share to 40%, giving control to the Egyptian and American investors. The final ownership percentages, however, were as follows: ERTU (50%); The Egyptian Company for Investment Projects (ECIP) (20%); Tetrad International Corporation represented by Schleifer (TIC) (20%) and a private Egyptian investment company (10%). Later, the agreement was changed to increase the percentage owned by TIC from 20% to 35%, reducing EICP's share to only 5%. Under the agreement, CNE would pay CNN 20% of gross sales during the first four years of the contract and 25% of gross sales during the final four years.[12]

The ERTU preliminary decision was but one of many that would have to be made in a highly centralized Egyptian bureaucracy not known for receptiveness to controversial new ideas. The entire process would take nearly three years and moved, according to one journalist, at the pace of a "dyslexic pharaonic scribe."[13] The chief external strategist in the struggle was Safwat Sherif, Egypt's Minister of Information, who ran what Schleifer called a "one-man educational campaign" in the media and at the cabinet level on behalf of CNN's introduction to Egypt.

CNE Advantages

Much of Schleifer and Sherif's arguments appealed to the pride Egyptians had in a broadcasting system they believed far surpassed any in the Arab world. Egypt had long considered itself the film and television capital of the Arab states and frequently trained broadcasters from other countries. Government officials reasoned that if a significant technological innovation were to be made, Egypt was the country destined to begin it.

Sherif particularly liked the idea that the staid Egyptian television news service would have competition. Abdullah Schleifer said this competitive aspect appealed to Sherif from the beginning:

> It's quite clear in my mind that the minister was encouraged to support CNN because he realized that it would be an incentive for improving the technical and editorial level of local television services. That's not a unique insight, but the government should be given credit for having had that insight from the very beginning.[14]

Another important reason for having CNN in Egypt was to promote tourism. Egypt knew that American tourists could receive CNN in hotels in virtually every major tourist destination except

Egypt. They saw the presence of CNN as a selling point to promote the country's chief industry. Schleifer sweetened the deal by promising four minutes of free advertising on CNN to the Egyptian Ministry of Tourism, a move that could greatly enhance tourism in the country.[15]

Schleifer argued that tourists and visiting businessmen would be psychologically reassured by the familiar presence of CNN in their hotel room. In his 1988 proposal, Schleifer said, "To put it as frankly as possible--the presence of CNN in his Cairo hotel room, reassures the foreign investor that he is still in the free world."[16]

While the tourism argument carried great weight, it was not without critics. Hamdi Kandil, former director of UNESCO's division of free-flow of information and communication policies, disputed the notion that having CNN in hotels would enhance tourism, saying that tourists do not come to Egypt to sit in hotel rooms and watch television and that no tourist would make a decision on whether to visit Egypt based on the availability of CNN.[17]

A third argument for having CNN was that the financial incentive to the CNE majority stockholder, the ERTU. Subscription royalties would be a much-needed antidote for the ERTU's emerging financial problems. ERTU was operating on a fixed allotment from the government, but faced rising programming costs. If Egyptian television journalism was to be competitive with western news sources, it would have to have a comparable budget and there was little other place to find new revenue sources than the CNN project.

While momentum from these arguments propelled the CNE proposal through the bureaucracy, many in the government thought the last thing Egypt needed was a neo-colonial intrusion to stir up its people and threatening the status quo. Others in Egyptian broadcasting were not enthusiastic about their work being compared with a global news network. Some thought too much effort and money were being wasted on a service that would serve only the needs of foreigners and an Egyptian elite.

Turner Influence

The CNE project got a significant boost when CNN founder Ted Turner visited Cairo in July 1990. By this time, Turner was a celebrity figure who could command attention at the highest levels. At a speech to the American Chamber of Commerce, Turner assuaged critics of CNN with conciliatory overtures conceding that "third world countries feel alienated because most of the influential news agencies are controlled by the West."[18] Turner assured his hosts that his network would never try to force a point of view on Egyptian audiences, "A news organization is good if it is credible and reputable, but if we were to depart from our current format of fairness and honesty we would be thrown out of the market."[19]

Turner eloquently spoke about the importance of all the world receiving news and information instantaneously and how badly he wanted to bring to Egypt what the rest of the world already had. Asked why if access to CCN was so important he had delayed it reaching Egypt by more than a decade, Turner deftly replied that he had concentrated on the United States and the Soviet Union for the first few years because of the nuclear arms race: "I was afraid they would blow up the world before I got to the Middle East."[20]

One tangible accomplishment Ted Turner could show to the third world as proof of his commitment was "CNN World Report," the program based on an international news exchange where CNN broadcasts a country's reports unedited. Egypt had been a steadfast contributor to this innovative programming and took great pride in having its reports shown around the world.

Over time, the quality of reporting on "CNN World Report" had improved to the point where the best reports were broadcast in a daily, mini-version of the program. Often, the Turner organization used the goodwill it engendered through "World Report" to scoop the international competition that did not have comparable grass roots connections and loyalties. During the early days of "CNN World Report," nearly all of the Egyptian contributions came from graduate students at the Adham Center for Television Journalism at the American University in Cairo.

Government Support

Regardless of how positive an impression Ted Turner made, CNN was likely to go nowhere in a highly centralized country like

Egypt without the support of the President. Fortunately for CNE advocates, they had both the ear and sympathy of President Hosni Marbarak. The President had reportedly been viewing CNN International for some time from a private dish and frequently alluded to CNN news reports. According to Abdullah Schliefer, Mobarak provided "quiet behind-the-scenes support for the proposal from the beginning."[21]

In June 1990, when the Higher Investment Authority gave provisional approval for CNE's operations, President Marbarak took a rare turn as presiding officer over the meeting. CNN's chief international strategist, Robert Ross, believed there were several high level government officials familiar with CNN:

> I believe that CNN was viewed by government officials for some time before we started negotiations. It's viewed everywhere because government officials need access to world news quickly. A by-product of using CNN as a news source was that they had an opportunity to observe first-hand the nature of its coverage and to make an independent decision as to whether it was compatible with their national interests or not.[22]

Egyptian news reports said officials watched CNNI for more than a year before making a decision. They reportedly had opposed CNN earlier for fear that the network would carry programs offensive to Egyptian culture and that there would be news that might conflict with the prevailing political system.[23] Abdullah Schleifer claimed that the receptiveness to CNN was part of an ongoing move towards openness that began in 1974 when Egypt lifted censorship for foreign correspondents and continued when Egypt was the first country to allow an opposition press.[24]

In the end, CNN was probably the least offensive signal the

Egyptians could import. Certainly, MTV and other entertainment programming laced with American-made sex and violence posed a greater threat than a global news channel already seen in more than one hundred countries. In fact, a conference on The Arab Media and Direct Broadcasting held in Cairo in 1990 had awarded CNN the distinction of being the "least offensive" of potential offerings.[25]

CNN had made a special effort to provide a broadcast light on sexual and violent material and was more sensitive than most news organizations to cultural considerations. While the majority of CNNI material was originally prepared for an American audience, efforts were being made to include greater amounts of material targeted for the international audience. Having raised his own sensitivity to the rest of the world, Ted Turner even threatened to fine employees who used the word "foreign" rather than the preferred "international."[26]

ERTU Control

If the Egyptian government allowed an alien signal into the country, they wanted to insure some control and share in the profits. Egyptian investment laws stipulated that any foreign enterprise should be a joint venture with an Egyptian company. With ERTU being the majority stockholder in CNE, the government felt reasonably sure of its ability to retain control over its operations.

Some in Egypt equated the presence of ERTU with censorship.

They envisioned ERTU pulling the plug on any controversial report from the Middle East or any content not conforming to the cultural tastes of the nation. Schleifer contended that it would be impossible to censor CNN because of the nature of its live programming. ERTU Chairman Fathi el-Bayoumi claimed that the licensing agreement explicitly prohibited censorship and even if ERTU intervened everyone would know instantly what was happening.[27]

Still, El-Bayoumi acknowledged that there would be times that CNN reports would clash sharply with the Egyptian government party line. He said, "If they (CNN) say something which is not right, we can comment in our Egyptian news."[28] Hamdi Kandil, former director of UNESCO's division of free-flow of information and communication policies, said it would be stupid for Egyptian TV to respond to a story on CNN because they would reach an entirely different audience, "CNN will talk to 10,000 viewers and the ERTU's reply will reach 10 million viewers--who will then all know what CNN said."[29]

CNE Structure and Operations

In October, 1990, the Egyptian government formally approved the establishment of Cable News Egypt as a corporation for a period of 25 years. The estimated capital for CNE was L.E. 1,608 million (the equivalent of $500 million plus in U.S. dollars) to be paid in both local and hard currency.[30] Table

One shows the distribution of shares among the three partners. Table Two shows the distribution of capital.

Tables One and Two

In July, 1991, the Board of Directors increased the company's capital to L.E. 25 million ($7 million) for two reasons: (1) the addition of new services such as a sports channel; and (2) increases in land, building, equipment prices, currency exchange rates, and the creation of a sales tax.[31] In increasing this capital allocation, the ERTU had to be careful that its input did not affect the state budget or the regular operation of Egyptian broadcasting.

Under the structure of CNE, the ERTU Chairman also became Chairman of CNE. There were seven members of the board of directors: four representing ERTU; two from ECIP; and one from TIC. Each member of the board was required to own L.E. 5,000 ($1,557) worth of CNE stock or its hard currency equivalent.[32]

CNE was divided into three main departments: (1) marketing, responsible for advertising for decoders, selling them, and writing contracts between the company and the subscribers; (2) engineering, responsible for connecting the decoders to subscribers' television sets and also for equipment related to receiving or transmitting the signal; and (3) finance, responsible for handling the budget and projecting revenues and expenditures.[33]

Technical Operations

CNE operates over a UHF channel controlled by the ERTU and has a satellite receiving station in the Giza area and a TV transmitter at Mokattam. CNE's signal currently comes from the Russian C-band satellite "Gorizont." By mid-1992, the CNN signal was scheduled to be delivered by the Ku band Arabsat satellite from which individual consumers could receive the signal direct.

Under the CNE operations plan, decoders cost $200 plus L.E. 260 Egyptian pounds ($81). CNE arranged to import 2082 standard decoders and thirty professional ones.[34] CNE also used the Video Link System to scramble its signal.[35] The initial capacity of the system was 100,000 subscribers. Subscription fees were set as follows:

$112	annually for Egyptians at their individual homes.
$120	annually for foreigners at their individual homes.
$250	annually for embassies, banks, international organizations, language schools and foreign institutes.
$3500	annually for newspapers.
$.08	cents per room for five star hotels
$.07	cents per room for four star hotels[36]

While the Egyptian individual subscription fee was heavily subsidized, all except the most wealthy Egyptians were priced out of the market, in effect, limiting the service primarily to expatriates, foreign businessmen, news organizations, and tourists in luxury hotels.[37] The hotel rate included a standard discount to allow for less than full occupancy.[38]

CNE Debut

After nearly three years of political wrangling, bureaucratic obstruction, and high profile debate, CNE went on the air on January 10, 1991, just six days before the start of the Gulf War with a free trial service for four hours each day for all Egyptian television viewers to see. On January 16th and 17th, CNE broadcast 24 hours a day before falling back to eight hours daily after the 17th. The inauguration of CNE, delayed by several months, proved highly auspicious when it coincided with the beginning of the Gulf War. For two and one-half months, from January 10th through March 31st, the unencrypted signal was on display for all to see, providing an eager public with round-the-clock coverage of events that vitally affected the life of every Egyptian.

No one could have conceived of a better promotion for CNE. Egypt had connected itself to the broadcast journalism mainstream at precisely the time that this linkage assumed extraordinary importance. While there was frustration with the decidedly American tilt to CNE's coverage of the Gulf War, the immediate access to multiple information sources simultaneously largely made-up for the network's ethnocentric shortcomings.

Despite the auspicious beginning, CNE founder Abdullah Schleifer worried about the possibility of letdown of interest in CNN after the war, "Once the Gulf crisis has been resolved, how many Egyptians will be interested in what's happening on an ordinary day in the Middle East, China or Ecuador? Not too many."[39] Schleifer was hoping for a residual appetite for CNE among Egyptians that would push them to subscribe when the encrypted service began later in the year.

Schleifer believed that the long delay by the ERTU in getting CNE on the air greatly hurt its financial viability. He said that the free test should have come long before the Gulf War with the encrypted service beginning in mid-1990.[40] Had this occurred, CNE would have been enticing paid subscribers at just the height of interest in having a global news service in Egypt.

Economic Forecasts

Initially, the business prospects for CNE were highly optimistic; the consensus was that it would be financially successful. While the debate flourished among Egyptians about the effect of the service on their country, it was the affluent foreigner who would make or break this venture.

ERTU chairman Fathi el-Bayoumi forecast in September 1990 that CNE would have between 60,000-100,000 subscribers (including 10,000-15,000 expatriates) and an additional 10,000 hotel rooms. Abdullah Schleifer's forecast was equally optimistic. Hamdi Kandil predicted that individual subscriptions would peak at around 20,000 and then decline:

> The novelty element is more important than any other element in a foreign channel. After the novelty loses its impact, in the final analysis, people go back to their own national channels, which deal with local issues--problems close to their own heart--in their own language. CNN won't even have the influence of video recorders, which I think have a penetration of almost 40 percent of television receivers in greater Cairo.[41]

CNNI's Robert Ross acknowledged that the viewers will "be measured in the tens of thousands" and that there would be a surge to buy the service followed by a drop-off followed by a promotional campaign to attract a second tier of viewers, perhaps non-American ex-patriots.[42] Language and economics would be two powerful constraints limiting the success of the service even if interest ran high. The hotel market would be more stable than the subscriber market. Most major western hotel chains had already bought into the CNN package worldwide. CNN research showed that increasingly the business traveller preferred hotels where the cable news service was available.

CNE investors assumed the financial risk of the enterprise, but the majority partner ERTU had the most to gain financially from CNE. ERTU officials were anxiously awaiting an attractive financial return to relieve the Egyptian TV deficit which was becoming more onerous by the year. Although there would be grumbling about CNE from the rank and file at the ERTU who saw CNN as an intrusion into their monopolistic world, the leadership clearly saw the economic windfall outweighing any negatives the new channel might bring.[43]

CNE was very successful in bringing in 17 of the 18 five star hotels as subscribers and a large percentage of three and four star hotels. CNE's encrypted service for home subscribers, however, which began in the greater Cairo area on August 1, 1991, has never had more than 3,000 subscribers. Subscribers were limited mainly to embassies, expatriates, and a very small percentage of Egyptian elites. Schleifer said:

> We lost our novelty. After the Gulf War, there was no more excitement, no crisis. Unless the news is very hot, no one cares. I overestimated the number of subscribers.[44]

In addition to environment setbacks connected with the launch of CNE, Abdullah Schleifer saw several technical and service factors that hurt the financial success of CNE: (1) the long delay in delivery of decoders; (2) the high cost of decoders; (3) the use of a fading Russian satellite to deliver the signal; (4) poor transmission quality of the signal; and (5) poor maintenance by the company doing installation and repair. Schleifer said that the switch by CNN to a better satellite and CNE's efforts to improve the transmission of the signal would result in greatly improved service.[45]

For a variety of reasons, CNE did not prove to be the financial bonanza backers anticipated. Within weeks of CNE's launch, CNE organizers were discussing the need to bring in additional channels to the subscription service to make it more attractive. Backers believed that the presence of a sports channel and an entertainment service acceptable to Egyptian standards would provide enough incremental value to entice reluctant potential customers to subscribe. CNN could no longer be considered a powerful draw by itself; it would have to be bundled with other services to make it attractive to a broader Egyptian community. The sport channel looked particularly attractive because its success did not depend on a relatively high level of fluency in English.

CNE Impact on Egyptian Television News

A not-so-hidden agenda for bringing CNN to Egypt was to provide a competitive impetus to improve the quality of news on Egypt's state-run television. As with many broadcasting systems with no competition, Egyptian TV's news operation was lacking. Formats were outdated, coverage had become limited, stories followed rigid, pedestrian formulas, and visual appeal was weak. The Dean of the Faculty of Communication at Cairo University Gehan Rachty forecast that the "availability of CNN in Egypt will lead to a significant development in Egyptian journalism" and prompt journalists into more investigative journalism.[46] Abdullah Schleifer believed that improvement of Egyptian news was an incentive for bringing CNN to Egypt:

> It's quite clear in my mind that the minister was encouraged to support CNN because he realized that it would be an incentive for improving the technical and editorial level of local television services. That's not a unique insight, but the government should be given credit for having had that insight from the very beginning.[47]

The dissatisfaction with the quality of news on Egyptian television was not limited to academics and media critics. There were even rumblings of discontent within the Egyptian broadcasting service. The Head of News Readers at ETV, Mahoud Sultan, said, "We are still using slow rhythm, long introductions, un-needed shots, and we never go straight to the point. The order of the news items is the same since 1960 and some items take from 5-10 minutes and even more."[48]

The public test broadcast of CNE from January 10th through March 31st in greater Cairo set off considerable debate concerning the quality of Egyptian TV news and prompted several changes in appearance and substance. When viewers saw differences in production values and journalistic performance between ETV and CNN, Egyptian television personnel felt considerable pressure to change.

Format

Perhaps the most noticeable change was in format. Ismail El-Nakib, a journalist with Al-Akhbar, said that the ranking of the news became better and the length of individual stories was shortened.[49] Egyptian TV news also took on a newer, slicker look. ETV purchased four pieces of new equipment to enhance its capability to use special effects and provide better teleprompters, bringing ETV into a new technological age. Soon, ETV was using many of the same production techniques seen on CNN. The technological initiatives, however, were not completely successful. Samir El-Touny, Head of News Programs for ETV, said:

> Since we began receiving CNN, we tried to attract our audience using similar techniques. We changed the news background using chroma and the monitors in the control room appeared, but this kind of imitation failed because we only have a few monitors in the newsroom and the improvement looked awful.[50]

ETV also altered the scheduling of news, providing short newsbreaks between regular news bulletins. This innovation was especially important during the Gulf War because viewers did not want to wait hours between news bulletins when information important to them and their families was being made in the interim. Had ETV not begun the newsbreak programs, it would have issued an open invitation for viewers to defect to CNN.

There was also a greater willingness at ETV to interrupt programs for breaking news stories. CNN's example showed that some stories were important enough to eclipse all others on the news and that it was sometimes necessary to stay with a story far longer than the time allotted for a regularly scheduled news bulletin.

The Gulf War gave ETV a perfect opportunity to experiment with extended, ongoing coverage. This was an event for which there was a huge public appetite. Thousands of Egyptian troops were stationed in the Gulf and the Egyptian President was a key player in the allied power structure. With CNN going out to all Egyptian viewers free, ETV felt a strong compulsion to offer a product to compete with their new rivals. A Visual News Center was created that allowed Egyptian television to receive and transmit reports from the field, greatly increasing their ability to follow breaking news.

Journalistic Behavior

CNE also affected the way Egyptian journalists approached their work. Egyptian television news had been one dimensional and repetitive. A minister would dedicate a facility and an ETV camera crew would cover it. On the news that evening would be a long voice-over report with a small sound bite of the minister speaking. This formula rarely varied. The locations changed, but the story line was basically the same.

ETV was generally seen in a reactive posture, usually commenting on second-hand news. As ETV's Mahmoud Sultan said:

> CNN makes news while here we only comment on the event. Our correspondents do not cover the event. They either analyze, comment or describe public reaction. We rebroadcast what we receive from CNN and similar channels; this differs drastically from what happens on CNN.[51]

With exposure to CNN, journalists developed a more varied repertoire. CNN offered more complex story formats with the integration of sound on film, interviews, voice-overs, and stand-ups in a compelling, interesting way that fit the nature of the story. Four or five persons might be interviewed, each offering a specific viewpoint. Voice-over video was held to a minimum. Whenever possible, CNN used live sound and action footage. The soundbites on CNN were not merely wallpaper, but provided substantive content to the story. The narration was but a linkage to the pictures and interviews that flowed together seamlessly.

Professor Heba El-Semary of Cairo University believed that CNN helped the Egyptian journalists to "learn how news is made" by relying more on anchors to provide substantive introductions to reports and to rely more heavily on field reports.[52] Like CNN, ETV started to veer away from the sterile voice-over approach to inject more of the reporter's viewpoint into the story and take the initiative to cover original news. Interviews became a more central part of the story. Video became better integrated with the story line. Reporters attached themselves to the story line.

Objectivity Emphasis

Inherent in preparing reports with more diverse components was a greater emphasis on balanced reporting and objectivity. To a limited extent, stories emerged from Egyptian television that provided two sides to a controversial issue or occasionally broadened the context of the one-dimensional government line. Still, Egyptian journalists were conscious of the fact that they were working for a government-run television station where sensitivities often ran high. As former UNESCO official Hamdi Kandil said, "They can't have views opposite to the those of the minister; they are employees."

ETV's Mahmoud Sultan, however, believed that the problem was not as much with the government as with the journalist's perception of the government:

> They can't believe the climate of freedom we are living in now. They are afraid to express their own views although nothing will happen if they did. On the contrary, everybody will congratulate them on the courage to achieve such improvements.[53]

It was clear that greater press freedom would be more difficult to attain than technological sophistication. Egyptian journalists had labored for years under significant constraints. Yet, the government of President Mobarak was on a steady trend of greater democratization and openness which would eventually be reflected in greater freedom and objectivity.

Reaction to Change

While ETV news underwent a metamorphosis after the appearance of CNE, it was not an easy transition. There was considerable disagreement within ETV over the merits of change. Younger, more ambitious journalists strongly advocated formats and journalistic standards that would compare with international newsgathering standards. Older, more entrenched ETV staffers saw no reason to stampede towards change just because a foreign broadcaster had moved next door. Some even saw the presence of CNE as a negative influence on a journalistic system that had evolved naturally from Egyptian culture for Egyptians.

Almost everyone realized that the best antidote to CNN mania was stronger local news. Although CNN dazzled viewers with its coverage during the early days of the Gulf War, the one thing CNE could not deliver to its audiences was local coverage; only ETV could provide this service and it was a powerful advantage.

The question remained whether ETV was up to the challenge. Eventually, the debate revolved around resources and expertise. ETV Chief Editor Wafai Shalaqamy blamed the lack of equipment and expertise for the failure of ETV news, but others like Al-Ahram journalist Abdou Mobasher said that ETV is to blame for the staff's lack of expertise, "They should train talented students and graduates and give them the chance to work and see the results."[54]

Despite the finger pointing, it was obvious that ETV news could and should improve. It not only needed to improve the quality of its reporting, but include more news from the rest of Egypt and from the Islamic world. When the Gulf War ended, the immediate pressure on ETV subsided, but reformers in Egyptian television emerged in a much stronger position to change the internal structures that affected news coverage. There was clearly much less patience with the status quo than before the arrival of CNE.

Cultural Imperialism

In the industrialized world, the introduction of a television channel would be back-page news, but in a developing country like Egypt, the arrival of CNE stimulated considerable interest. Before the CNE service began, a lively debate over the benefits of CNN took place involving academics, government officials, and media critics.

The most prominent concern was that of cultural invasion. Egyptians had never been subjected to alien television signals and many feared the worst. There was not as much objection to CNN as there was to opening the door to foreign influences that might pollute the culture, especially western entertainment channels. Cairo University Communication Dean Gehan Rachty, reflected the sentiments of many Egyptians who feared the bombardment of foreign programs:

> This foreign culture trespasses the sanctity of national cultures, norms and values, not only in its large dose of sex and violence but also by weakening the bond between family generations, encouraging

> teenage promiscuity and fostering a libertine attitude towards sex. The threat is posed directly at our teenagers who can easily be brainwashed into adopting western attitudes, even in their dress, eating habits and dealing with people.[55]

Journalist Ismail El-Nakib said that the greatest impact would be on the lower classes if they were exposed to foreign content.[56] Yet, Nagwa El-Fawal believed that if there is any effect it will be on the elites who are the prime consumers of foreign programs.[57]

Abdou Mobasher believed that the fears of sex and violence were exaggerated, but said that foreign programs could be very effective over time in subtlety altering attitudes.[58] Abdullah Schleifer dismissed most cultural invasion charges, but acknowledged that the public's fear could stir up considerable religious fundamentalist sentiment, "The immoralities in these programs would be a good target for fierce criticism by fundamentalists and that may erupt into a massive social unrest."[59]

Others among the intelligentsia said that Egyptians had nothing to worry about the arrival of CNN or any other foreign programming source. ERTU Trustee Saad Labib was indignant about the idea that Arab culture was fragile, easily uprooted by the mighty western culture. He said that instead of opposing direct broadcasting, the electronic signals should be an incentive for local television producers to upgrade their own programs. Labib said, "What is the harm in watching a good television production of drama, documentary films, news, operas, and music shows?

Shouldn't this also improve the taste of the viewer?"[60]

Former UNESCO official Hamdi Kandil said, "The real danger is from 'internal cultural invasion.' Look at the films produced which offer awful models of the Egyptians. These films are bound to affect our culture more than any foreign programs." While discounting the cultural invasion charges, Kandil said that a steady diet of western news, even from a relatively unbiased source such as CNN, would provide a distorted view of reality with no countervailing source of news from another perspective. Above all, Kandil saw CNE as an exclusive service for powerful elites in society and questioned the importance of the issue in light of pressing economic problems that would affect all Egyptians.[61]

Despite all of the public apprehension concerning the arrival of CNN, that sentiment subsided when the CNE signal was encrypted and limited to subscribers. CNE's biggest problem today is lack of interest. Journalist Ismail El-Nakib said he would have paid any price to receive CNN during the Gulf War, but "now there is nothing on it. I virtually do not feel its existence."[62] The fear of cultural invasion remains, but CNN is no longer the object of that immediate fear which will be saved for other invading foreign channels.

Conclusion

The transformation from a one-channel government television system to a multi-channel environment with foreign news programming that occurred in Egypt in 1991 is one that will likely be repeated in dozens of developing countries during the rest of this decade. For Egypt, which was not prepared to allow unlimited signals through direct satellite broadcasting, the UHF subscription broadcast was the least risky alternative. The CNE prototype also conformed to Egypt's highly centralized tradition in mass communication. The system allowed the government maximum control with little financial risk. CNE investors, meanwhile, received exclusive entree into a market ripe for alternative media.

Despite clear dissatisfaction with the quality of Egyptian television and the impetus gained from the Gulf War, CNE was not a financial success early on. Investors and government officials badly misjudged the demand for the CNN product. Financial and language constraints were more formidable than expected. Fortunately for CNE, Cairo offered a strong expatriate base to serve as a core until the indigenous population could be cultivated.

What started as a means to deliver CNN to the Egyptian public will now be transformed into a multi-channel subscription service offering sports and entertainment as well as CNN. One could argue that investors would have never convinced the Egyptian government to start a news, sports, and entertainment service, but CNE's initial setback forced the ERTU into a broader service to recover its investment. Having ERTU as a principal stockholder gives CNE a major advantage until direct satellite broadcasting grows in Egypt.

While CNE may not have debuted as a huge financial success, it made a spectacular editorial entry. Having CNN live during the Gulf War was a windfall for the Egyptian people. They received Western-style television and a griping human drama all in one package. That the service reached every television household in a major world city was a significant step forward for global journalism which had largely been confined to the worlds' elite.

The contrast between CNN's Gulf War coverage and ETV's news product was lost on neither the Egyptian people nor the broadcast journalists who produced the local news. Almost immediately, Egyptian television responded to the competition by altering their programming, technological tools, and journalistic routines. While Egyptian television news is still heavily constrained and underfunded, the quality of the news product appears to have been well-served by the arrival of CNE.

Egypt has now been exposed to two versions of CNE--one that dominated the public environment for several tense weeks during an international conflict and another which remains the province of the expatriate community and wealthy Egyptians. It will be interesting to see whether there is pressure on the ERTU to bring back CNE in unscrambled form. It could be in CNE's best financial interest to whet the consumer's appetite by offering a limited free service for a few hours each day. If CNE becomes financially viable through the addition of other subscription services, CNN could become an attractive loss leader for the masses.

In the end, each developing country must cope with the question of foreign television programming, facing the cultural invasion question and the economic implications head-on. Most countries' exposure to foreign channels will likely come via direct broadcast satellite, but the Egyptian example of a government/private sector partnership using the broadcast spectrum could be an attractive alternative in some countries.

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CNE DISTRIBUTION OF SHARES*
Table 1

in L.E. 1,000

PARTNERS	NATIONALITY	SHARE Local	 Free	 Total	PERCENTAGE
ERTU	Egyptian	964.8	--	964.8	60
ECIP	Egyptian	--	80.4	80.4	5
TIC	Off-Shore American (Panama)	--	562.8	562.8	35
TOTAL		964.8	643.2	160b	100

CNE DISTRIBUTION OF CAPITAL*
Table 2

in L.E. 1,000

PARTNERS	NATIONALITY	SHARE Local	 Free	 Total	PERCENTAGE
ERTU	Egyptian	964.8	--	964.8	60
ECIP	Egyptian	--	321.6	321.6	20
TIC American	--	321.6	321.6		21
TOTAL		964.8	543.2	1608	100

* $1.00 = L.E. 3.21

Source Credibility During the Gulf War:

A Q-Study of Rural and Urban Saudi Arabian Citizens

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Abstract

This study involved a set of 30 sources (10 print, 10 broadcast, and 10 interpersonal/other)--Q-Sorted for their credibility in Gulf War information by 40 male Saudi nationals in western Saudi Arabia. Twenty respondents lived in a rural setting; twenty resided in an urban area. After completing the Q-sort, each respondent was asked to rank order his most important sources of information from among the 30 choices (Q-sort items) available during the Gulf conflict.

Factor analysis, rotated to an oblique (Oblimax) solution, resulted in 2 types of respondents accounting for 49% of the total variance, or 81% of the trace variance. Type I respondents are International Radio-Oriented; they are heavy users of Western broadcasts. The majority of Type I men are urban dwellers. Type II men are identified as Traditional Communication and Domestic Media-Oriented; these respondents, primarily from a rural area, attached credibility to more traditional forms of communication for information about the Gulf conflict.

Source Credibility During the Gulf War:
A Q-Study of Rural and Urban Saudi Arabian Citizens

It is possible that no other developing country has received as much international press attention as Saudi Arabia. Largely unknown to those outside the Middle East until the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the kingdom has attracted wide-spread press coverage because of subsequent economic and political events that have exerted influence on the region and the world, including: 1) the quadrupling of world oil prices after then-King Faisal stopped petroleum shipments to the West; 2) the assassination of King Faisal in 1975; 3) the 1979 take-over of the Holy Mosque in Makkah; 4) the kingdom's role in attempting to stabilize OPEC oil prices during the last 15 years; and 5) the August, 1990, Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the resulting Gulf war, conducted from Saudi soil.

Attention has thus come to a society reluctant to adopt outside values, especially those that are Western and incompatible with Islamic teaching. Being placed in the international spotlight only draws attention to the fact that this Islamic state is also one of the most religiously conservative in the world. Since its official creation in 1932 under the leadership of King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, subsequent leaders have been careful to avoid offending conservative religious elements while at the same time putting the kingdom in a position to exist in a world of increasing complexity. It was only in the 1960s that public education for females was permitted. There was a great deal of planning, discussion, and sheer political bravery among progressive members of the royal family before photography, radio, and television were allowed in this sparsely-populated state in which approximately 12 million people (*The world almanac and book of facts*, 1989) reside in a largely barren land the size of the eastern half of the United States.

There have been several studies done, primarily in the West, regarding how people obtained and used information about the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent short-lived war itself. For example, Lewis, Jhally, & Morgan (1991), Cohen (1991), Courtright, McLeod, Perse, & Sigorielli, (1991), Gantz (1991), and Wober (1990) have completed projects that in one way or another investigate news consumption patterns of citizens in the United States, Britain, and Israel. Zelizer (1992) has written about CNN and other media during the war as changing journalism forms. Additionally, several non-academic studies have been done of press coverage during the war (Dennis et al., 1991; *Witness to war*, 1991).

However, conducting such studies of information acquisition in the Arab world is difficult. The Gulf states are relatively closed societies. They do not issue tourist visas; official permission is necessary before a non-citizen can enter the country. Surveys on international radio-listening preferences done by the major Western broadcasters are permitted only after receipt of government permission.

Background

The facts just reviewed explain why most research on information systems and behaviors in these countries has been largely exploratory and descriptive. Such will probably continue to be the case until a more comprehensive descriptive portrait emerges to reveal similarities and differences between these cultures and more thoroughly-examined societies. Certainly, this is true of the present investigation, which attempts to identify and describe an aspect of information behavior as it might have occurred under crisis circumstances.

We were interested in this Islamic state because of its religious importance (it is the founding home of Islam and the location of the two most holy cities of Islam, Makkah and Medina) and because of its financial importance to the world economy. Further, Saudi Arabia was the host country from which the eventual defeat of the Iraqi forces was planned and executed. We wanted to know how a segment of the Saudi Arabian population followed a war that directly affected them. Finally, we were interested in examining a rural as well as an urban population in an area of the country that was removed from both the multi-national military buildup and SCUD missile attacks. Thus, we selected a small rural town and a major urban area in the Western Province of the kingdom.

The Saudi Arabian Media Environment

The electronic media in the kingdom--like those in all other Arab countries with the exception of unofficial Lebanese stations--are controlled by the Ministry of Information. Although relatively late to develop radio, by the late 1960s the urban areas were well served by the country's medium-wave radio transmitters. Powerful medium- and short-wave transmitters were added in the 1970s and 1980s, making the medium available to most residents, regardless of where they lived in the kingdom. Wood (1991) notes that only Iraq (before Operation Desert Storm bombing operations destroyed most Iraqi radio transmitters) had more medium- and short-wave transmitter power than Saudi Arabia.

Residents of the Middle East are among the world's most enthusiastic transnational radio listeners. A quarter-century of surveys show that listeners tune to 1) stations from neighboring states, and 2) clear, reliable radio signals from the major Western international broadcasters--British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Voice of America (VOA), and Radio Monte Carlo Middle East (RMCME)--because they transmit to the area on the standard (medium wave) band (Boyd, 1989).

Television started in 1965 (Boyd, 1982) in the two largest urban areas, Jeddah and Riyadh. Through a system of microwave relays and later satellite connections, the original television channel quickly became a national visual medium. A second channel was added in 1983.

Except for a few specialized government publications, the print media in the kingdom are mostly privately owned. Wealthy businessmen or those from prominent families are influential, especially in the publication of daily newspapers. Although not directly controlled by the government in the same sense as the electronic media, the papers understand, and seldom violate, the prevailing religious, cultural, and political values of Saudi society. Rugh (1979) notes that the fact that the Saudi government both has the legal power to close newspapers and influences personnel selection, "helps give the government some day-to-day influence over the content of the newspapers" (p. 77).

Saudi Arabia appears to be the only country in the world that does not permit public cinemas. The government is very concerned about large groups of people gathering for entertainment, especially if both males and females are present. The Ministry of Information has always been troubled by citizens being exposed to material, especially from the West, that depicts cultures and religions that are not in keeping with conservative Islamic tradition. Thus, television--a medium that could be controlled by the government--was seen as ideal for this family- and home-centered society. However, in the late 1970s the videocassette recorder (VCR) was introduced into the kingdom; by the mid-1980s, penetration had reached beyond the 80% level. Like the earlier introduction of the audio cassette, the VCR in effect eliminated government control of imported visual material, despite the fact that the kingdom has enacted laws restricting the sale and rental of certain video material (Boyd, Straubhaar, & Lent, 1989).

Those living in Saudi Arabia are well equipped to receive radio and television broadcasts and to watch home videos. BBC statistics indicate that there are 4.5 million radio receivers, 3.25 million television sets, and 2 million videocassette recorders in the kingdom (British Broadcasting Corporation, June, 1991).

Method

Q-methodology (Stephenson, 1953) provides a way of gaining in-depth data from a person on subjectively held belief systems. It can produce unusually rich insights from relatively small samples of people. Q-studies emphasize meanings framed by the respondents rather than by the researchers. Because of its inductive nature and the use of small samples, the strength of Q rests in the development of understanding rather than in the formation of statistical generalizations. The technique is not often used in developing countries, but Boyd (1978; 1986) and Van Tubergen & Boyd (1986) found that Arab world respondents like to sort Q items; they found the method to be accepted in cultures where, for various reasons, people are reluctant to complete a standard survey questionnaire.

From all of the sources of information about the Gulf conflict available to Saudi citizens in the western part of the country, we selected a representative set of 30. Ten of these information sources were electronic media, e.g., Saudi Arabian radio and television as well as Western international and regional Arab radio stations. Ten more identified print media--major Saudi magazines and daily newspapers. The final 10 statements represented a variety of interpersonal sources or other non-media sources, e.g., "family members," "friends," or "audio cassettes."

The instrument was initially developed in English and pilot-tested among a group of Arabs in the U.S. After translation into

Arabic, the Q-items were taken to Saudi Arabia where they were verified by back translation into English; the final version of the Arabic instrument was both certified and approved by the Department of Linguistics at a Saudi Arabian university.

Sample

The instrument was administered by one of the researchers in and near a large city in the western part of Saudi Arabia between May 25 and June 10, 1991. Participants in the study were 40 male Saudi nationals. Females were excluded from this study because it is culturally unacceptable for males to interview females who are not close relatives. Females are separated from males at all educational levels and in most work places for religious and cultural reasons.

Among the 40 participants, 20 lived in a rural area and 20 lived in an urban area. Eight were less than 20 years old, six aged between 20 and 25, seven aged between 26 and 30, eleven aged between 31 and 35, two aged between 36 and 40, and 6 over 40. Four respondents had reading and writing skills only, 9 had completed elementary school, 12 had finished middle school, 7 had secondary school educations, 5 had the B.A., and 3 had earned a specialized diploma. Respondents were neither rich nor poor: 12 subjects earned less than $10,000; six earned between $10-15,000; nine received between $5-20,000; twelve earned between $20-26,000; and just one earned more than $26,000.

Following conventional Q-sort technique, each participant was asked initially to sort the sources into three piles: those he felt were believable and trustworthy sources for information about the Gulf conflict; those about which he had mixed feelings of credibility, or which were unfamiliar sources to him; and those which he distrusted. He was then asked to refine these decisions by further sorting the set of sources into a quasi-normal forced distribution, comprising nine ranking levels.

After the exercise was completed, each respondent was asked to rank order his ten most important sources of information during the Gulf conflict.

Findings

The sort data were Q-factor analyzed using the principal axis method with S.M.C.'s as communality estimates. The Scree test and other indicators suggested that the data included two distinct groups of Saudi men, each with different perceptions of the relative credibility of the information sources in the sorting task. These two factors accounted for 49% of the total variance, or 81% of the trace variance; they were rotated to an oblique (Oblimax) solution.

Using the original sorting responses of each group of men identified by the factor analysis, as well as each man's factor loading in his group, a composite sort was constructed for each type of Saudi man. In order to compare the two patterns of credibility perceptions, each composite sort was placed in standard Z-score form. Thus, highly positive Z's indicate a source was ranked high in trustworthiness; while highly negative Z's indicate a distrusted source. Z-scores that exceed ±1.0 were considered important in identifying the relative credibility of each source for each type of Saudi; similarly, sources that differed by as much in Z-score between the two types of men were considered important perceptual differences.

Table 1 lists the 30 information sources, each with its Z-scores for the types. The results are also presented graphically in Figure 1.

Place Figure 1 about here

Consensus: Shared Credibility Perceptions. The correlation between the two arrays of Z-scores is 0.44, indicating the perceptions of information source credibility had about 20% of their variance in common between the two types of Saudi men. This is reflected in the fact that 21 of the 30 information sources received credibility Z-scores that did not differ between the two types by more than 1.0. Of these, only 4 sources elicited strong consensual credibility judgments--all of them broadcast sources. Both types of men perceived Saudi radio and Saudi TV to be highly credible (average Z-scores of 1.59 and 1.17, respectively). Similarly, they agreed to distrust information about the Gulf conflict coming from the Iraqi, Jordanian, and Sudanese radio services (average Z=-1.79). Both types of men also tended to express some suspicions of information found in pamphlets and gathered in conversations with non-Saudis or with Saudi strangers. Most other consensus sources were rated somewhat neutrally, suggesting a lack of familiarity; interestingly, seven of these were print media.

Place Table 1 about here

Type I: International Radio-Oriented. Nineteen Saudi men clustered into Type I. This type of man felt that the most trustworthy sources of information about the Gulf conflict were broadcasting outlets, particularly those of Western nations. They perceived Voice of America, the British Broadcasting Corporation World Service, and Radio Monte Carlo Middle East to be the most credible sources. Of course, Saudi radio and Saudi TV also rated highly with these men, but not as highly as the Western voices. These participants not only rated the Western broadcasts high in credibility, they rated these sources distinctively higher than did Type II men. Also, Type I found Israeli radio to be much more credible than did Type II men--even though the rating they assigned, in an absolute sense, was somewhat neutral. As part of the consensus perceptions, of course, Type I indicated strong distrust of broadcasts from Iraq, Yemen, Jordan, and Sudan. Among interpersonal sources, Type I considered friends and co-workers to be moderately trustworthy as information sources. Friday prayers were also important to them, but considerably less so than were these ceremonies to Type II. Type I men also viewed Westerners neutrally as interpersonal sources but were more trusting of them than were Type II men. Of the 19 participants who exhibited the Type I source credibility pattern, 15 (79%) were urban residents. This type tended to report higher incomes and included all 5 college graduates.

Type II: Traditional Communication and Domestic Media-Oriented. The remaining 21 men in the study affiliated with Type II by placing their greatest trust in Friday prayer ceremonies, audio cassettes, and discussions with immediate family members. Indeed, Type II placed substantially greater trust in all of these sources than did Type I. Even when exhibiting the consensual trust in Saudi radio and television, Type II tended to rate these sources somewhat more affirmatively than did Type I. As noted above, Type II strongly rejected Israeli radio broadcasts. Type II men saw co-workers, non-Saudis, and Westerners as less credible sources than did Type I men. Of the 21 Type II men, 16 (76%) resided in a rural community, and were lower in income and educational achievement than those in Type I.

Discussion

With apologies to Marshal McLuhan, one is tempted to label the men associated with the two types of source credibility beliefs found in this study as The Global-Oriented and The Village-Oriented. Type I (Global-Oriented) people seem to have had more experience with other cultures, perhaps as the result of traveling abroad or working with others in one of the Saudi urban environments. The majority of Type I men are urbanites.

In contrast, Type II (Village-Oriented) men seem to have less contact with Westerners and non-Saudis, apparently because they are largely confined to rural areas. Those in this Type seem to place a high degree of trust on communication with people they know, i.e., interpersonal communication with relatives, friends, and co-workers. Somewhat surprisingly, they attributed high trust to audio cassettes as a source of information. The cassettes, mostly recordings of the "sermons" given during the important Friday noon prayer, often made references during the conflict to the Arab world political situation, especially Iraqi aggression against Kuwait and the subsequent presence in the kingdom of Western military personnel.

The broadcast media were favored over print media among both study types, apparently because of the technological advantage radio and television enjoys over print. Additionally, the rapidly changing political and military situation during the Gulf crisis motivated people to seek the most up-to-date stories available. Thus, there was no aggregate of men in our study for which a print medium was highly trusted or distrusted; these sources were simply not much used.

In follow-up questions to the Q-sort, 30 respondents (75% of respondents) indicated that they first learned about the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait from other people; ten people (25%) heard about it directly from the electronic media.[1] In contrast, 21 people (53%) said they, six months after the invasion, first learned about the American-led coalition air strike against Iraq from interpersonal sources; 19 respondents (47%) said they learned about the air attack from the broadcast media. Clearly, in this traditional society, the importance of others as sources of information cannot be overemphasized. The difference in the types of sources from which one learned about the invasion and air attack is explained at least in part by the fact that some form of military action was expected in early 1991 because the United Nations resolution designed to give behind-the-scenes negotiations an opportunity to succeed expired on January 15, 1991.

Even though Iraqi radio did not enjoy credibility among both types of respondents, some apparently listened to Iraqi broadcasts because they were interested in what the "other side" was saying, i.e., the curiosity factor. Finally, both types were somewhat hesitant about Saudi Arabian print media sources, but were positive about the broadcast media. This may be due, at least in part, to the fast pace of news developments after the invasion and the war itself. Radio was especially important to respondents because of its potential to give the most up-to-date news.

Our study points to a modest negative relationship between educational level and credibility of the print media. The moderately better educated Type I gave slightly lower credibility Z-scores to 9 of the 10 print sources, as compared with Type II.

Both types in this study were enthusiastic radio listeners. For Type II men, Saudi radio was the second most credible source after audio cassettes. Especially for those in Global-Oriented Type I, Western radio broadcasts were especially important, trusted sources of information. Studies done by the BBC and VOA over the years have shown that Western radio broadcasts are well received in the Arab world states, including Saudi Arabia. The fact that broadcasting in the Arab world is a government activity, coupled with the availability of the major Western broadcasters on the medium-wave (standard broadcasting) band makes foreign radio important, especially during times of crisis.[2]

The primary demographic distinction between the two types of respondents appears to be location--rural vs. urban--and educational level. Income and age, however, seem to be relatively similar in both types.

Figure 1

Gulf War Information Source Credibility Among Saudi Men



Source: Al-Makaty, Boyd & Van Tubergen, 1991

Table 1

	Typal Z's	
Item Descriptions **Types:**	**I**	**II**
1-Saudi radio services	1.2	2.0
2-Saudi TV channels	0.8	1.6
3-Iraq radio services	-2.5	-1.6
4-Egypt radio services	0.3	0.3
5-Arab Gulf States radios (U.A.E. and Kuwait)	-0.2	0.2
6-Israel radio	-0.2	-2.0
7-Voice of America	2.0	-0.6
8-British Broadcasting Service	2.0	-0.2
9-Radio Mont Carlo Middle East	1.4	-0.6
10-Yemen, Jordan, and Sudan radios	-2.2	-1.4
11-*Okaz* (Saudi newspaper)	0.4	0.2
12-*Al-Madinah* (Saudi newspaper)	-0.7	-0.0
13-*Al-Belad* (Saudi newspaper)	-0.3	0.0
14-*Al-Nadwah* (Saudi newspaper)	-0.4	0.2
15-*Riyadh* (Saudi newspaper)	-0.4	0.2
16-*Al-jazeerah* (Saudi newspaper)	-0.2	0.0
17-*Al-Yaoum* (Saudi newspaper)	-0.2	0.1
18-*Iqra* (Saudi magazine)	-0.4	-0.0
19-*Al-Yamamah* (Saudi magazine)	-0.7	-0.6
20-Pamphlets	-0.9	-0.6
21-Video Cassettes	-0.5	0.0
22-Discussion with close family	-0.1	1.0
23-Discussion with other relatives	-0.4	0.2
24-Discussion with friends	0.6	0.1
25-Discussion with co-workers	1.0	-0.5
26-Discussion with non-Saudis	-0.3	-1.0
27-Audio Cassettes	0.6	1.9
28-Friday prayer ceremonies	1.1	2.5
29-Discussion with Saudi "strangers"	-1.0	-0.3
30-Discussion with Westerners	0.1	-1.1

Notes

[1] It is widely believed that most people in the kingdom learned about the August 2, 1991, invasion from radio stations operated by neighboring Arab states or from Western stations such as the BBC, RMCME, or VOA. Although the exact day and time that Saudi Arabia officially acknowledged the invasion is a matter of speculation, it was at least 48 hours after the invasion. The Saudi government has said that this was done in order to give behind-the-scenes negotiations for Iraqi withdrawal time to work.

[2] A United States Information Agency (USIA) study in Saudi Arabian urban areas between December 5 and 25, 1990 highlights Gulf crisis radio listening levels. All respondents in the USIA Saudi survey used radio as a daily information source. To illustrate the impact of radio listening before and after the invasion, Saudi nationals were asked about regular listening before the August 2 invasion, during August and September, and finally in December. Results indicated that before the invasion 1% listened regularly to the BBC; in August and September, 35% were regular listeners; in December the percentage had increased to 40%. All radio services, but especially those from the West, had increased listenership. The percentages of radio listeners in the kingdom were higher for non-Saudi residents (United States Information Agency, 1991).

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Markham Competition

JOURNALISTIC EXCELLENCE IN TWO DIFFERENT POLITICAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AMERICAN AND CHINESE NEWS REPORTING AWARDS

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Markham Competition

Journalistic Excellence in Two Different Political Systems:

A Comparative Study of American and Chinese News Reporting Awards

ABSTRACT

This study employed a researcher-analyst-narrator framework to compare the standard of journalistic excellence shown in news reporting awards in the United States and China from 1979 to 1984. The Pulitzer Prize represents news award under democratic capitalism while the National Award for Good Journalism represents of news award under communism. Standard of journalistic excellence is recognized as a product of the interplay of political system, media structure, the regulations of the award and composition of juries.

The popularity of topics on economy and finance reflects China's quest for development. The Pulitzer Prize showed its muckraking heritage with exposure of graft and corruption as the most popular topic. Prize-winning stories in both systems were characterized by opinionated reports. Objectivity was not treasured as journalistic excellence.

Discrepancies were found in the latent and manifest criteria of selection. The manifest criteria of the two awards showed that the Chinese award emphasized the narrative excellence while its American counterpart emphasized analytic excellence of journalists. Comparing the latent attributes, both showed emphasis on narrative skills. Even though the Pulitzer Prize commended news reports that stirred up reforms, most of the prize-winning stories still follow the policy of the current administration.

A considerable amount of Chinese prize-winning stories kept neutrality on the issue covered while Pulitzer-winning stories showed a stronger journalist's dedication to news reporting. The weakness in news event analysis and the desirability of critical reporting as standard of journalistic excellence points to the need for new direction in journalism education.

Journalistic Excellence in Two Different Political Systems: A Comparative Study of American and Chinese News Reporting Awards

INTRODUCTION

Journalism is probably the earliest area of study in the field of mass communication. In the early years, journalism schools only taught press history, printing knowledge, then added the skill of newswriting and reporting. Gradually, the approach of social science is introduced into the curriculum. Research focus changed from strengthening journalism as a profession to exploring the role of the press as agent of social control or maintainin the status quo.

Stemming from Breed's study (1955) on social control in newsroom, a vast amount of literature have examined the co-operative relationship between the press and government (e.g. Paley & McIntyle, 1971; Tunstall, 1971; Tuchman, 1977), the power-centered orientation in the newsgathering process (e.g.Cohen & Young ed., 1976) , the press as an established institution (e.g. Sigal, 1973; Herman, 1985) and various structural constraints on newsgathering and presentation style (e.g. Gans, 1979; Bennett et al., 1985; Jensen, 1987; Brown et al., 1987). As the critical paradigm (Hall, 1982) is sweeping through the academic circle, criticism on the press and the mass media became the rule rather than exception.

These criticisms certainly have enhanced our understanding of the problems underlying the profession and their deleterious effects on society. However, the pessimism prevails in these studies which laments over the profession as a tool serving the establishment's interest has overlooked the potential of the press as one of the leading forces in social change. When we review the modern history of both Western and Oriental countries, the press, especially the revolutionary and the underground press, played a significant role in advocating revolution and reforms (Passin, 1963). Besides the active role such transitional press has played, the mainstream press has also pushed for social reforms and political changes. In the United States, the resignation of the top leader of America as a result of the uncovering of the Watergate scandal, national park preservation and changes in the Federal tax law are among the better-known examples in mainstream press.

Moreover, the criticism on the pro-establishment attitude of the press only addressed to the objective or neutral journalistic orientation. Another equally distinguished journalistic orientation - the participant orientation - has been neglected. Participant-oriented journalists aim to change the society by advocating new ideas or criticizing the establishment through their reporting (Janowitz, 1975; Fjaestad & Holmlov, 1976; Lowenstein, 1979). Even though the neutral orientation seems to be the dominant mode of practice (Weaver & Wilhoit, 1986), the most significant impact of the press can be achieved by a small group of influential journalists. Current discussion of the press with a cross-national perspective usually adopts a simple and stereotypical approach such as the Western press is objective and the Communist press is subjective and propagandistic (e.g. Peterson et. al., 1959., Yu, 1979, Lendval, 1983). These discussions have omitted the possible diversity in journalistic practices in the same country.

This study on new stories demonstrating journalistic excellence attempts to identify the standard that journalist had achieved and the attributes of journalistic excellence in the eyes of experts. It serves to provide a fair evaluation of journalistic performance in their maximum capacity and reverse the scope in current studies on the press which paid little attention to differentiate between distinguished and mediocre journalistic practices. In this study, the Pulitzer Prize in the United States and the National Award for Good Journalism in China were chosen as representative of journalistic excellence in the two countries respectively.

The selection criteria of news reporting awards can be viewed as the definition of journalistic excellence laid down by the judges of the award. These criteria can be manifest or latent and discrepancy may occur between the two. To have a comprehensive understanding of the standard of journalistic excellence, both the latent and the manifest criteria had to be identified.

Standard of journalistic excellence is a product of the interplay between the political system, media structure, regulations of the award systems and the composition of juries. It consists of a set of attributes which distinguish mediocre practice from distinguished practice. It reflects the desirable practices or ideal that can set example for fellow journalists to follow. The composition of the judging body determines the outcome of the awards. If the judges of the prize are composed of practitioners, then the selection criteria reflects practitioners' opinion on journalistic excellence, if the judges of the prize are composed of academics, then the selection criteria reflect academic's perspective. The standard is normative in nature. Political system, as the setting under which the press operates, is an important factor to explain the differences in selection criteria of reporting awards. In this study, the relationship between the standard of journalistic excellence and the politico-economic system is examined. The two political systems under comparison are democratic capitalism represented by the United States and communism represented by China. Rather than explaining journalistic practice by simple political environmental determinism, this study of journalistic excellence employed a tri-partite researcher-analyst-narrator framework to analyse the commonalities and differences in award-winning news stories in different systems. It is an exploratory attempt to reveal the nature of journalistic excellence and develop a standard of journalistic excellence in news reporting through a cross-national comparison.

Mainland China and the United States were chosen as representatives of communism and democratic capitalism because of their comparable large size and population. Both have significant political influences on each side of the hemisphere and have an established annual news award system. The National Award for Good Journalism was chosen as the representative of news awards in China because it is national and is the most authoritative one in the country. For the United States, the Pulitzer Prize was chosen for its long history in the United States and worldwide reputation. The time-frame of this study was 1979 to 1984. There are two reasons for choosing this period: the availability of data and the the historical significance of the period to both countries. The National Award for Good Journalism was established in 1980 to award news stories published in 1979 and the starting point of comparison cannot be earlier than 1979. To China, the year of 1979 marked the consolidation of Deng Xiaoping's power in the Chinese political scene and the reversion of the leftist policies of the "Gang of Four". The country started to re-open its door to the west and underwent substantial economic reform. It can be viewed as a watershed period in contemporary Chinese history. The year of 1979 is also a critical point to United States with the Iranian hostage crisis paving the way for the defeat of Jimmy Carter by Ronald Reagan in the presidential election of 1980. Reagan is one of the most popular presidents of the United States, but his large budget deficit and welfare-cutting policies largely reverted the Great Society Movement laid down by his Democrat predecessors (Chafe, 1986; Kaplan & Cuiciti, 1986; Reed, 1987).

Three main elements have to be considered in discussing the structure of the press: 1) The government's policy towards the press including regulation and editorial influence on the press; 2) the ownership pattern and organizational characteristics of newspapers and 3) newspaper circulation and readership.

In China, the Communist Party controls the realm of all cultural enterprises and operates them as an ideological machine. The Propaganda Department of the Party's Central Committee is the top director of all mass media in China. The press structure is designed by the government with dual status vertically and horizontally. Vertically, parallel to the hierachical structure of the political system, newspapers are published at different administrative levels: central, provincial, city and county level. Horizontally, the press is divided by functions. Besides the general newspapers, there are functional newspapers published by functional institutions with a specialized readership. *Liberation Army Daily*, published by the General Political Department of the Army, is an example of central functional newspaper.

The Party also influences the recruitment of news staff. Nearly 50% of professional staff are Party members. Non-party members are obliged by the National Council's regulation to "support Communist Party leadership, warmly love socialism, strive to study Marxism-Lennism-Mao-Zedong Thought and implement the Party's line, principles and policies,"(Houn, 1981). Most of the reporters still have to follow the life-long staffing system. The newspaper with which they first work will most probably be the newspaper they worked for life. Newspaper circulation is controlled by Post Office who handled the subscription. Office subscription is a common practice. Only entertainment newspapers enjoy high individual subscription rate.

In this author's view, the Chinese press is a hybrid of intelligence service for the government and public press. The press, besides publishing regularly for the public, has frequent internal communication with all the departmental units through internal newsletters. The mass work department of every newspaper is a special unit for forwarding the readers' complaints to the relevant departmental units. If the mass work department cannot gain any response from the units, they can refer the case to Party Secretariat for further scrutiny. This kind of case-referral system has fostered a cautious treatment of criticism and complaints.

After the Third Plenum Session, the reformist headed by Deng Xiaoping proclaimed the open door policy and the goal of the Four Modernizations in "military, industry, technology and agriculture." Journalistic practices underwent several changes from traditional communist dogma. Editorial emphasis shifted from political struggle to more factual reporting of pressing issues in economic development. The task the government assigned to the press was no longer class struggle but a means to achieve stability and solidarity for development. Human interest and criticism on bureaucratism, once a taboo topic, were then permitted (Chu, 1978, 1986; Lee, 1980, Ha, 1987).

Another characteristic of the Chinese journalistic style is the mixture of literary and news writing. Sometimes the two resemble each other so much that a reader cannot distinguish if he is reading a novel or news story. Many of the incumbent reporters of Chinese newspapers are either graduates in Chinese literature or holding a professional writer title. Reporters are so much influenced by literature that they tend to write their feelings and imagination into the story rather than reporting the facts (Li, 1983).

A further exogenous factor must also be taken into consideration in analyzing the current Chinese press - the impact of Western journalistic influence as a result of the Open Door policy. Western journalistic style is introduced through the translation of western journalism books and introductory articles published in professional magazines such as *News Front*. Although evaluating such impact is beyond the scope of this study, some western elements such as the inverted pyramid style are expected to be found in the Chinese prize-winning stories.

The American press structure is greatly different from its Chinese counterpart. Adopting a pluralist policy and abiding by the American Constitution, the government generally adopts a laissez-faire policy towards the print media (Edgar & Rahim, 1983). All newspapers are privately owned and operation is independent of government. A major feature of American newspaper ownership is chain ownership in the hands of four big newspaper groups. They control 63% of all dailies and 22% of total circulation in 1982 (Schramm & Porter, 1982). There is no clear designation of national or state press except several newspapers with national reputation such as the *New York Times*, *USA Today*, and *The Wall Street Journal* etc.

Since newspapers are privately owned, the recruitment of journalists depends on the recruitment policy of the individual paper. High job mobility allows high turnover of news staff. Newspaper's distribution and subscription are run by newspaper's own circulation department. Despite Americans' high literacy rate, readership of newspaper in the United States is much lower than China. Such phenonmenon can be attributed to the popularity of television and the lack of a centrally-organized distribution system similar to that of China (Nathan, 1985).

Edwin (1978) and Boylan (1986) characterized the development of modern American press as the dialectic shifting of emphasis between investigative reporting and objective reporting. The shifting of journalistic style reflects the changes in the relationship between the government and the press. Moving from the dark age of partisan press and yellow journalism at the beginning of the 20th century, the adversary role of the press was adopted by a group of writers and magazine journalists. They developed a new journalistic style called muckraking which aimed at exposing the wrongdoings of authorities or darkside of the society. It was these muckrakers who set up the tradition of investigative reporting and won the status of the "Fourth Estate" for the American press. This type of journalistic pracitice is based on the belief that serious wrongs could be remedied or changes could be brought about by informing the public so that they can exercise their rights through political and legislative actions (Paneth, 1982). Currently, the American press is dominated by objective reporting which journalists keep neutrality on news events by their overarching consensus with the government (Weaver and Wilhoit, 1986). Yet the muckraking tradition still exercise a significant influence on many journalists who took pride on the exposition of the Watergate Scandal and the Pentagon Papers in the 1970s.

THE PULITZER PRIZE AND THE NATIONAL AWARD FOR GOOD JOURNALISM

News awards is a recognition of the importance of professionalization in news reporting and expected to set models for journalists to follow. As Hohenberg (1974) explained, the changes in award categories in the Pulitzer Prize is in accordance with the need of the field as an encouragement to the development of important underdeveloped areas for journalism.

The Pulitzer Prize

The Pulitzer Prize can be viewed as one of the tools of Joseph Pulitzer to realize his desire of professionalizing journalism similar to the profession of law and medicine (Hohenberg, 1974). Pulitzer donated a sum of two million US dollars to Columbia University in 1903 for setting up the Pulitzer Prize Fund and estalished a school of Journalism in Columbia University which laid down the close relationship between the Prize and the Columbia School of Journalism. Since 1917, the award is conferred by the Columbia University upon the recommendation of the Pulitzer Prize Board. Reporting prizes, as one of the award categories, is awarded for "the best example of a reporter's work during the year, the test being strict accuracy, terseness, the accomplishment of some public good commanding public attention and respect" (Hohenberg, 1974). There were two major types of news awards: one for the newsapaper only (the Meritorious Public Service Prize) and one for the individual journalist/reporter (reporting prize). Compared to the National Award for Good Journalism in China, the award categories of the Putlizer Prize are much more specific. Geographic coverage (local/national/international), scope of news content (general/specialized/investigative/ explanatory) and style (news reports/features) are distinguished as different prize categories.

Despite the various changes in award categories, the three-tiered system of the screening process maintains to the present following the will of Pulitzer. On the top of the screening system are the Trustees of the Columbia University comprised of scholars and veteran journalists. Although they have the final say on the winner of the prize, they can only act on the recommendation of the Advisory Board of the Pulitzer Prize. While the Trustees may accept or reject a recommendation, they may not substitute an award other than those recommended by the Advisory Board (Fischer & Trump, 1980).

The key decision on the choice of prize-winners rests in the hands mainly at the middle level: the 15-member Advisory Board. The Board is comprised of eminent journalists with Pulitzer's descendent as chairman by tradition. It has the power of appointing juries at the bottom level of the screening process and their approval is needed before submitting the recommendation to the Trustees (Hohenberg, 1974). Juries of distinguished newspapermen screen all the exhibits submitted for the Pultizer Prize. The standard being a five-member jury for each category.

The National Award for Good Journalism

Compared to the 70-year old Pulitzer Prize, China's National Award for Good Journalism is just a child of nine years old by 1987. This award is very significant in China because it has not only reflected the changes in attitude toward the journalism profession by granting professional status to journalists, reversing the "barefoot journalism" conception during the reign of the "Gang of Four", but also serves as an indicator of the degree of press freedom given to journalists by the government.

The Award was jointly established in 1980 by the Beijing Journalism Association and the editorial department of the most authoritative journalists' magazine in China, *News Front*. The award is funded by the National Union of Journalism Associations of China. Since the fourth year of the award, the venue of screening activities changed from Beijing only to different province in rotation.

According to the call for nomination published in the *News Front*, the purpose of the award is to "push for press reforms, improve news reporting and encourage more writing of "timely news, short news and quality news". "Good Journalism" in China means distinguished journalism and does not mean upbeat and favorable good news.

The criteria of selection are based on the Vice-Premier of the State Council, Xi Zhongxun's advocacy on "true, short, prompt, lively and strong" news, stressing the innovativeness and social impact of the news reports. Innovativeness means newness in time, newness in theme, newness in content and newness in presentation. Social impact of reporting means the provision of guidance on working, education to the mass, and opinion leadership in daily living.

The National Award for Good Journalism also employed a three-tier screening structure. Its levels were parallel to its hierarchial press structure. Apart from award at national level, each province and each press unit has its own news award. Nomination of exhibits for the national award is open to the public. Its system is much more complex than the Pulitzer Prize because of its semi-official nature.

The preliminary screening is done by the veterans of the editorial department of *News Front* and journalism academics. The results of the preliminary screening are submitted to a second-round screening panel composed of representatives of eight news organizations: *People's Daily*, the New China News Agency, the *Liberation Army Daily*, the Capital Journalism Association, the Institute of Journalism Practice Section of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the journalism departments of the People's University, Beijing Institute of Broadcasting, and the editorial department of *News Front*.

The final round of screening is done by renown experts in the field and the chiefs of major news organizations including the Director of the News Bureau of the Central Propaganda Department. The task of the final selection is just to determine the class of award. On rare occasions, it rejected the candidacy of certain entries for the award after receiving complaints or reports of falsehood. Organizers also imposed limits on story length and amount of submission. For news report entries, the maximum length is 1200 words; for feature writing entries, the maximum length is 3000 words. The entries quota for second-round screening of each province is based on its amount of newspapers and stations. The higher the number of newspapers a province has, the more the quota will be allocated to the province in the second-round screening.

There is a remarkable difference in the composition of juries in the two awards. The Pulitzer Prize is dominated by practitioners while the National Award for Good Journalism is dominated by both practitioners and academics. The official elements in the National Award for Good Journalism are more of a political ritual because the number of officials is a minority which cannot affect the decision results by majority votes. Understanding this difference in composition, it is expected that the Pulitzer Prize reflects more the viewpoints of practitioners than the National Award for Good Journalism.

Studies on mass media awards as a phenomenon are seldomly found. Interestingly, all such award studies focussed on non-literal visual or audio-visual media such as news photos, TV news photography or movies. None addressed the issue of the standard of excellence. Singletary and Lamb's study (1974) on news elements in award-winning photos is one of the few studies to use mass media awards as the subject of analysis in mass communication research. Tension, conflict, and timeliness were found as common attributes of award-winng photos.

The Oscar Award was criticized by Real (1985) as a ceremony for funding of the Academy of Motion Piciture, Arts and Science, making profits for Television networks and promoting Hollywood films. His study only concentrated on the economic benefit generated by the award and did not examine the content of the movies or selection criteria of the award.

Attention to news reporting awards had not gone beyond compiling winning stories into volumes (e.g. Rucker, 1975; Hohenberg, 1974; 1980) or making occasional criticisms (e.g. Irvine, 1980; Estabrook, 1984). Hohenberg's first history of the Pulitzer Prize (1974) and his two volumes of anthology of Prize-winning stories in 1974 and 1980 respectively are the major works on the

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Pulitzer Prize. The preference of sensational stories by Pulitzer jurors can be deduced from Plunkett's criticism (1968) of sensationalism in Pulitzer prizewinning photos. Besides Hohenberg's historical review, there has been no systematic study on the Pulitzer prize-winning news reporting to the best of this author's knowledge.

The National Award for Good Journalism has been studied only by this author. The award reflected the changes in the Chinese journalists' conception of news in which the notion of surveillance, competition and promotional effectiveness were emphasized in conferring news news reporting awards (Ha, 1987). One study which shares similar conception on standard of excellence was found in a recent survey of academic journal reviewers' perceived standard in screening of submissions (Wearden & Endres, 1991). Only manifest standards for selection were identified.

In this study, whether the prize selection is fair is not the major concern. We only wish to tap and compare the standards for journalistic excellence exemplified by the prize-winning stories employing a researcher-analyst-narrator framework.

THE RESEARCHER-ANALYST-NARRATOR FRAMEWORK

In essence, the researcher-analyst-narrator framework is a synthesis of the three major stages in the process of news reporting from numerous works on news reporting skills. Journalists' practices in each stage affect the final news product. The standard of journalistic excellence is set on the news product taken into consideration of the three stages in the process of news reporting. Attributes of the standard may be latent or manifest in the criteria of selection. News Reporter as Researcher

The first stage of the news reporting process is news gathering or collection of information. Reporters have to define their news net or frame of reference. The question to the journalist at this stage is to identify newsworthy happenings and personalities and gather information on these happenings and personalities. As Tiffen (1978) noted, breakthrough from structural constraints such as difficulty in gaining access to information and exclusiveness are the main discrepancies between mediocre and outstanding journalistic practices. In examining the standard for journalistic excellence, the newsgathering process of obtaining background information and exclusiveness in reporting is a refutation to the criticism of lacking background information and bandwagon journalistic practices (pack journalism). In the newsgathering stage, four attributes of excellence were examined: 1) Choice of principal actors covered in the story, 2) choice of topic, 3) depth of reporting, and 4) cost of newsgathering.

Choice of Principal Actors

Abundant literature on news studies revealed that journalists often focus on the elite class in society. How far is this true in news stories demonstrating journalistic excellence has never been examined. In this study, principal actors refer to the personalities that was the focus in the news reports. Eleven types of principal actors of different social status were identified as latent preference of the judges. The typology of principal actors

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was a slight modification of Schramm & Atwood's scheme (1981) of analysis of Asian news:

1) government officials (including senators, military officer and party officials)
2) interest groups such as labor union, professional associations
3) businessmen (owner of an enterprise)
4) academic (at college level or above)
5) workers or farmers in general in an unorganized form
6) middle management executives doing administrative work with policy-making power
7) professional or non-political celebrity figures e.g. teachers, lawyers, movie stars.
8) students
9) children
10) public in general
11) other

Choice of Topics

The choice of topics in prize-winning stories also reflects the concern and interest of the judges. By modifying Hohenberg's classification scheme (1974), the prize-winning categories were categorized into 16 mutually exclusive types. The 16 topics identified were :

1) Exposing graft and corruption at all levels of government
2) War
3) Crime
4) Social problems at large such as education, social welfare
5) Community affairs and improvement
6) Human interest
7) Domestic governmental news
8) Disasasters and accidents
9) Science and Technology
10) Diplomatic or foreign governmental news
11) Ecological problems
12) Sports and games
13) Culture activities
14) Economy and Finance
15) Non-technological innovation such as new method of management
16) Other

Depth of Reporting

Overemphasis of spot news events over issues in reporting had been a major crticism on the western press (Tiffen, 1978; Galtung & Ruge, 1965). The judge's preference on issue reporting or event reporting can reflect the depth that journalists should excel. Event was defined in this study as happening that lasts for a specific period of time. It could be transformed into an issue through follow-up stories and in-depth analysis. News issue could originate from an event or from a phenomenon reported by the journalist to stimulate pulbic discussion. News issue was characterized by analysis of trend and availability of substantial background information.

Cost of Newsgathering

Apart from the news focus, how much efforts journalists had put together for their stories was another important constituents of journalistic excellence. The cost of newsgathering in this study refers not only to the monetary amount spent on the gathering of information but also the efforts put to get the story such as team work, sourcing of background information, self-initiativeness and large scale investigation. Six different news collection method were identified including single source personal interview, solicitation of controversial sources for balance of opinion, investigation or eye-witness by the reporter, press conference or situations that reporters are invited, multiple sources showing consensus opinion, and other unconventional method. In this study, the ranking of method by amount of efforts descending order are investigation by reporter, controversial sources, multiple sources, personal interview and and press conference. Among the six methods, press conference is considered as the lowest in newsgathering cost because information are ready for the reporter. When the number of sources employed is higher, the cost of news collection would also be higher as it shows additional efforts of the journalists.

News Reporters as Analyst

After newsgathering stage, the reporter has to interpret and assign meaning to each piece of information he collected. Acting as an analyst of news event, there are three attributes of excellence that journalist can achieve: 1) Objectivity in evaluating the information, 2) interpretation of news event from the perspective of current administration policy, 3)level of criticism in reporting problems.

Objectivity

Journalists have been accused that they equate "objectivity" to "truth" by some theorists (e.g. Tuchman, 1978). Atkins (1979) made an effort to explain journalistic objectivity by borrowing from the historian's debate idealist objectivity and positivist objectivity. Idealist objectivity is the critical evaluation of sources and information and immersion in the physical evidence by the writer. To him, news objectivity should be defined as an idealist form of objectivity because journalism by its nature, requires interpretation and empathy of understanding of mind and feeling of the interviewees. Gans (1979) further explained the essence of news objectivity as the intent of the profession, rather than a complete exclusion of opinions.

In this study, journalistic objectivity is defined as a type of journalistic analytical approach. Four indicators of employing objectivity in news analysis by reporters were identified following Tuchman's (1972) characterization of objective style of journalists:

1) The number of sources. The number of news sources in this study is computed by the number of non-repetitive and identifiable attribution. The more diversified the source, the higher the objectivity.
2) Presentation of conflicting possibilities. Presence of conflicting possibilities is measured by - the inclusion of controversial opinion on the same issue in the news story.
3) Presentation of supporting evidence. A five-point index was employed to measure the degree intensity of opinion expression and provision of supporting evidence. The range is from no opinion, opinion given by interviewees only, opinion with sufficient supportive evidence, opinion with some supportive evidence, and opinion without supportive evidence.
4) Usage of Direct Quotations. Direct quotation is defined as a phrase or sentence enclosed by quotation marks and th[illegible] of the phrase is identifiable. Employme[illegible]ect quotation is an objective form of presenting the opinion of the interviewee. A four-point scale ranging from of direct quotation usage to very frequent usage was constructed to measure the frequency of usage in proportion to the opinion given by the sources.

Adherence to the Perspective of Current Administration Policy

The press have been criticized as policy-trailers maintaining the status quo and the power structure without an independent voice. In stories demonstrating journalistic excellence, whether this view can still be applied was unknown. In this study, the journalists' adherence to current administration's policy was examined by comparing the policy of the current administration under study and the viewpoint of the news story (if any). The winner would be considered as policy trailer if the story supported or followed the published domestic or foreign policy of the government or the ruling party. The winner would be regarded as an independent voice if the reports were disjunctive with the government policy or party line.

Criticism

Criticism news reporting is the identification of a problem in society. Such reporting requires journalists to exercise his analytical power to judge the right and wrong of a news event and the scope of the problem. In this study, two types of criticism of different depth of analysis shown in the story (Gallagher, 1977) were examined:

1. Scandals which focus on the misbehavior of a particular individual or group.
2. Criticism with substance that dig into the root of a problem such as interlocking interest between large corporation and public enterprise providing with demand or solution.

Another perspective to analyze the reporting of criticism is its level of cause attribution. The level of causes of on the problems covered by the prize-winning news stories can show the journalists' generalization power of their reported problems. Four levels were identified in this study:

1. Individual level (e.g. an official, a criminal)
2. Group level (e.g. a gang of youth, minority group)
3. Institutional level (e.g. Federal Tax Bureau, school)
4. Structural level (e.g. command economy, party line, official corruption in general).

News Reporter as Narrator

Narration is a process to present the information attractively and comprehensibly to readers. After the newsgathering and the analytic stages, a news reporter has to decide how he should narrate his information to readers through various newswriting techniques. Apart from an overall appreciation of narrative skills, two specific newswriting techniques that may constitute journalistic excellence were examined: 1) non-conventional use of story structure, and 2) non-conventional use of story lead.

Story Structure

Story structure is defined as the presentation order and organization of a news story. Two major types of conventional news structure (Hill & Breen, 1977) were identified in this study:

1) Inverted pyramid structure: the basic design used for the most straight news stories. The most important facts are blurted out in the first paragraph and the reporter works his way down to and through the trivial facts (i.e. in order of decreasing importance) which facilitate readers to finish a story in a short period of time.

2) Chronological structure: the structure of the story is presented by temporal order instead of significance order, writing the story from the beginning of the event of issue until the latest development. A variation of this structure would be started from the latest development in the first paragraph and then told the story in chronological order.

Non-conventional story structure refers to any story structure other than the two structures.

Story Lead

A lead is the first paragraph in a news story. As Mencher's popular newswriting textbook (1979) explains, a lead should either capture the essence of the event or attract the reader to read the story. Although writers of newswriting textbooks have offered different classifications of leads, the typology of Metz (1985) was employed in this study because the distiniction is clear and represents a variety of style and mastery of writing skill. Leads are differentiated into six categories:

1. Striking statement - using an exciting statement of a "Gee whiz" sense as the first paragraph.
2. Summary Lead - present a synopsis of the entire story for the reader in the first paragraph.
3. Direct Address - using "you" or directly addressing the reader in the first paragraph.
4. Narrative Lead - an introductory paragraph to the whole story which contain no significant information of the event or issue covered.
5. Descriptive Lead - description of the scenerio of the event covered in the first paragraph.
6. Unclassifiable lead - any lead that does not belong to any one of the above types.

Understanding the journalistic tradition of both countries, conventional story lead in the

United States would be summary lead while its Chinese counterpart would be narrative lead.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Both the method of documentation analysis and content analysis were employed for this study. Interviews with award-winning journalists and jurors of the National Award for Good Journalism in China were also conducted to supplement information on the details of the selection procedures and the process of newsgathering and reporting in China.

The problem of equivalence must be addressed by the comparative researcher so that the concepts tested and data obtained are meaningful and comparable (Przeworski & Teune, 1967; Smelser, 1973). There are three types of equivalence: 1) conceptual equivalence, 2) measurement equivalence and 3) linguistic equivalence. In this study, these equivalences were established in the following ways:

Conceptual equivalence concerns whether the concepts or variables used in the study are comparable. To facilitate the comparability of the concepts, all concepts used in this study were of a universally identifiable dimension with high level of abstraction such as political system, newsgathering, objectivity, story structure etc. The major equivalence problem in this study is measurement validity in cross-national comparison. For example, the difference in media structure, composition of news award judging body and the difference in award categories posed problems in measuring the selection criteria of the prize-winning stories. However, since both the Pulitzer Prize and the National Award for Good Journalism are institutions of highest journalistic honor and the composition of juries of both awards are experts in the field, the employment of award-winning stories as indicators of journalistic excellence can be justified. Multiple indicators tapping the same concept can also alleviate the problem. In this study, objectivity was measured by four indicators including the diveristy of sources, usage of direct quotations, provision of supporting evidence and the presence of conflicting opinion. Concepts such as cost of newsgathering and sacrifice of reporters were examined by both the text of the prize-winning stories and documentation of nomination and recommendation.

The problem of language difference has also been taken account in this study. The perception of value-judgment words may be different across different cultures. To reduce intercoder error as a result of language and cultural difference, we trained six sophomore journalism students of the Chinese University as bilingual coders who were proficient in both English and Chinese and had taken courses in newswriting, professional ethics and mass communication histories in China and the United States. In addition, three native-born Americans who stayed in Hong Kong as visiting teaching assistants of the English Department at the university also participated in the coding of the Pulitzer-prize winning stories. The author served as the second coder for all the stories.

The study began with collection of all the available documentation such as jurors' reports and recommendations, comments on the prize-winning stories found in various journalism review periodicals, celebrative advertisements for the prize-winners and biographical materials on the prize-winning journalists, etc. From these documents, we can understand the manifest selection criteria of the award and identify the various attributes of journalistic excellence. After obtaining such background information, their manifested criteria were matched to the results of the content analysis of the prize-winning stories to see if there is any latent criteria and discrepancy between the two criteria.

The unit of analysis in our content analysis was individual prize-winning story. For stories that were in series form of with follow-up stories, only the first one of the series was analysed because in usual practice, the first one would contain the most important information on the topic covered and best written to attract readers. By so doing, we could also minimize the bias caused by story length and multiple stories.

The whole population of Pulitzer-prize winning stories from the publication year of 1979 to 1984 were analysed because only one winner was awarded in each category. For the Chinese award, only the winners of the the Distinguished Prize and First Class Award were included in this analysis since the study aimed only at the "best stories" in the eyes of the experts. However in the year between 1981 to 1983, all the prize-winning stories were analysed because there was no distinction of class.

The sampling frame of this study was a complete list of the winning entries of news stories published within the period of 1979 to 1984 for both awards. The six publication year of the two awards was identical to control the international environment. Only reporting categories - feature writing and news reporting were analysed.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

A total of 194 prize-winning stories were coded. Coder reliability across all the studied attributes of journalistic excellence was 0.702. Pulitzer Prize accounted for 39 (20.1%) of the total and the National Award for Good Journalism accounted for 155 (79.9%) of the total. Winners of the Pulitzer Prize reflected the American press structure. The Pulitzer roster was dominated by group newspapers (71.8%). The Knight-Ridder Newspaper group, being the largest newspaper group in the United States, had the largest share of award (20%). In China, newspapers at the highest level of the hierarchy such as the central and provincial newspapers won most of the awards.

Among the news reporting award, news reports occupied 51% and feature writing occupied 49% in the National Award for Good Journalism. The Pulitzer Prize emphasized more on news reporting which accounts for about 80% of the prizes. The remaining 20% of the prizes are non-news reporting categories such as feature writing and explanatory journalism.

A great difference is found in reporting format between the Pulitzer prize-winning stories and the Chinese award-winning stories and it came as no surprise. The limitation of story length and regulation of the number of story submission determined that most of Chinese prize-winning stories are single story. In a less restricted situation like the Pulitzer Prize, series are the most favorite reporting format and cumulative comes second. All the single stories among the winning entries under study belonged to feature writing and explanatory journalism.

Due to the formidable length of the prize-winning series, most of them are published on Sundays when newspaper had the most readership and more space could be allocated to the report.

The documents on the award's manifest criteria of selection showed a great difference between the two countries in their emphasis. The Chinese news reporting award showed a strong emphasis on the narrative skill in journalistic excellence. A majority of prize-winning stories in China were commended for their writing skill and style (76.8%) while its American counterpart mentioned this attribute least (20.6%). The Deputy Editor-in-chief of the Jiefang Daily explained that evaluating excellency in writing skill of the text is easier for the judges which composed of academic and practitioners. Many of them could not understand the background of a story and difficult to appreciate the behind-the-scene process of a news story.

In the analyst stage, the story's push for reform is most popular reason for selection in the Pulitzer Prize (67.6%). The Chinese award showed preference on stories providing moral guidance and education for its readers (67.1%). The researcher stage has been given moderate attention with timeliness and exclusiveness being most often mentioned in both the Pulitzer Prize (35.3%) and the National Award for Good Journalism (24.5%).

In commending the deeds of journalists, what the journalists have sacrified for the story are always impressive and taken into consideration by the judges. Sacrifice in publishing the story is an indicator of the commitment of journalists to the event or issue being reported. By comparing the differences in sacrifice of the reporting institution or journalists in publishing the story, we can understand the degree of professional dedication of the press in both systems. Prize-winning journalists in a system of democratic capitalism has a higher probability of encountering unpleasant consequences than prize-winning journalists in a communist system. The sacrifice ranges from life endangerment to the reporter such as *St. Petersburg Times*' coverage of Scientology, cancellation of subscription by *Forth Worth Star-Telegram*'s coverage of mast bumping caused by unsafe helicopters, to letter of protest like *Charlotte Observer*'s coverage of Cotton Dust. Besides professional dedication, the cooperation and alliance of the reporter and his reporting institution also explain why they did not concede to such threat and persisted publishing of the stories. These unpleasant consequences in one way or another demonstrate the difficulties and risks to the reporter or reporting institutions in reporting criticisms. Certainly, not every prize-winning story brought unpleasant consequences and newspapers were likely to avoid un necessary sacrifice as much as possible (Roschco, 1975). The Chinese prize-winning journalists, as mentioned above, are very cautious in reporting criticism. They are both trained and taught by history to be cautious. During the anti-Rightist Campaign and the Cultural Revolution, journalists who wrote on the Party's wrongdoings were severly punished as counterrevolutionaries. As one of the veteran journalists who suffered greatly during that period confessed to this author in an interview, she now learnt to be cautious in writing criticism in a milder tone although she still believed that writing criticism is essential to the well-being of the people.

Content analysis of the award-winning stories reveal many latent attributes that were not found in the manifest criteria of selection. In the researcher stage, the news net of journalists demonstrating journalistic excellence was similar in the two countries under different systems. Government officials were the most frequently covered principal actors in the news stories (33.3% in American prize-winning stories, 37.4% in Chinese prize-winning stories).

In China, the working class was the second group most frequently covered in the Chinese award-winning stories. The general public was the second most important concern in American prize-winning stories.Youngsters were the group undercovered in both countries. Only 2.6% of American prize-winning stories and 3.2% of the Chinese prize-winning stories covered students or adolescents.

Interestingly, businessmen and middle management which constituted the vein of the economic sector, were also an underrepresented group in both countries. The stress on the importance of government affairs by judges may explain such outcome.

The greatest difference in coverage between the National Award for Good Journalism and the Pulitzer Prize is their topics of coverage. The quest for economic development in China during the period might account for economy and finance as the most popular prize-winning topic in China. Disasters and accidents, being the second most popular topic in the Pulitzer Prize roster, was among the least popular topic in the China award roster.

Human interest ranked the second most important topic among the Chinese prize-winning stories. Most of these stories were exemplary cases such as a city cleaning campaign organized by a group of old women. Exposures of graft and corruption in government ranked the third popular topic for the Chinese prize-winning stories. These three most popular topics of the prize-winning stories were in line with the manifest selection criteria of the award in encouraging reporting of reforms, models and criticisms.

Inheriting the muckraking tradition, exposures of graft and corruption continued to be the most popular topic of the Pulitzer prize-winning stories (23.1%). Social problems such as public education and scientology, scientific recovery, natural disasters and accidents were also popular prize-winning topics (12.8% for each topic). Another popular prize-winning topic is crime (10.3%). The Pulitzer Prize was less diversified in topics than its Chinese counterparts. Such phenomenon can be explained by the different in amount of awards given. The amount of awards of Pulitzer Prize was just a quarter of the total amount of the Distinguished and First Class Award in National Award for Good Journalism.

To the surprise of the Western press critics, the Pulitzer prize-winning stories has a higher proportion (76.9%) of discussion of issues than its communist counterpart (44.5%). Two factors can explain this phenomenon. First, most of the Pulitzer prize-winning stories were in-depth investigative reporting breaking the conventional practice of simple short stories so that details of a problem and its implication with trend analysis was possible. Secondly, the coverage of issues is advantageous to obtain favor from the judges because the time spent in newsgathering and depth of the story can easily be appreciated. For China, the limitation of story length is an obstacle for issue to be selected because usually an issue is discussed in considerable length with background information. From this finding, the claim that western journalists treasure spot event reporting more than communist journalists is a myth rather than a reality. Rather, we can say that due to space allocation and resource constraints, events are more often emphasized in the press. The discrepancy between what the press prefer and what they routinely practice as predicted by Tiffen (1978) is supported. With sufficient resources and space allocation, the proportion of events and issues in the newspaper can be balanced.

By our measure of the diversity of quoted news sources and examination of newsgathering method, it is found that Pulitzer-winning stories invest much more resources in gathering the news than its Chinese counterpart. Over 50% of American prize-winning stories obtain a high score in newsgathering cost while nearly 90% of the Chinese prize-winning stories have low score in newsgathering cost (Table 1).

A vast majority (87.2%) of the American prize-winning stories provide background information and analysis for the reader. In a communist system which is expected to emphasize trend analysis with its relative neglect of immediacy, the outcome is that prize-winning stories have lower proportion of stories containing background information. Only 38.7% of the prize-winning stories contain background information. Such a phenomenon can be attributed to the same exogenous factors affecting the proportion of events of issues - the limitation of story length and resources put on the gathering of a story. As shown in the above comparison of the cost of newsgathering between the political systems, the Chinese prize-winning stories invest much less than its American counterpart and individual work rather than team work is the Chinese journalistic practice. Thus the provision of background information which requires an extra work for journalists is highly dependent on the journalist's intiative. The phenomenon can also indicate one problem of the newspaper staff in the Chinese press - the lack of professional training and dedication among most journalists.

Besides breaking through the common practice of superficiality, the self-intiativeness of reporter in digging up news stories are highly favored by the jurors. The recommendation of exclusiveness is true to both communist and capitalist press (84.6%) although the communist is to a lesser extent (62.6%). The appreciation of exclusiveness and availability of background information showed indicated that breakthrough from pack journalism, passive reporting is another important common characteristic of research excellence while the problem of superficiality is has only been combated by the American prize-winning journalists.

In analysing the news events, there is also quite a significant difference between the interpretation in the Chinese and American prize-winning stories. As expected, with overt political restriction on the press, the majority (82.6%) of the Chinese prize-winning stories follows the party line of current Chinese administration. However, in America where the press is privately owned, over half of the prize-winning stories adhere the policy line of the Reagan administration. This is especially true in the reporting of international news when American interest is affected. Herman (1985) called this phenomenon in international news as a propagandist framework. For both China and the United States, many social problems were not attributed to the fault of the government policies but the fault of those officials who implement the policies. Violation of federal regulation in water supply, cotton dust standard, minority employment rate were such example found in the Pulitzer prize-winning stories. The exploitation of state-allocated fertilizer, state quota of official promotion were examples found in Chinese prize-winning stories. However, there is still a considerable portion of Pulitzer prize-winning stories (35.9%) challenging Carter's and Reagan's policies especially on the issue of nuclear power and disarmament.

The American prize-winning stories scored higher in observing all the objectivity rituals than its Chinese counterpart in playing the analyst role came as no suprise. Only 3.3% of all the prize-winning stories attain the absolute level of objectivity - no opinion (Table 2). Surprisingly, the five stories that no opinion can be found are the Chinese prize-winning stories which are expected to be "subjective". The objectivity ritual of refraining from giving personal opinion by quoting opinion of the news sources is kept more by the Chinese prize-winning journalists. So we can see that in presenting an opinion, the Chinese prize-winning journalists were much more cautious than their Amercian counterpart.

However, this is just an iceberg of the objectivity problem. When we examine the table carefully, opinion always exist in prize-winning news stories no matter in which form, from the journalists or from the news sources. Even if we classify opinion attributable to the interviewees as no opinion in the story, we still have 70% of the Chinese prize-winning stories and 84% of Pulitzer prize-winning stories that reporters inserted their own opinion. It is also necessary to point out an underlying problem found in the prize-winning news reporting: the existence of opinion without supportive evidence such as "Mr. Walesea, with an unerring instinct for issues that move blue-collar people, plays upon their sense of class revenge....Communists leaders are obsessed by their minority position. They are quick to spot anti-communist conspiracies even there they do not exist" (*New York Times*' coverage of the Polish Solidarity Movement), making prophecies such as "he would return to apologize", "he would say later" (*Philadelphia Inquirer*'s coverage of the Three Mile Island Radioactive Leakage) or "They wait for another assault by Thai soldiers who come to rape their women. Or for the Vietnamese troops to launch an allout offensive that would drive them across the border into Thailand" (*Louisville Courier-Journal*'s coverage of the Cambodian refugees' life).

Giving such opinion without supportive evidence can be appreciated as insights or intuition, but can also be denounced as rumours and premature judgement on the event. In this author's view, the provision of supportive evidence is an important distinction between news reporting and commentary writing. If reporter arbitrarily and easily insert his opinion without supportive evidence, then it will mean the revival of the era of yellow journalism where the press's credibility can be completely ruined. Moreover, reporting interviewees' opinion is still an opinion that affect the perception of the reader on the topic covered by the story, thus it is necessary that supportive evidences are accompanied with either the opinion of the interviewees or the reporters' opinion to ensure the quality of the opinion.

Diversity of news sources being quoted is a quantitative measure of news sources diversity. The Pulitzer prize-winning stories adhered more to this ritual and have a higher score in news sources diversity. Over half of the stories quoted over 10 sources in one story. Only 5.1% of the stories quoted less than three sources which were news features. Chinese prize-winning journalists, in contrast, were highly dependent on personal interview of a single source such as the Party secretary of a region and explored the one single source in great detail. Without a cross-checking mechanism of soliciting and comparing multiple sources, reporter will be easily controlled by the sources if he is not skeptical enough.

Increasing the number of news sources is the first step to prevent manipulation of the source. Multiple sources sought by the American prize-winning news journalists were more often reported as unanimity of opinion to an event (82.1%) rather than providing controversial opinion (56.4%). In the case of China, prize-winning journalists often did not use multiple sources thus controversy is seldomly found. The right and wrong of the actors and issues being reported often clearly distinguished to the readers.

The Pulitzer prize-winning stories also score higher than their Chinese counterpart in the frequency of using direct quotations. Usage of direct quotations is nearly a rule-of-thumb for American reporters as an objective presentation of an opinion and a writing skill to enhance the vividity of the event or the interviewee. However, this is not the case for the Chinese prize-winning stories because many Chinese reporters posed themselves as an informed narrator of the event. In addition, the usage of direct quotation is found to be a matter of narrative technique to add color to a story than a protective mechanism as seen from the variety of using direct quotation in different news stories.

There was also a significant difference in the reporting of criticism between the two systems. Scandals, as a form of reporting criticism which exposes only the misbehavior of particular individuals, are accused by critics (Pool, 1975; Gallagher, 1975) as superficial criticisms. The American press was accused as only exposing scandals rather than making substantive criticism for improvement. In this study, it is found that such accusation is partially supported. Among American prize-winning critical reporting stories, 51.6% were scandals. In contrast, only 22% of Chinese prize-winning critical reporting stories were scandals without giving concrete demands for action to a problem.

How critical is the press in reporting criticism? In this study of journalistic excellence, it is found that level of criticism in Pulitzer prize-winning stories was quite evenly distributed (Table 5). There was also a slight majority (29%) of criticism challenging the system at structural level such as the nuclear armament race in general ("The Hiroshima Plus"), the exploitation of the American government by corporatist groups ("The Bigness of American government"). Established institutions such as the Bell Textron Helicopter Company, the Church and the transportation authority were the second highest level most often criticized in Pulitzer-winning stories.

In contrast, the Chinese prize-winning stories rarely challenged the political system at a high level. Usually, criticism focussed on the fault and selfishness of a particular official or officials related with one another in a group. Focus on individual level in reporting of criticism has the merit of showing a clear target so that change is easier for the system rather than a broad criticism. Moreover, the public can understand the problem of corruption from a concrete real-life case. However such focus on individuals has also the defect of missing the structural or systemic cause of a problem. In the case of China, such focus is strategically better in meeting the immediate needs of the common people. Overt attack on structural level such as the monopoly of communist rule is not allowed in China with its restriction on the press, but "constructive" criticism that does not shake the base of communist rule is acceptable. And as most people do not care about changes of policies in general but care who actually implement the policies, the press can serve their immediate needs by maximizing their function in checking the corruption of particular officials. Apart from satisfying the immediate needs of the people, criticism at group level is already an illustration of the relation network among the Party officials which is a symptom of the monopolistic rule of the Communist Party although the story does not declare this disease overtly.

Criticisms at structural level are few in China compared to the United States. Yet their existence and recommendation of the jurors is already a remarkable improvement from the past. A veteran editor of *People's Daily* won the award by reporting problems behind the success of agricultual modernization policies - the widening gap between the wealth of the entrepreneurs and poverty of the vast majority left behind in the backward rural areas. The reporting of Party official corruption at all levels by a case study of chemical fertilizers also won an award from the *Chinese Farmers' Daily*.

In terms of narrative excellence, though the Pulitzer Prize has not placed emphasis in this area in manifest criteria of selection, it is an important attribute in the prize-winning stories. Majority of the prize-winning stories employed non-conventional story structure and story lead (Table 4). The Pulitzer prize-winning entries demonstrate a variety of story structure. Inverted pyramid structure which has been denounced as a story structure fragmenting readers' understanding of a story (Bennett, 1983) or "strategic ritual" (Tuchman, 1972) were not the most popular story structure used by the prize-winning journalists. Rather the story were organised into different patterns according to the content of the story.

Even though the Chinese award commend innovativeness in narrative skill, most of the prize-winning stories still followed the conventional story structure and story lead. Chronological structure to narrate the news issue or event from the genesis to the latest development was typical of the Chinese prize-winning stories. However, inverted pyramid as a western news story structure was also popular among the prize-winning stories (35.7%). The influence of western journalistic technique to Chinese journalists is obvious.

Narrative lead is the most popular style to begin the story for both Chinese and American prize-winning stories (Table 4). Summary lead is as frequently used as narrative lead in Chinese prize-winning stories while descriptive lead is the second most frequently used in American prize-winning stories. From the variety of leads used in prize-winning stories we can understand how much journalists emphasize the attraction of readers' attention by mastering and polishing the first paragraph. The popularity of narrative lead indicates the storytelling nature of the prize-winning stories in creating atmosphere and provoking readers' emotion.

Besides selection criteria, an examination of the reasons for rejection of candidacy also enable our understanding of proper journalistic practice. The reporting of falsehood, non-existing fact, person or event for both system is the major reason for rejections. Janet Cooke's story of a fake black child heroin addict in 1979 Pulitzer Prize was the only story that was rejected for falsehood. The National Award for Good Journalism, also rejected one story for falsehood and one story for plagiarism in 1985. Interestingly, the falsehood of Cooke's story is exposing darkside of the society of the muckraking style commonly appreciated by the Pulitzer judges, the falsehood of the story rejected by the Chinese award is the commending of advance model which is commonly appreciated by the judges of the Chinese award. Such a phenomenon indicates the dysfunctions of overemphasis on particular topics in selection of prize and problem of prizemanship.

CONCLUSION: FACULTY AND RESPONSIBLITY AS STANDARD OF JOURNALISTIC EXCELLENCE

This paper on news reporting awards has articulated the journalist's own initiative and the bright prospect for development in journalistic excellence. Such optimism is based on the appreciation of human faculty and the desire to break through the constraints of the environments. The common values shared by the prize-winning news stories transcending different politico-economic systems have shown that journalists still retained a certain degree of autonomy over their reporting. A stereotypical approach in cross-national studies should be given away to a multi-faceted approach which can measure and illustrate the dynamics of the journalistic development. Comparison of latent and manifest criteria of selection showed a discrepancy in the support of current administration. The difference is particularly obvious in the Pulitzer case in which over half the stories are active supporters of the government. The exposure of graft is more a reformist change similar to their China counterpart. The difference in news net and choice of topics in the newsgathering process, the different emphasis on narrative skill and the and the set-up of the award shed light on our understanding of journalistic excellence. Among the three components of journalistic excellence, the least emphasized one is the analytical power of journalists which can explain for the accusation of shallowness in news reports.

Journalists are the front-line people who come across the complexity of happenings in different aspects of the society and assign meaning to the social happenings. What they covered and wrote serves as the window frame of the readers (Tuchman, 1978). The demand of both faculty and responsiblity of journalists is no less than other professionals such as physicians. Joseph Pulitzer and other predecessors who emphasized formal journalism education are aware of the far reaching impact of the press on society and the need to nurture journalists with high calibre and strong sense of social responsibility. However, current western journalism education has only concentrated on equipping students with objective rituals and writing in a formal news style rather than developing students' analytical thinking and social knowledge that is essential to the interpretation of the politico-socio-economic complex. In this study, the mastering of newsgathering skill and writing techniques has been well-recognized in the manifest criteria and latent of selection, but how to interpret information gathered critically is an equally important standard in journalistic excellence. A proficient journalist has to become a critical researcher-analyst-narrator of his increasing complex society.

Table 1
Cost of Newsgathering (Sum of number of news sources and rank in efforts in method of newsgathering)

Cost score	U S A	China	Total
Very Low	5.1%	67.7%	55.2%
Low	17.9%	22.6%	22.6%
Moderate	23.1%	4.5%	8.2%
High	41.0%	5.2%	12.4%
Very High	12.8%	0%	2.6%
TOTAL	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
(N)	39	153	192

N. B There are 2 missing observations for China because part of the text of the stories were torn.

Table 2
Objectivity score (aggregate from four indicators carrying equal weight: number of news sources, presence of reporter's opinion, frequency in using direct quotations and controversial opinion solicitation)

Objectivity Score	U S A	China	Total
Very Low	2.6%	16.8%	13.9%
Low	10.3%	47.8%	40.2%
Moderate	41.0%	28.4%	30.9%
High	46.1%	7.0%	14.9%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
(N)	39	153	192

Table 3
Presence of Reporters' Opinion

	U S A	China	Total
Opinion without supportive evidence	10.3%	13.7%	13.0%
Opinion with some supportive evidence	35.9%	26.8%	28.6%
Opinion with sufficient supportive evidence	38.5%	29.4%	31.3%
Opinion given by interviewees	15.4%	26.8%	24.5%
No opinion	0%	3.3%	2.6%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
(N)	39	153	192

Missing Observation = 2

Table 4
Type of Lead Employed in Prize-winning stories

	U S A	China	Total
Striking Statement	15.4%	7.8%	9.4%
Summary Lead	17.9%	32.7%	29.9%
Direct Address	2.6%	2.6%	2.6%
Narrative Lead	38.5%	33.3%	34.4%
Descriptive Lead	25.6%	19.0%	20.3%
Unclassifiable Lead	0%	4.6%	3.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
(N)	39	152	191

Missing Observation=3

Table 5
Level of Criticism

	U S A	China	Total
Structural level	29.0%	8%	16.0%
Institutional level	25.8%	18%	21.0%
Group level	16.1%	44%	33.3%
Individual level	22.6%	30%	27.2%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
(N)	31	50	81

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Children of the Himalayas: The message of Chipko.

"Travel of information" in Chamoli, India

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Abstract

Children of the Himalayas: The message of Chipko

"Travel of information" in Chamoli, India

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The women of Chamoli, Garhwal in India are spiritually and economically associated with forests. The principal deity of the forests is female. The women depend on the forest for their daily needs of fodder and fuel wood. Therefore, when forests are cut down women suffer. Naturally then, they are drawn to a movement like Chipko whose major agenda is to stop deforestation and to plant trees. This movement operates in the north-eastern Himalayas of India, in a region called Garhwal. This study is based in the district of Chamoli (in Garhwal), in villages active in the Chipko movement. Though its major participants are women, few researchers have studied it as a feminist movement. Chipko has been examined from a feminist standpoint, using qualitative techniques. Despite the lack of a telecommunications system to spread its message to small and far-flung mountain villages, Chipko is a popular movement in Chamoli. This study reveals a three level information hierarchy and a four step model of the travel of information that Chipko uses to popularize itself. The information does not flow, it travels orally through people who walk from one village to another.

Children of the Himalayas: "Travel of information" in Chamoli, India

When it began, Chipko was an environmental movement. Now it is a symbol for popular movements in India. Chipko has been one of the most successful popular movements in modern India. The simplicity of its message coupled with the simplicity of the spread of that message are largely responsible for this success. Women are the motivating force behind this movement and they have contributed to the popularity of Chipko. Chipko has been written about from environmental and feminist viewpoints. A review of the existing literature as well as a qualitative investigation shows that it is not one or the other. It is all of them and much more besides.

The geographical location

Garhwal is a region of the north Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. Garhwal, itself is in a region called Uttarakhand made up of it and Kumaon. Kumaon is made up of three districts called Nainital, Almora and Pithoragarh. Garhwal is made up of the five districts of Chamoli, Tehri, Pauri, Dehradun and Uttarkashi. The entire Uttrakhand region is located in the Himalayas (Bhatt, 1988) Garhwal, specifically borders Chinese occupied Tibet. Bhatt (1988) estimates that the average height of the Garhwal Himalayas is 25,000 feet. Guha (1989) reports that Chipko has been operating in the districts of Uttarakhand since the early 70's.

Since Chipko became popular much has been written about it. Environmentalists and some social scientists have traced its history from the first protest and direct action in Mandal to its current status as a well established and well known movement.

Recorded history of Chipko

Chipko literally means embrace, hug or stick to. The word 'andolan' means movement, in Hindi. Hutchinson (1988) writes that Chipko in both Hindi and Garhwali means "to embrace or hug-- as a tree." According to Joshi (1984), Chipko originated from a form of non-violent direct action developed by hill women in the 19th century. In the 19th century, women would hug trees to protect them from being cut. Some of these women were even killed while doing this. The modern Chipko movement is the direct descendant of this 19th century movement.

The first Citizens report (C.S.E, 1982) relates the activity of Chipko in Chamoli district. The movement began in the March of 1973 in Gopeshwar, the district head quarters of Chamoli (Joshi, 1984; C.S.E. report, 1982). Representatives from the Symonds company of Allahabad were granted a tract of ash trees, for sports equipment, in Mandal. Mandal is about 10 km from Gopeshwar. The Gopeshwar based social organization, the Dasholi Gram Swaraj Mandal did not want the ash trees to be cut. The villagers of Mandal and Gopeshwar came upon the idea of hugging the trees to prevent the wood cutters from cutting the trees. They were successful and the Symonds company had to return from Mandal, empty-handed. However, they were given another lot of trees in Rampur-Phata, 80 km away. When this information reached Gopeshwar the villagers marched to Rampur-Phata gathering more people on the way. Once again the trees were not allowed to be cut.

For a cursory knowledge of Chipko this account would suffice. The first citizen's report (C.S.E., 1982) merely sketches out the bare essentials of the Chipko story. To get a more detailed look at the movement, additional research is necessary. Bhatt (1988) and Guha (1989) write of the early days of Chipko. Bhatt (1988), the originator of Chipko, holds the Government bureaucracy accountable for irresponsible deforestation of the Garhwal Himalayas. According to Bhatt (1988), development, roads and dams led to massive deforestation in the area. By 1970 16,082 acres of forests had been destroyed. A direct result of this was the devastating flood in the Alaknanda river in 1970. The tributaries of this river overflowed, destroying villages and killing 55 people and 142 cattle. Bhatt writes of this human tragedy in his Hindi novel 'Pratikar ke Ankur' (The seeds of protest) published in 1979.

Bhatt (1988) and Guha (1989) acknowledge that the activists of the DGSM were angry at the aftermath of deforestation and that they just needed a spark to set them off. The people of Garhwal did not even reap any of the benefits of deforestation as contractors from the plains earned the money from tree felling. This was an added incentive for local unrest. As early as October 22, 1971 the DGSM had organized a procession in Gopeshwar to educate the people about the effects of deforestation while sending a message of discontent to the administration. Similar protests and demonstrations surfaced in other villages in the Uttarakhand region.

Things came to a head in 1973. The DGSM asked for one ash tree to make agricultural implements. The authorities denied this request and, instead, allotted the Symonds sports company of Allahabad a tract of trees in Mandal, near Gopeshwar. The DGSM activists warned the local administration that they would protest this. To appease them the DGSM was offered five ash trees, instead of the one they had requested. They refused and threatened to hug the trees in Mandal that were allotted to the Symonds company. The villagers converged in the forests of Mandal and the tree cutters had to leave without cutting a single tree.

The name Chipko was born as the people of Gopeshwar debated on strategies to stop the deforestation. Bhatt suggested that they hug the trees as a non-violent protest. The villagers resolved to hug the trees, even if they were killed by the axes while doing this. Young men signed this resolve in blood (Guha, 1989). The vehemence of this vow is grounded in their mythological heritage. The women of Garhwal, specially have a spiritual interconnectedness with the forests.

The domain of Shakti

Forests have been central to India's villagers. Forests were worshipped as Aranyani, the goddess of the forest. According to Shiva (1988), the self sustaining nature of forests and their diversity and harmony led to the organizational principles that have guided Indian civilization. This was called the culture of the forest or 'Aranyani sanskriti.' Myers (1984) finds that the villagers of India do not regard the forests as dark and dangerous places as their counterparts in the more temperate regions do. Forests, instead embody the balance, harmony and well being in nature.

In 1922 Pant wrote that in the Himalayas conservation was the norm. Local deities were worshipped on every hill top, and the trees around the deities were deemed sacred and no one dared to cut them. Furthermore, the people of the region planted a tree for every one cut down. Shiva (1988) reiterates the idea that Indians had co-existed with their forests for centuries. Before the advent of technology, villagers in Garhwal took only what they needed from the forests. Women of the region lopped off branches for fire wood, stripped leaves for cattle fodder, and tapped just enough pine resin for their needs. Their primitive hand held tools did not allow large scale deforestation even if they had been so inclined.

Trees in ancient India had been protected because of the benevolent and malevolent spirits that dwell in them. Frazer (1958) confirms that trees are worshipped in India. Crooke (1926) found that trees are often worshipped because of the spirits that live in them. The same author writes that the Hindus regard the forests or groves as a refuge or a 'saran.' Cutting down trees meant sacrilege which in turn meant that the guilty person would be punished by the injured spirit. Trees in Garhwal used to grow profusely on the mountains. If the trees are the abode of spirits, the mountains are the domain of the gods and of the great Earth Mother herself.

Indian mythology teaches that the mountains are the abode of the gods. Lord Siva, the god of destruction, lives on Mount Kailas in the Himalayas, with his consort Parvati (Crooke, 1926). Parvati is also worshipped as Shakti (Power), as Prakriti (nature) and Dharti (Earth). She is the great Earth Mother and the great Mother Goddess in one.

Shakti is the dynamic energy and power that arises in the cosmos from the tensions of creation, destruction, cohesion and disintegration. Shakti as Prakriti (nature) is a powerful reproductive force. In Kulacudamim Nigama, an ancient Indian text, Prakriti says:

> "There is none but Myself
> Who is the Mother to create" (Shiva, 1988).

The feminine in nature is, therefore, dynamic, regenerative and powerful.

Indeed Crooke (1926) finds that the Devi (goddess), in her manifestation as Parvati, is closely connected with the entire Himalayan range. Women, therefore, have a bond with the trees and the forest. The supernatural entity, the protector of the forests, is after all, female. She is worshipped as Arnayani, Vana Durga and even as another form of the great earth mother (Beanne, 1977). Parvati, Prakriti, Shakti, Dharti: all of them meld into the "primal Mother Earth" (Crooke, 1926. p 51). Mother Earth is worshipped in many ways, throughout India.

Travelling in Garhwal I uncovered one Earth Mother legend told to me by my guide, Om. He says, "In the villages on the Tibetan border the people celebrate Nanda Devi's birthday. (Nanda Devi is another name for Parvati/Durga and is also a mountain peak in the Himalayas). This celebration occurs during the harvest season and all the things that are grown like cucumbers and grain and the new rice are taken to Nanda Devi. That's in the month of September. A group of people are selected from each village to take these offerings to her. One of these selected ones is a person who is possessed by the goddess herself. They all meet on a high altitude meadow near the peak. It's very beautiful there. There they make their offerings to Nanda Devi to protect their fields. She is their mother and their sister."

Obviously the feminine manifestation of the mountains persist in Garhwal. The female deity is not only written of but she is worshipped even today. This reaffirmation of faith is also a reaffirmation of the relationship between women and the environment.

Since women are the primary workers of Garhwal they have an affinity with the forest and the great protector herself (Shiva 1988). Shiva (1988) writes that for these women the trees do not represent a "stock of wood." Instead, for them, the forests and the trees are a part of a balanced ecosystem and its economic value is not limited to the price of its timbre. The forest sustains them and their life-style. It provides them with fuel, fodder, herbal medicines and fibre and they respect it and do not exploit it extravagantly. It stands to reason, therefore, that the women are the losers when deforestation denudes the mountainsides of trees.

Agents of deforestation

Development is a subjective term. For traditional developers it means heavy industrialization, an exploitation of the land as a sure-fire fast road to success. Ziegler (1991 p 7) classifies India as a member of the "newly industrialized" third world. Bergmann (1977) reveals that India is one of the few developing nations to have a strong industrial base. The second report by the Centre for Science and Environment (1985) states that the Indian government owns, controls and develops almost all of its dams, irrigation systems, power stations, mines, railways, ports, etc: all the trappings of modern development. Dams are constructed at the point of run-off just as the snow fed rivers gush into the plains.

Chellany (1991) finds that the growth in India's industrialization is palpable and growing. He refers to it as "becoming a leading industrial and military power" (p. 108). Indeed the statistics are impressive. This developing country has the world's third largest personnel pool of doctors, scientists and engineers. It has the fourth largest military machine behind the U.S, Russia and China (Chellany, 1991). However, this impressive development after only 44 years of independence has a down side. It demands a price in gigantic power supply stations, dams and roads to make the borders accessible to the military. This, in turn takes a heavy toll on the environment and on the citizens of the newly developed areas. Sivaramakrishna (1987) interviewed the Centre for Science and Environment (C.S.E.). head Agarwal who said that Indian tribals who had co existed peacefully with their environment for centuries have now become alienated enough to cut trees and sell their wood. The rationale is that if they do not cut down the trees the government or the contractors surely will. Both the C.S.E reports (1982, 1985) and Shiva (1988) write that dam and road constructions lead to massive deforestation. Shiva (1988) calls this 'maldevelopment.' This type of unsustainable development means the death of the environment and of plant, animal, and human life as we know it.

This development which leads to deforestation has many direct and indirect effects on the lives of the people who live in Garhwal. The agents of deforestation claims their major victims in the women, the primary workers of Garhwal.

Status of women in India and Garhwal: effects of deforestation

The direct link between the region and its women is dramatically exhibited in the work habits of the region. However, before narrowing in on Garhwali women, it would be useful to look at them in the overall context of the status of women in India.

Status of contemporary women in India

India's women are trapped in a paradox. Their role models are on the one hand the patient servitude of Gandhi's wife Kasturba, on the other the militancy of the leader of the 1857 mutiny, Queen Lakshmi Bai of Jhansi (Duley, 1986). For nearly 20 years modern India was under the governance of Indira Gandhi. Yet, millions of Indian women still are the most persecuted and powerless citizens of the world's largest democracy.

It is important to note that legally, Indian women have the same status and rights as Indian men. Article 15 of the Indian constitution clearly states that no one shall be discriminate against because of their religion, race, caste, place of birth or sex. Equal pay for equal work is also a constitutional guarantee (Duley, 1986).

However, the reality of women's status in India is a bitter one. They are a minority in every sense of the word. The census of 1981 estimated that India's population was 685 million. The United Nations Fund for Population Activities estimated that it is closer to 865.5 million. Chellaney (1991) reports that India's population is getting close to the one billion mark. This spiralling growth exerts enormous pressure on already meagre resources and land. In a country with a literacy rate of 36.2% (1981 census) environmental preservation is not high on the government's and on the people's list of priorities. Women made up barely 25% of the literate populace of India in the late 70's and 80's according the 1981 census (Subtext, 1991). Perhaps the most disturbing statistic for women is the adverse male to female ratio, one of the worst in the world (Subtext, 1991). In 1901 there 972 women for a 1000 men. In 1981 this ratio was 933 females to a 1000 males. Some possible explanation for this atypical (according to world-wide standards) ratio are gender based discrimination like the misuse of amniocentesis, inadequate nutrition for female children, and even female infanticide (Subtext 1991; Forum for development of women and children, 1988).

The state and fate of Indian women are summed up by Robinson (1985) when he writes that Indians can entrust the governance of their country to a woman while being simultaneously familiar with the persecution of women in their history. The Chipko movement and its participants, especially women should be considered in light of these facts.

Status of women in Garhwal

The status of the women of the Garhwal Himalayas is similar to that of rural women in other developing countries. Cecelski (1987) reports that it is the women in the developing world who are responsible for the subsistence and food production for their families. A study by the International Labour Organization (ILO) revealed that women in Africa put in long hours collecting water and fuel and tending to the livestock. In the semi-arid societies of the Middle East women spend nearly half the day looking for and collecting fuel-wood and water. South Asian women collect water, fuel wood, tend to the livestock and process rice (Bagchi, 1987). Conditions are much the same in Garhwal.

Women in Garhwal are the primary workers at home and in the fields. In addition to collecting fodder they also scavenge for fuel for cooking. Men often migrate to the cities to find work due to the adverse effects of erosion on their lands. Their departure means an even heavier work load for the women (Bahugana, 1984; C.S.E report 1982; C.S.E report 1985). Joshi (1984) also found that Garhwali women gather fodder, fuel and water for their households.

Obviously the drastic and growing reduction in the forests mean added work and hardship for these women. Their lives and those of their families are inextricably linked with the forests and the trees.

Effects of deforestation on Garhwal and its women: The forests, in fact the landscape of Garhwal, has changed drastically since industrialized development became high on the nation's agenda. In 1960 the state of Uttar Pradesh (in which Garhwal is situated) had 80% of its green cover made up of pine forests. By 1988 this had fallen to 64%. During this time period the entire forest cover in the state had fallen from 20% to 11% (Awasthi, 1988). In 1984 the Delhi based Centre for Science and Environment estimated that India loses forests at the rate of 1.3 million hectares a year. This figure is eight times more than the one the Government's forest department discloses. Chipko leader Bhatt deplores the destruction of forests in the ecologically sensitive Himalayan region of Garhwal. Forests now cover barely 9% of India's total land area. This, despite a projected goal by the authorities to cover 33% of India's land mass with forests in 30 years (C.S.E. report 1982; Clad 1989).

According to Hutchinson (1988) deforestation in the Himalayas has become a major ecological hazard. Apart from disrupting the lives of the locals, deforestation also posed a threat to the people who lives hundreds of miles downstream in the Ganges basin. The agents of development and change; dams, roads, and resorts lead to the denudation of entire mountains in a very short time.

Large scale deforestation leads to immediate dangers like landslides as well as adverse effects on daily survival. Chipko volunteers estimated the number of human deaths due to landslides and floods from 1971 onwards. In 1971 10 people were killed. In 1978 this figure climbed to 14 while in 1979 it had risen to 45 (C.S.E report, 1982).

However, it is the lingering and long term effects of deforestation that are the most disturbing. In 1988 conversations with women in Dandagaon in Uttarkashi revealed that they now had to walk further and climb higher to gather fuel wood. As the tree line recedes the women follow while whole mountains once green and verdant become barren and brown.

Deforestation and its resultant desertification has disastrous effects on the availability of cheap biomass fuel in Garhwal, as in most rural areas of the developing world (Ceceslski, 1987). The two C.S.E. reports state that women of Garhwal do have to walk extremely far to look for fuel and fodder. For example, in Diving they walk at least 10 km 3 out of 4 days for an average of 7 hours a day and return with a 25 kg load of wood or grass which they carry on their heads. Cecelski (1987) reports that rural women in developing countries have to work increasingly harder in their traditional activities of fuel and fodder collection. They spend more time and energy while existing at lower standards of living. In the absence of wood they are forced to used twigs and other energy inefficient fuels. These fuels are smoky and lead to diseases of the eyes and the respiratory system (Cecelski, 1987). Parvati Devi, 65 of Chamoli, Garhwal says that it now takes her a whole day to collect fuel wood (Chengappa, 1990).

That this change has been recent and sudden is evidenced by the fact that older women remember the forests being full of fuel wood, fodder grass and water. Now, unable to believe the depletion they persecute their daughters-in-law when they do no bring back enough of these basic commodities (Bahugana, 1984).

Deforestation is now being perceived as a major environmental problem in India.

Activists range from film actors to tribals, social workers to politicians like Menaka Gandhi (former minister for environment and daughter-in-law of Indira Gandhi) reports Chengappa (1990). The same author finds the Chipko Andolan responsible for popularizing this new awareness.

The above review was a starting point for conducting a qualitative study in Garhwal. The acknowledged success of Chipko as an environmental movement and as an awareness builder led to an abiding interest in the dynamics of this movement.

Methods

To a large extent, the area and the participants determined the methods used in this study. The initial plan to live in a village and conduct an ethnography could not be carried out because of circumstantial constraints. These are discussed below under the different sections.

Gaining access: Getting into Gopeshwar and into the Dasholi Gram Swaraj Mandal was the most difficult part of the study. The contact person Dr. Ravi Chopra, director of the People's Science Institute of Dehradun was instrumental, in gaining access. He wrote a letter which I carried with me as I travelled to Gopeshwar. He had also made a phone call to the DGSM to inform them of my arrival and to ask for someone to meet me at the bus-stop and take me to the DGSM head-quarters. This was necessary as Dr. Chopra did not know the postal address and he was concerned at the arrival of a young woman at night in a strange hill town. The hotels were full because of the national elections which attract politicians and out of town supporters. Thus it was crucial that I get to the DGSM and stay at their guest house.

The bus arrived in Gopeshwar at dusk, about 7 p.m. There was no DGSM representative at the bus stop. Asking people at the bus stop was of no avail because different people gave different directions. Directions ranged from "it's five km up hill" to "it's just two km that way, in the market." Finally, taking a chance, the main market address was revealed as the correct one.

On my arrival there, a DGSM official Tiwari greeted me but was not very receptive to the strange arrival of an unescorted Indian female in Gopeshwar. Apparently the person Dr. Chopra had talked to, Shishupal Singh Kunwar was out of town and had left no instructions regarding my arrival. In hushed tones Tiwari did inform me that "Bhattji is here." When he learned of the letter I carried he informed Chandi Prasad Bhatt (the head of DGSM which is Chipko's parent body) of my arrival. I was given a really primitive room but it was infinitely preferable to spending the night on the road side.

The letter was invaluable in gaining access. Bhatt's son was designated as my guide/interpreter. Permission was granted for interviews with DGSM members as well. With Om as a companion, access into Chipko villages was made possible. Without the letter this study would not have been possible. As Mr. Bhatt informed me "You were fortunate that you had Chopraji's letter. Otherwise, if people from outside come to study Chipko we just greet them from outside and say thank you but we don't think you will be able to do this. However, my contact with Chopraji did not allow me to turn you away." Needless to say Dr. Chopra's personal contact with Bhatt was an invaluable resource in this study.

Travelling in the area: Narrow, twisting and pot-holed roads and decrepit buses do not make for comfortable travel. However, the conversations on the buses (people seemed to know each other) as well as their curious glances and questions made the travel entertaining and interesting.

However this bone jarring experience became the easiest part of this journey. The bus stopped at the foot of the villages that we were supposed to visit. The road just skirted the widest circumference of the mountain. Mountain villages usually nestle at the peak. The only way to get to the villages was to walk. The paths were vertically steep and very narrow. Coupled with the high altitude and the thinning air the climb was usually very difficult though exhilarating. The path swung from one angle of the mountain to the other. Usually the high snow capped peaks were visible behind the villages. This meant that one turn would reveal periwinkle sky and the other another long endlessly winding path. The hospitality of the mountain people is legendary. Om was familiar with the economic situation of the people who extended invitations for meals. If they were able to afford this added expense (since guests would be served food of greater quantity and quality than what they might eat themselves) the invitation was accepted. If not, Om would decline saying we had already eaten though our growling stomachs tried to contradict us.

All in all, this travelling was unique. Observation of Garhwal, its country side and its people lent a feel for the study of information travel. The conversations on the bus, the shouted exchanges between people on the climbs gave me an inkling of the way information travelled in this mountainous region.

Interviews: On arrival at Gopeshwar there were dire warnings of the approaching monsoons. The lashing rains in previous years had stranded people in the region for months because roads, paths and bridges had been swept away. This was one of the reasons that the original plan of living in a village for a month or two to write an ethnography was shelved. The lack of usable time and practicality dictated the terms here.

Om and Bhatt planned out most of my schedule according to their own. Due to limited knowledge of the area I was content with this arrangement.

All the villages visited had strong Chipko backgrounds. The women interviewed were articulate and active in their reforestation efforts. Once their initial discomfort fell away they practically took over the interview, telling me stories and anecdotes they thought might be of interest. That is the major reason that all the interviews are not exactly the same. The leads at the end of a story prompted different lines of questioning.

Even as I first interviewed the women and then the men I could see the different patterns emerging. Their perspectives on the movement, their and each other's roles and the activities differed qualitatively from each other. Even the language they used had revealing differences.

Each interview was helpful in setting up the next and gave new leads for the questions to be used for others. They were probably the most enjoyable part of the study. Gaining insights into the people who were the movement was a valuable experience for me as a researcher.

Transcribing: Obviously the most tedious part of this whole experience was the transcribing of the interviews. Each interview took ten hours to transcribe. Even though the actual interviews lasted an average of 45 minutes the translation from Garhwali to Hindi to English made this process laborious. Of course, not only were there to be translations but some idiosyncratic idioms etc. had to be interpreted. For instance when an interviewee said that "my nose was cut" a direct translation would have made no sense to the English language reader. Idiomatically in Garhwali and in Hindi the woman meant that she was shamed, i.e., the English expression of 'my head hung in shame.'

The transcribing was done using a computer. One advantage of the transcribing process was to give a starting point to the rest of the study. While listening to and typing the statements made by the interviewees I gained familiarity with the material and began to organize it mentally.

Limitations: Some of the advantages in this study also proved to be its limitations. While Om was a powerful access tool and an interpreter his companionship was also a drawback. Since he was affiliated with the DGSM, the villages I was taken to were probably the ones in which Chipko was operating and successful. This restricted data from dissident villages or ones who did not believe in or follow the Chipko doctrine.

Not understanding the actual dialect, i.e Garhwali, was another drawback. Om's translations were adequate and helpful but it was possible that he edited, paraphrased and shortened much of what the village women said. This did not give me total access to the entire body of stories that could have been used.

Related to that was the problem associated with transcribing the data. The three way translation depleted the rich data of it's naturalness, spontaneity and flow. Om translated the original Garhwali to Hindi. This was then translated into English while transcribing the interviews. The lack of exact synonyms from one language to another was compounded by the translation of Garhwali to English with the intermediation of Hindi.

Travelling, living and listening to the actual interviews and the tapes added up to an intriguing complication. I started to understand Garhwali myself. While transcribing I found myself interpreting/translating along with Om's interpretations/translations. This led to a long, laborious and confusing transcribing process.

Though they were expected these limitations were, nonetheless, very difficult and often frustrating. However, they did not destroy the essence of the study and the analysis of the data.

Nature of women's movements

Chipko has been called a women's movement by the C.S.E. report (1982). Shiva (1988) was perhaps the first to write of Chipko as primarily a feminist movement. Yet others like Guha call it a peasant's movement (Guha, 1989) or an environmental movement (C.S.E report 1982; C.S.E report, 1985). The first C.S.E report (1982) did refer to it as a feminist movement primarily because of the high profile of the women in Chipko. There was no elaboration as to why it was a women's movement. Travelling in the area and interacting with the people crystallized the instinct that whatever the controversy, Chipko is a women's movement, albeit in its infancy.

It is interesting to note that the men involved and associated with Chipko categorically deny its feminist nature. Chandi Prasad Bhatt examined this question using the Reni incident as an example. He says, "The contributions of the women at Reni are invaluable but that does not make it a women's movement." He continues, "even though their actions were great that day, it was a once in a lifetime act." He elaborates further, "People are very concerned whether or not this is a women's or a feminist movement, as in the West. It was only because the women (in Reni and Phata etc.) were there at the time that people call it a women's movement. If there had been only men there who knows what form this movement would have taken. Perhaps the women gained courage in the absence of their men." Obviously, he means that the women stumbled into the movement but the fact remains that they are still active in it.

Mishra (the first journalist to cover Chipko) almost echoes Bhatt's comments. He says, "I never thought of Chipko as a separate women's movement." He defends this statement saying "It's like if ten college boys get associated with a movement we say it's a youth movement and if they leave we say it's not so any more...there was never any talk of separating it as a women's movement."

Both narratives imply that it is not a women's movement because that was never the intent of Chipko. Yet, movements can evolve into something different than what they were intended to be. It is also very possible that one aspect of Chipko is a women's movement, while others are peasant and environmental movements. The women of Chipko never say that it is a women's movement but their narratives do tell of a journey into the realm of self determination, self confidence and a feeling of self worth. By that alone I would classify it as a women's movement. However, it can only be done by comparing the dynamics of a recognized women's movement with those in Chipko.

According to West and Blumberg (1990), the place of gender in protests is being recognized despite "resistance, as the reality of women's historical place in protest becomes more widely (known)" (p.8.). The narratives of the Chipko males echoes West and Blumberg's (1990) observation that powerful men in movements are widely instrumental in rendering the women virtually invisible. The men of Chipko say that it began as an environmental movement. That does not preclude the possibility, however, that it can also be classified as a women's movement.

Initial stated goal: The initial stage of the U.S. women's movement did not begin as a bid for their freedom. Instead, the cause that drew women like Parker, Grimke and Mott together was to protest the horror of slavery. That is how it started but later out of this was born the modern women's movement (The anti-slavery convention of American women, 1987).

Similarly the initial stated goal of Chipko was not the liberation of the women of Chamoli, but was in fact, an environmental concern. Manshree Devi of Papriyana says (we) "...need to plant a forest...plant trees." The women wanted to protect the forest because "The forest gives us everything" (Kalavati Devi, Bachher). Sateshwari Tiwari says that Chipko taught her that "I have to nurture these trees because they give us so much."

A striking similarity in all the female interviewees was an almost personal concern for the trees. The trees **are** their children. Sateshwari Devi of Tangsa says, "Trees are like my children. Just as I would bring up my children I have to nurture these trees... ." Kalavati Devi of Bachher says, "The trees are like my children. In fact, a child you bring up can be false to you, but a tree is always faithful and true to you." This concern and this connection with trees keeps these women involved in Chipko. Paprachristou (1976) wrote that American women found a "concern" for themselves out of a "concern" for others. The Chipko women are concerned about the trees while the American women were concerned about slaves.

Even the women of Chipko never proclaim it as a feminist movement. But the signs are loud and clear. A sense of interconnectedness with the environment and their feelings of empowerment point to that fact.

Personal gains: Even though the first suffragists or abolitionists in the U.S. had not (and still have not) achieved all their stated goals they had gained self empowerment that will fuel their goals and the movement forward. They did, however, come to a realization that when women talked other's listened, that they had the courage and self confidence to speak in public (Papachristou, 1976; Millstein and Bodin, 1977). Once women (or any oppressed group) achieve this they are well on the way to victory. Faludi (1991) also emphasizes this aspect of the empowerment of women.

I believe that the women of Chipko are experiencing this new self worth and are well on their way to be recognized as a women's movement. Manshree Devi of Papriyana says, "... it is us common people, specially us women who have made this movement successful." Kalavati elaborates on this theme "Before...if we met or even saw a man walking toward us as we worked in the field or the forest we were so shy we would run away. ... Now I am so sure of myself that I can talk to anybody." Later she says, "Now we know that we can do something even if we are women."

Sateshwari Tiwari of Tangsa lays out her position well when she says, "(We have gained) Respect for ourselves. Earlier I thought that I could not do so many things ... that I was a nobody because I was a woman." After she came into Chipko's fold "I am self confident. So what if I am uneducated? I can still do many things." They are aware that they have become somebody from a nobody, that if they want to they can achieve many things. These are the personal gains of Chipko. Kunwar, DGSM's secretary tells of an incident in a small village called Kalgoth. When the women of Kalgoth came to a DGSM camp one of them said "... after so many years of independence, for the first time we have seen that we are free. That we can also talk in front of men."

These first glimmers of realization of self and confidence meld into the issue of empowerment. Chipko is obviously in its infancy as a women's movement. The women have to carve out a parallel path along with Chipko the peasant movement and Chipko the environmental movement.

It is evident that the women of Chipko are busy in their daily activities of supporting their families. Bhatt does concede that "The mountain economy as you must have read is dependent upon women as far as the relationship between the forests and the villagers is concerned." Given this fact it is intriguing to examine how these busy, often shy and isolated women heard about Chipko and its message. That they have heard of it and adopted it is beyond question. How did they get information about Chipko in the absence of electronic media is the thrust of this study.

"Travel of information" in Chamoli

A variation of the two step flow of communication operates in the spread of the Chipko message in Chamoli. Actually, in this context 'travel' of information is a better word choice than flow. Flow seems to seem an almost effortless transference of information: rather like the flowing of a river. Travel: actually walking long distances from one village to another is actually the nature of the spread of information in Chamoli.

DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach (1989) report on the two step flow of information. An 'opinion leader' was the intermediary between the masses and the major disseminator of information. In this report of the Erie County study that was conducted in early 1940 by Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, the mass media were of course the primary source of information. In the Chipko study, on the other hand, there are no electronic media. This means that the information originates in one place (Gopeshwar) and is literally carried to other places through and by these 'opinion' leaders.

The information structure

There is a structure of information travel in Chipko. Gopeshwar is linked to the villages of the region through an efficient information structure. Gopeshwar is the administrative headquarters of the district of Chamoli. It is also the headquarters of the DGSM, the organization that gave birth to Chipko as a legitimate movement. Chandi Prasad

Bhatt lives in Gopeshwar in the DGSM office and guest house. Gopeshwar is the information centre from where information about Chipko is disseminated. The information structure is made up of three major components. The information centre is situated in Gopeshwar. Information links, who are members of the DGSM connect the centre with the information receivers and adopters in the villages. Since the DGSM is an exclusively male organization there are no women in the information centre or the information links. They enter the information structure as the receivers and adopters of information. The Chipko message focuses on the importance of saving forests from being cut as well as the benefits of reforestation.

Gopeshwar as the information centre: Chipko began in Gopeshwar. Bhatt recalls the early days of Chipko when public meetings were held there to discuss the possibility of "direct action." He says, "I called a meeting to decide on the strategy for direct action. There were many different suggestions from different people." Note that he is talking of the time before the first Chipko incident at Mandal. Shishupal Singh Kunwar, the secretary of DGSM, also recalls the first public meeting. He says, "...we had a public meeting...In this room we called people together to voice their views and opinions. And we also put our issues and agenda in front of the people." The "people" referred to were the prominent men of the region. In the early accounts of Chipko no women were highlighted.

In the early days of Chipko the outlying villages like Reni needed to rely on Gopeshwar's leadership. When the forests of the village of Reni were to be cut Hayat Singh of Tapovan informed DGSM, specifically Bhatt, in Gopeshwar. Of course, by the time the Gopeshwar people got there the women had already thwarted the wood cutters. Hayat Singh who belongs to Tapovan, 7 k.ms away from Reni, recalls, "So when we reached Gopeshwar I told Bhattji that they (the wood cutters) had gone up (to Reni)."

The major strength of Chipko, the women, also look to Gopeshwar for direction. Kalavati Devi of Bachher recalls that her inspiration to join Chipko came from Gopeshwar.

She says "Well, we used to see the women of Gopeshwar and see the work they used to do." She continues "Gopeshwar's (women) ...prevented the trees from being cut down."

Gopeshwar is the information centre, primarily because of Bhatt's presence there. He has achieved an almost demi-god status if the hushed tones people use to talk of him are any indication. Manshree Devi of Papriyana says, "Bhattji told us about it (about planting trees)." The other people in the village square echoed her. Sateshwari Devi of Tangsa simply said "We are grateful to Bhattji for Chipko." Later she says, "Bhattji started it (Chipko) but he gave it to the people and it is our movement."

It is logical that if the movement started and its founder lives in Gopeshwar it can be designated as the information centre. From the public meetings of the early days to the presence of the DGSM there, Gopeshwar is undoubtedly the information centre. The question now is, how does this information get to the remote mountain villages that Chipko and DGSM hope to target?

Information links: Members of DGSM belong to different villages. They retain links with their villages because, in most cases their families still live there. Bhatt's wife lives in the small village of Gopeshwar (different from Gopeshwar the information centre). Kunwar's wife lives in the remote village of Dasyara. Murarilal's family lives in the little village of Papriyana, barely 2 kms. from Gopeshwar.

Manshree Devi of Papriyana says, "There is one person in our village, Murarilalji... who... told us about Bhattji and Chipko." Murarilal corroborated this when he said "I belong to Papriyana and visit it many times every week. I also carried the message (of Chipko) to my people. I was the link between my people and Bhattji." Sateshwari Devi of Tansa said that she and her village came into Chipko because "My husband was in DGSM. He still is. He used to tell us about Chipko and trees and all." Her husband Tiwari was out of town so he was unable to comment but Om, my guide did say that "Tiwariji was able to bring Tangsa because he was known to people there. Through talking of the need for not cutting trees and, in fact, planting more trees he was able to make the people of Tanga take an active role in Chipko."

One of the most information leaders is Hayat Singh of Tapovan. His role as information carrier became eclipsed in the euphoria of the Reni incident. He carried the news of the arrival of wood cutters in Reni. He carried the news to Gopeshwar and then "... (we, i.e. Bhatt and Singh) hired a taxi and arrived in Reni/Tapovan that same night." He was able to link Gopeshwar with Reni, perhaps one of Chipko's most far-flung villages.

Information receivers and adopters: All the narratives point out that the villages were supposed to be the ultimate destination of the Chipko message. They came into the movement via the men who belong to their villages as well as to the information centre, that is Gopeshwar. Information was carried and continues to do so, to villages like Mandal, Reni, Papriyana, Tangsa and Bachher.

Once the Chipko message came into the villages the women became actively involved in the struggle against deforestation. They also planted trees in their depleted forests. Manshree Devi says, "Murarilalji, our leader told us about Bhattji and Chipko. Now we get wood and grass from our own forest." Their "own forest" is a great source of pride for Papriyana judging from their insistence that I see it. This narrative also shows that the information link, Murarilal was largely responsible for introducing his village to Chipko.

The villagers, especially the women, saw some merit in the "need to plant a forest...plant trees." They adopted the information to follow Chipko directives to plant trees and get their "own forest." Similar narratives abound in the study of Chipko. The villages get information about Chipko from the information links and adopt the message. Reforestation is a reality in the villages active in Chipko.

This was a three level structure of the movement. That is, Gopeshwar is the information centre. The villages are the information receivers and adopters. The link between the two are the members of DGSM, who belong to the villages. Once this is set in motion a four step travel of information is revealed. This is an expansion of the two step flow model described in the Erie County (DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach, 1989).

The four step "travel" of information

The four identified steps of information travel are (1) Making themselves heard: Processions, (2) Being drawn into Chipko: a contact person in each village, (3) Dissemination of information: walking and talking and (4) Keeping the message alive: consolidation through camps.

Beal, Dissanayake and Konoshima (1986) write in the introduction of Knowledge generation, exchange and utilization that "Information and knowledge cannot be utilized unless communication takes place between the source of that knowledge and the potential user of that knowledge" (p. 4). The structure of the travel of information had already been discussed. The "source" of the information, Gopeshwar is linked to the "potential users" of that information, the villages through "opinion leaders." Now the dynamics, the actual, process will be examined.

Processions Step I: Processions accompanied by some kind of sound, drums, flutes or horns have long been used to attract the attention of the populace of India. These means of "aural" transmission were also used in getting people together in insurgencies against the British, according to Guha (1983). Guha (1983) writes that in a country in an "age of poor communication" (p. 230) these "aural" means were and (I would say), still are indispensable.

Bhatt talks of many such processions, usually just before a major Chipko incident. Even before they had decided that their strategy would be to hug the trees, the DGSM had taken out a procession to show its dissatisfaction with the Government's policy in Garhwal. He recalls "On the 14th or the 15th of November (1972) we (DGSM) took out a procession of about a 1000 villagers. We beat drums and carried banners through the streets of Gopeshwar."

Later, processions were taken out in other places. He says "On the 27th of March (1973) a procession was taken out in Rampur-Phata which only returned to Gopeshwar after the tree contractors had returned empty handed." This was just before the RampurPhata incident. Before the Reni incident there had been a show of strength also "On the 15th of March 1974 Chipko activists in Joshimath took out a procession." Then, other villages like Laata and Tapovan "... took out many processions with drums... ." He acknowledges that one way "... to popularize our message (is) through song, processions, slogans... ." He recites one of the major slogans to demonstrate their solidarity "The forests awaken. The forest dwellers awaken."

The women recall the processions as being their first contact with Chipko. Kalavati Devi of Bachher says, "The first time I had gone to a procession it was a strange experience. All the villagers and tribals were beating drums and blowing their lutes and trumpets. There I was along with the other women reciting the slogans. We were all chanting 'the forests awake and the forest dwellers awake. I had heard of these before and it showed that we were one, that we were united. There were a lot of women there."

Kunwar points out the logic behind the use of sounds and processions in their communication with the villagers. He talks of the dilemma of attracting people in remote villages. People who have had limited contact with others may not be very receptive to the presence of strangers. He says, "Once we go into a village how do we gather people together. Now, they will come to see you because you are obviously from outside. We are locals, so no one will come. ... We get people together through music. Local songs... we are not poets but we sing and manage to get people together... when people come to us we talk to them and tell them of our work."

Obviously all the people in the villages cannot be drawn into Chipko this way. More sustained, in-depth and personal contact is needed to keep the people in the movement.

Links in every village (Step II): This step overlaps the structural discussion of information links. To sustain and keep people in Chipko's fold, contact or link people are indispensable. Bhatt talks of "Hayat Singh, a good grass roots worker" who brought him news of Reni." Singh's wife belongs to Reni, giving him a gateway into the village. Since men do most of the travelling in Garhwal, they are the village to village links. Therefore, all the narratives identify men in this process of connecting villages.

Thus, in effect this link person is a lifeline to the main organization, DGSM. Without them the villagers would not have been successfully assimilated. Also, news of important incidents would not have reached Gopeshwar. Bhatt says Singh "reached Gopeshwar with the news that wood cutters had reached Reni on the 26th of March (1973)." Singh had also acted as DGSM's representative in Reni. He had been expecting the wood cutters in Reni and since he had to leave he says, "We had already told the women of Reni that if by chance we are not here at some time do not let anyone into the forest." Notice that he uses "we" to align himself with Bhatt and DGSM. Not only that, but he aligns himself with men, because DGSM is an exclusively male organization.

The information links are the direct official link between Gopeshwar and the villages. But how does the major bulk of the dissemination of information take place? How do people come to know and spread the message of Chipko?

Walking and talking (Step III): The three words say it all. In the absence of telecommunications or even drum signals, basic human communications has to suffice Actually this system is remarkably efficient. Note that every time, be it Reni or Mandal or Dungari-Paitoli, information travel was quick and accurate enough that it reached DGSM in time for them to act successfully.

Manshree Devi of Papriyana addressed this issue. She says, "Sometimes people come here, or people from our village go there." The "there" refers to Gopeshwar. Sateshwari

Tiwari of Tangsa also says "since Tangsa is just about 10 km away from Gopeshwar someone or the other keeps going back and forth."

Hayat Singh, the link between Reni and Gopeshwar explains this walking and talking phenomenon. "Well, everyone in the mountains travels by foot. Besides Reni is barely 8 or 10 km away. It's like this, someone from Reni will come here or someone from here will go there and bring news. He'll come here and sit at the tea stall and talk to two people and then those two people will talk to a few more. People from Reni might be on their way to Chamoli or Gopeshwar for some work. Then, of course they might have relatives in another village... who might visit (each other) and that's how we get news. That's how it happens... it's no big deal."

Singh's narrative was the best example of the walking and talking spread of information in the region. The community atmosphere of visiting relatives, talking and discussing issues at tea shops where most people sit, all contribute to the spread of information here. Going from one place to another on foot leads to conversation between travellers thus fostering this travel of information. Maintenance of the message in villages combines some of the other steps of information travel.

Maintenance (Step IV): This is probably the most crucial stage of information travel. Chipko solves this problem through the medium of camps. It is important to realize that the Steps II and III operate simultaneously and in conjunction with Step IV.

Kunwar says that DGSM holds four or five camps each year. Each has a slightly different agenda. "In the May-June camp we concentrate on building protective walls for the forest. In the rains, July-August we plant seedlings. In the two winter camps we concentrate on weeding the fields and fertilizing them. In the January-February camp we plant trees. This way they help the host village and also take the opportunity to "educate" the villagers about "education, nutrition and health" along with their environmental agenda.

Bhatt refers to the camps as one of the ways to spread Chipko's message. Kunwar also describes the camps as keeping the villages in their fold. In the camps the people get together and "... donate our work, pray and sing together." He elaborates saying "... through our camps and the medium of song we get news from around the place."

Manshree Devi of Papriyana says that "We have learned a lot from the camps." She says that "We sing songs and work together." Sateshwari Tiwari of Tangsa adds that "In the camps we learn to help each other. In fact, in the villages we hold the camps in, we plant trees and build protective walls for their forests. We listen to speeches and find out how trees help us." All the women also recall feeling a new unity with "meeting people... specially, women from many other villages." The camps, therefore, not only educate people but also give the women the opportunity to bond with each other.

People from remote villages meet each other and work together. DGSM had cleverly devised the camps as a consolidation device. Perhaps the most visible sign of their success: now people come to their camps instead of their having to go out and gather people.

Major conclusions

Chipko is, if anything a multi-faceted movement. A movement in progress. The men and women of Chipko donate their services to it, regardless of whether or not they call it a women's movement. For them at this point it is not necessary to define Chipko as a women's movement. At this point in time survival is paramount. That does not mean, however, that the women will not and should not continue to carve a niche for their individual rights. That the women are linked with the environment, the trees by mythical tradition and by their activities is indisputable.

Chipko was and is a fascinating glimpse at one of the most efficient and often overlooked method of information travel. In this age of telecommunications the efficacy of talking has been overshadowed. Without detailed study of the power of processions and the attraction of music and loud sounds Chipko managed to use both to aid in the spread of its message. The grapevine that links the Chipko villages spreads its message into every home in the area. Again, knowing the nature of Garhwal, DGSM did not have to spend money to popularize Chipko. Instead, people walking back and forth between villages and between villages and Gopeshwar carry information about the movement. Contact people, the life line, both for DGSM and the linked villages maintains a constant two way flow of information. They also use the talk and walk technique of information travel but they are part of the Chipko/DGSM structure. They represent the villagers in DGSM and represent the DGSM to the villagers. The women are not represented in the power structure of the DGSM, but it is their work and presence that has popularized Chipko. Therefore, the concerns of the women will be addressed, if not now, then in the future. Their visibility ensures that.

Maintaining the Chipko family, many of whom never actually get a chance to meet and interact with each other, was perhaps its biggest challenge. The camps, while educating and entertaining, also manage to forge the different activists into one cohesive unit. Members of Chipko meet in a village and unite into one unit, while they discuss each others concerns and problems.

A major implication here is that Chipko can be used as a model of a movement. A grass roots movement that uses all the resources that it has to popularize, spread and maintain its grip on all its participants. Creative use of people and local travel patterns led to the successful dissemination of Chipko's message. It is literally a four-step travel-log.

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Vaccination Messages on Nigerian Broadcasting Stations: Does Content Really Matter?

by

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Vaccination Messages on Nigerian Broadcasting Stations: Does Content Really Matter?

Introduction

This paper describes the analysis of vaccination messages broadcast by Nigerian radio and television stations as part of a mass media campaign aimed at convincing pregnant women and mothers of young children to accept immunization services. The vaccination campaign was under the aegis of a nationwide mass immunization exercise known as the Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI). Focus on vaccination messages arises out of concern over the presumed effectiveness of mass media utilizing top-down approaches for diffusing innovations and communicating development messages (Rogers, 1981).

The paper examines both the structure and thematic content of broadcasting messages because radio and television were primary vehicles used by EPI managers to disseminate vaccination messages. The EPI messages were broadcast in English and 57 local languages. English is the official language of Nigeria.

The paper compares the content of the EPI messages with vaccination information made available by the United Nations Children's Fund -- a co-sponsor of Nigeria's EPI program -- to see if broadcast messages have relevance to knowledge of vaccination services. Furthermore, the paper examines the perceived effectiveness of vaccination messages, using information collected from focus studies of nursing mothers, media practitioners, and EPI advisers as evidence.

Study context

This paper arises out of research on the role of communication, infrastructure, socioeconomic variables, public policy, and management in the acceptance of vaccination services in Lagos and Kano states of Nigeria Research was done in 1989, using randomly sampled household surveys, content analysis of mass media messages, focus studies, and field observation as principal methods of study. Overall, work was implemented in 53 clusters comprising 18 towns, four villages, and four local governments (counties). Two Nigerian ethnic groups, the Yoruba of Lagos, and the Hausa of Kano comprised the majority of indigenous people in the communities where research was conducted. Lagos and Kano are about 700 miles apart.

The selection of Kano and Lagos as principal research sites arose out of three considerations. One, both Lagos and Kano states were markedly different in the prevalence of EPI diseases and in the coverage of immunization vaccines at the time of the study (Ogundimu, 1991:50). Two, differences in the distribution of modern communication facilities and the concentration of infrastructure between Lagos and Kano states highlighted differential access to vaccination messages and immunization services. Three, distinctive topography, rural-urban residence, climate, cultural history, and ethnic composition reflected the variations among Nigeria's 36 major ethno-linguistic groups and their more than 200 minor ethnic cousins (Akeredolu-Ale, 1985). This combination of factors meant that a study of the Yoruba and the Hausa is consistent with the notion of comparative equivalence (Edelstein, 1982).

Literature Review

Nigeria's program of mass immunization is a multi-million dollar vaccination campaign launched in 1984 and designed to immunize at least 80 percent of Nigeria's children under the age of two years against six deadly diseases by the year 2000 (Gyoh, 1989). The diseases are measles, whooping cough, diphtheria, tetanus, polio, and tuberculosis. The United Nations estimated about seven million cases of these killer diseases by 1985, about 6 percent of which resulted in either death or permanent disability for children under the age of five years (UNICEF, 1986).[1]

Protection against the six EPI target diseases requires a minimum of 14 doses of vaccines for children -- given at five intervals -- and two doses of tetanus toxoid vaccines for pregnant women. In 1988, Nigeria's EPI vaccines were given on three consecutive "National Immunization Days" (NIDs) during March, April, and May.[2] This mass immunization exercise was designed to boost coverage and lower the dropout rate from vaccination series. Great emphasis was placed by health officials administering the immunization program, on voluntary compliance by mothers who were expected to take children to vaccination clinics.

To reach mothers, massive publicity campaigns were staged, typically in the preceding week before an immunization days exercise. The primary vehicles for the campaigns were radio, television, mobile vans outfitted with loudspeakers, handbills and other kinds of illustrated posters displayed in public places. Aside from mass media campaigns, local community action groups and religious leaders were used to publicize the program. The concept of mass immunization has since been applied at the state level, in 1989 under a program known as "State Immunization Days" (SIDs). And in 1990, the program was known as Local Immunization Days (LIDs), under the auspices of local government authorities. The major reason frequently claimed for using this mass mobilization strategy was that Nigeria was able to give 18.4 million doses of vaccines to children during nine days of NIDs in 1988, far more than the total recorded for the previous year.

But the apparent success of the mass mobilization exercises have not significantly improved coverage of vaccination services to target groups over the last few years. A national survey of children under the age of two years found only 38 percent of children nationwide were covered by the end of 1988 (United Nations, 1989:6). Similarly, surveys in Lagos and Kano states in 1989 showed that only 31 percent of children under the age of three years completed the DPT (diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus) series of vaccination, and only 25 percent completed all five trips required for full immunization (Ogundimu, Ibid). Furthermore, the vaccination program continues to suffer from high dropouts, and the cost of running mass immunization campaigns had proven prohibitive by the Fall of 1989.[3]

The concept of mass mobilization, using radio and television in particular, for mass immunization is not unique to Nigeria. It has international import because it was the brainchild of UNICEF, the United Nations agency which preaches social advocacy as a means of implementing development programs such as immunization campaigns. The EPI campaign being implemented in Nigeria at the time of my study had previously been tried in 60 other developing countries, several of them African, with similar result.

In the case of Nigeria, radio and television were so accorded prominence in the dissemination of vaccination messages that a tripartite agreement was signed between three key agencies handling the immunization program. The agreement provided for the UNICEF to supply broadcasting equipment, transportation, and funding to the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria, FRCN, and the Nigerian Television

Authority, NTA, in return for the production and dissemination of child survival messages (including EPI promotional messages) on Nigerian radio and television stations. The Federal Ministry of Health, the government agency coordinating the primary health care scheme acted as a third party to the agreement. Its chief responsibility was to provide technical expertise in the design of vaccination messages and in the coordination of training workshops for mass media producers of those messages.[4]

The priority the Nigerian government accords mass media, radio and television especially, has deep historical attachment. First, these media are seen as prestige media essential to the country's security and development. Hence only government owns broadcasting in Nigeria.

Second, broadcasting enjoys very high profile, judging by the money government spends on radio and television in comparison to other social welfare programs such as health. For example, in 1987 federal grant to radio and television was 63 percent of the entire budget of the Ministry of Information and Culture. (Nigeria Approved Budget, 1987:Schedule 11).[5] Furthermore, whereas federal support for information services was cut by 23 percent between 1986 and 1987, cutbacks from the budget of the Ministry of Health was 40 percent. And in years when the economy got a boost, such as in 1987-1988 fiscal year, the increase in federal allocation to information (32 percent) was almost as large as that for health (56 percent) (Nigeria Approved Budget, 1988).[6]

The potential of the mass media to mobilize the masses for development is the principal reason frequently given by government officials for the large sums of money spent on radio and television in Nigeria. This, despite evidence that the penetration of these mass media may be exaggerated. Nigeria's Federal Office of Statistics shows that by 1980 only one-half of the households in the country owned radio, and only 12 percent owned television (F.O.S., 1983:27). These data reinforce the observations of other Nigerian scholars that the mass media are not the most important channels for communicating information in the country. For example, a survey of an education program, a food production program, and a local government reform program in Nigeria's Bendel state found that radio and newspapers ranked lowest as sources of information. Ranking ahead of these media were the school, market social forum, and town crier (Moemeka, 1981:45-46).

The problems of Nigeria's mass media are symptomatic of what other scholars have identified about the African media. Doob (1961) highlights infrastructure constraints; Mytton (1983) mentions political control and domination of the mass media by urban elite; McLellan (1986) points to the unfulfilled potential of television to serve as an instrument for the diffusion of development messages, and

Moemeka (1981) blames media ineffectiveness on the organizational constraints of urban-based elite. Although all of these writings point to the shortcomings of mass media in Africa, and Nigeria in particular, none have specifically focused on the content of vaccination messages on Nigerian radio and television.

Theoretical Framework

There are at least three good reasons why we should focus on the content of vaccination messages on Nigerian broadcasting stations. First, radio and television were accorded a prominent role by the Nigerian government and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) -- the major international development agency serving as technical consultant to Nigeria's program of mass immunization -- on the assumption that the mass media, radio and television in particular, would help mobilize the population to accept both the concept and practice of immunization (UNICEF, 1986:11).

Second, two communication related factors are usually blamed by public health scholars and health officials for the poor coverage of vaccination services and the high dropout rates from the immunization program. These communication related factors are (i) ignorance of mothers in knowing about the concept and practice of vaccinations (Ogunmekan, 1982), and (ii) inadequate publicity by mass media, resulting in lack of sustenance in enthusiasm for the immunization program (Jinadu, 1983). Rarely has anyone done systematic research on the structure and content of vaccination messages in mass media campaigns, to see if assumptions about the intended efficacy of mass media are correct.

Three, focusing on broadcasting messages about immunization and on the emphasis placed by policy makers on broadcasting to diffuse vaccination messages can be linked to the debate over the nature of communication effects. In the case of Nigeria, we can question whether the failure of radio and television to properly communicate vaccination messages was due to what Hornik calls "theory failures" or "program failures" (Hornik, 1988). Earlier, I referred to the concern by Rogers and others that too often the diffusion of innovations and the communication of development messages followed top-down strategies. Family planning programs in developing countries were cited as examples of innovations where scholars too readily accepted the notion that individual parents were to blame for the failure to adopt contraceptives and for having "too many" children (Rogers, 1981:41). In the case of Nigeria, I have already referred to the study by Ogunmekan (1982) in which mothers' ignorance about the concept and practice of vaccinations was blamed for the failure of the EPI program to achieve high coverage and lower dropouts from the vaccination series.

The formulation of the innovation-decision model (Rogers, 1983) atoned for two criticisms of earlier diffusion models in regard to the individual-blame assumptions. One, it deemphasized the role of mass media channels in the adoption of innovations, including health practices such as preventive vaccines, by placing greater emphasis on the knowledge creation and information spreading potential of mass media (Rogers, 1983:198). Two, it shifted attention away from individuals as isolated decision makers in the process of innovation adoption. Instead, the new innovation-decision paradigm proposed a study of individuals as members of social systems, in the process of reaching decisions about innovations (Rogers, 1983:ibid).

This paper is concerned with two elements of the innovation-decision model. First, it attempts to study the thematic structure and communication content of vaccination messages on Nigerian broadcasting stations, in order to see if the messages embody the kinds of knowledge creating functions Rogers specifies in his proposed innovation-decision model. Rogers specifies three kinds of knowledge in the innovation-decision model: 'awareness-knowledge,' which merely lets an individual know of the existence of an innovation; 'how-to-knowledge,' which provides information necessary to use an innovation correctly; and 'principles knowledge,' which deals with the functioning principles underlying how the innovation works (Rogers, 1983:167-168).

In the context of EPI, Rogers' notion of germ theory, which underlies the functioning principles of vaccinations is an appropriate example of the specific kinds of knowledge necessary for getting mothers to adopt immunization practices. Whereas Rogers speculates that the mass media are more suited for conveying basic awareness knowledge, and that the job of conveying principles knowledge is best left to interpersonal sources, nothing precludes mass media channels from conveying principles knowledge as well, provided the messages are well designed. Hence attention to the content of vaccination messages on Nigerian broadcasting stations allows us to address the communication of substantive knowledge which might help in the adoption of immunization services.

Second, this paper examines the perceived effectiveness of Nigeria's vaccination messages, as determined by mothers, who were targets of the messages. Interest here is in relating mothers' perception of immunization services to the content of promotional jingles broadcast on Nigerian radio and television stations. Furthermore, I will present some feedback provided by media practitioners and health policy managers connected with the mass media campaign, to provide some context for the evaluation of broadcast messages. This secondary objective of the study accounts for the supposition that individuals often make decisions about innovations in cognizance of their memberships of social systems.

Method

To analyze the content of vaccination messages on Nigerian broadcasting stations, I collected for content analysis, 12 samples of radio and television jingles broadcast in English and Yoruba and used on the network service of the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA), as well as on radio stations in Lagos, Abeokuta, Ibadan, and Ondo states of western Nigeria. These were all the available promotional jingles I could find at the stations. Many of the broadcasting stations neither kept program logs of promotional jingles aired nor retained EPI promotional tapes beyond a few weeks after the latest immunization days exercise. This was because resource constraints meant limited supply of audio cartridges, forcing stations to frequently recycle (by erasure) promotional tapes.

Most EPI jingles were of 30 seconds and 90 seconds duration and all 12 tapes examined share similar production attributes. For this study, I selected three of the 12 promotional tapes for analysis. Each tape represents the kind of EPI jingles broadcast in three languages: English, pidgin English, and Yoruba. I was interested in both the thematic structure of the broadcast messages and their idiomatic characterization. My interest in idiomatic representation was motivated by the need to establish cultural relevance, linguistic referents, or some such symbols to EPI messages. As for thematic structure, I examined how the media relate to established facts or knowledge about immunization. To help with this analysis, each jingle was broken down into thematic categories (themes) and their messages were then compared to 17 facts on immunization published by the WHO, UNICEF, and UNESCO. Each "fact" on immunization was taken as reference to a separate theme. So, the unit of analysis was the theme(s) contained in a jingle. The 17 facts on immunization were set out by the U.N. agencies as being important to mothers' understanding of both the concept and principles of immunization. (See Appendix A.)

The objectives of the thematic analysis were twofold. One was to see which facts on immunization were contained in EPI jingles. The other was to see which perceived problems of immunization exercises, obtained from focus sessions of nursing mothers, were included in promotional jingles. The UNICEF had supplied message producers the fact book on immunization as part of the child survival training workshops for radio and television personnel publicizing EPI. As for mothers' perception of vaccination services, my reference is to information obtained from focused interviews and focus groups of nursing mothers. These included interviews with mothers at private and public hospitals, market places, and university campuses. In all, nine group sessions of mothers and six focused interviews were held in Lagos and Kano between April 15 and August 1, 1989. Access and expediency determined whether or not a focus group or a focused interview was used. Typically, the focus group was used where at least five respondents could be assembled according to specified criteria (Ogundimu, op.cit:115).

For data analysis, interest was in extracting relevant information from a broadcast jingle and then making content inferences from the information. This is similar to the discourse models described by Krippendorf (Krippendorf, 1969:78-80).

Analysis

As indicated earlier, the three jingles discussed in this paper represent the variety of EPI promotional messages heard on Nigerian radio and television at the time of this study. The essential information contained in the jingles as well as the context of the presentation are given below. The key themes for each jingle are highlighted in parentheses.

Jingle #1 is an English-language production that opens with a mellow song about EPI, composed and vocalized by a famous Nigerian female singer. The song lasts 90 seconds and is set in the jazzy rhythm and blues format preferred by Nigeria's younger generation. The song contains the following key messages: (1) EPI will save the lives of the younger generation (**longer life expectancy**). (2) Strong children start out as EPI babies, they are free from all diseases (**resilience against diseases**). (3) EPI babies sleep well (**assures peace of mind**). (4) Nigerian mothers love their babies (**reinforces love of babies**). (5) EPI allows for a healthy life (**reinforces value of well-being**).

Jingle #2 is a Yoruba-language production that lasts 50 seconds. It features a man engaging his spouse in dialogue. No songs or musical embellishment accompany this particular jingle. The context of the dialogue with the key themes highlighted in parenthesis are: (1) Man calls out to spouse and admonishes her for not taking vaccinations despite her advanced pregnancy (**concern and admonition**). (2) Man uses Yoruba proverbial saying to warn of consequences of not immunizing (**non-compliance is dangerous**). (3) Spouse rejects advice, questions value of vaccinations (**rejection and skepticism**). (4) Man mentions why EPI vaccines are important, derides spouse's ignorance of immunization (**knowledge dissemination, derision**). (5) Man identifies several diseases EPI vaccines protect against (**knowledge dissemination, reinforcement**). (6) Several times during the man's harsh monologue, spouse displays skepticism for the information by asking if the information could be right (**debating skepticism**). (7) Each time skepticism is raised, man reaffirms information and adds sacarstically that spouse is ignorant (**knowledge confirmation, derision**). (8) Spouse displays her conviction by seeking direction to the nearest vaccination center (**conviction, decision, acquiescence**). (9) Husband gives direction, along with dates of vaccination exercises (**reaffirming superior knowledge**). The jingle ends with both husband and wife telling everyone to take advantage of vaccinations immediately (**concordance and conformity**).

Jingle #3 is narrated in Nigeria's pidgin English, the form of the English language widely spoken throughout the country. This production lasts 85 seconds and opens with a foreign musical interlude. Then two male characters engage in a call and response dialogue. Again, the context of the dialogue and the key themes are presented as follows: (1) Speaker #1 asks Speaker #2 if he knows that the immunization program is still on-going (**information seeking**). (2) Speaker #2 feigns ignorance of immunization and asks for clarification (**ignorance, information seeking**). (3) Speaker #1 tells who immunization is meant for; the diseases the vaccines protect against; the place of vaccination; and the dates of vaccination (**knowledge dissemination**). (4) Both speakers jointly say all nursing mothers should be mobilized for EPI (**social mobilization, conformity**). They say EPI is free, and that it is a civic duty to have a child immunized (**knowledge dissemination, conformity**).

Findings

The thematic analysis of the three jingles is summarized in Table 1, for easy comparison of the informational strategies adopted by the three jingles. The first observation in respect of the summary provided in Table 1 is that none of the three jingles addresses the kinds of principles knowledge Rogers theorizes as essential for the adoption of health innovations such as vaccination services. Only two of the jingles -- Jingle #2 and Jingle #3 -- contain any kind of knowledge dissemination. And such knowledge is limited to what Rogers calls "awareness knowledge," such as information about the importance of vaccination services (Jingle 2, category 4); names of diseases EPI protects against (Jingle 2, category 5); dates of vaccination (Jingle 2, category 9); identification of EPI target population, names of diseases, place and date of vaccination (Jingle 3, category 3); and information that EPI vaccines are given at no charge to recipients (Jingle 3, category 5). Of the three jingles, Jingle #1 shows the least merit for conveying substantive knowledge of vaccination services. It is true that the jingle has enchanting acoustics, but this was probably the least significant attribute of diffusing substantive information.

When compared with the UNICEF Fact book on immunization -- information regarded as important for mothers' adoption of immunization services (Appendix A) -- the shortcomings of the Nigerian promotional jingles become very glaring. Comparison of the "Category Themes" listed in Appendix A with those listed in Table 1 shows that only three of the 17 UNICEF Category themes (theme category 1, 2, 9) feature among the 20 themes identified in the EPI jingles.

Also, a review of the themes in Jingle #2 shows a very sexist approach to communicating vaccination messages to women. The most frequently recurring negative stereotypes in the husband-spouse dialogue of that jingle are that: (a) a woman needed to be admonished, cajoled, or derided in order for her to perceive the advantages of vaccination; (b) a woman was naturally inclined to skepticism and rejection on matters concerning 'good' innovations; (c) a male spouse was best at reaffirming superior intelligence, including that about the vaccination of young children -- an area of child care where women are probably more knowledgeable. These negative stereotypes recur in at least 8 of 10 themes listed in Jingle #2 of Table 1. In contrast, the messages diffused in the "Two males in dialogue" of jingle #3 show no evidence of admonition, derision, skepticism, or condescending diffusion of knowledge.

Furthermore, I have summarized in Table 2 information from focus groups and focused interviews of nursing mothers during my research in Nigeria. The key themes relating to mothers' perception of vaccination services and the EPI vaccines were classified into 10 categories reflecting concerns about the immunization program. I have used the shorthand "syndrome" to label these key themes according to the dominant linguistic expressions of the nursing mothers. The key themes and the associated syndrome (highlighted in parentheses) concern: (1) suspicion that EPI vaccines were for the sterilization of women (**sterilization syndrome**); (2)

concern over the side-effects of vaccines (**side-effects syndrome**); (3) concern about social pressures by family, friends, and neighbors not to accept vaccinations (**peer pressure syndrome**); (4) use of experience as natural experiment for vaccination decision (**natural experiment syndrome**); (5) personal testimonials of fatalities resulting from non-immunization of children (**personal testimonial syndrome**); (6) unresolved conflicts with mothers' vocation (**occupational constraint syndrome**); (7) religious objections (**religious belief syndrome**); (8) poor treatment at vaccination clinics (**depersonalization syndrome**); (9) cost of vaccination exercises (**economic poverty syndrome**); and (10) more pressing concerns over food and nutrition (**hunger syndrome**).

As with the information in the Fact book, comparison of the themes in Table 1 and Table 2 shows there is a big gap between mothers' concerns over immunization services and the kinds of information radio and television producers choose to emphasize in their promotional jingles publicizing the immunization program. I found that only two aspects of the mothers' concerns were addressed in the EPI jingles. These are: (1) the economic poverty syndrome (Table 1, Jingle #3, theme #5); and (2) the peer pressure syndrome (Table 1, Jingle #2, theme #10; Jingle #3, theme #4). In the latter case, however, there is no reference to why conformity is essential. This is an important point because of the disinformation about the vaccination program.

I also discovered during focus groups that women attending vaccination clinics in both Lagos and Kano had been taught by nurses an EPI song in local languages. This song was helpful in motivating women and letting them remember some facts about the immunization exercise. The Yoruba version of this song along with the key themes embedded in the song is presented in Appendix B. Although the EPI song does not convey all the relevant information about EPI vaccinations or immunization, the song was at least popular among mothers attending the clinics and it appears that the knowledge conveyed was deemed meaningful to both literate and illiterates as well. At the very least, the song serves as an appropriate billboard for some vaccination messages broadcast on radio and television stations in Nigeria. Surprisingly, the song was never featured in any of the radio and television campaigns promoting EPI and not one of the four radio and television stations visited knew of the existence of the song.

Conclusion

The thematic analysis of the three promotional jingles on Nigerian radio and television shows that all three jingles were lacking in substantive information relevant to either mothers' perception of immunization services or knowledge of facts considered by public health experts as essential for encouraging adoption of immunization services.

The jingles share, however, one common attribute. Each favors a top-down approach to communication, one in which producers decide what information and which approaches they thought were best in communicating vaccination information to women, without prior research. The point was not lost on R.N. Tuluhungwa, regional director of the UNICEF in Nigeria. His agency helped train Nigerian broadcasters about appropriate production techniques in broadcasting. Audience research is not part of the culture of production at Nigerian radio and television, Tuluhungwa said. At Nigerian television, "planning for production is not done, you do the picture first, then you do the script, is the way the NTA goes about its production," he said. As shown in this paper, Jingle #1 speaks to no specific knowledge of immunization and provides no specific information about what the vaccinations were for; the schedule of the vaccinations; where to obtain them; and so forth. The emphasis of the production was its acoustic and musical elements, which sounded pretty good but was probably meaningless and uninteresting to a majority of local women.

Jingle #2 contains some basic information on the immunization program but the message is extremely sexist, especially with the emphasis on admonition, derision, and acquiescence of mothers to male perceptions. The jingle blatantly insults the intelligence of women by assuming they generally are ignorant and unaware of what is good. The message implies that women, in general, need men in order to be educated about the good things of life. Furthermore, it implies that a woman was more likely to take action if a man was sarcastic and demeaning.

As with Jingle #2, Jingle #3 also stresses basic awareness of vaccination services. But Jingle #3 is less condescending to women. Nevertheless, it is men who address a predominantly female audience about the utility of immunization. The jingle assumes that men know better when it comes to knowledge of such things as immunization and men would be better at organizing women for vaccination exercises.

Although it is difficult to attach anthropomorphic characteristics to communication messages by themselves, my own experience with Nigerian broadcasting stations was that it was common for men to dominate decision-making in production processes and that this sometimes affected the quality of production. In this particular case, it is unlikely that knowledgeable female producers would approve productions such as those featured in Jingles #2 and #3.[7]

When compared with information in the UNICEF Fact book and feedback from focus groups, the omissions in the vaccination jingles include: (1) information about the side effects of vaccinations; (2) information about sources of infection for EPI diseases; (3) information about the consequences of failure to complete vaccination series; (4)

information about specific dangers posed by EPI diseases; and (5) information about the ages at which children needed to be vaccinated.

I might add that based on interviews with producers at Nigerian radio and television stations, broadcasting stations had sound strategy for communicating vaccination messages, but implementation of the strategy was problematic. The strategy was said to be based on a three-pronged plan: (1) to permeate existing programs with EPI messages; (2) to create new programs that would address EPI and the other child survival components; and (3) to use jingles to promote the immunization program. I have addressed only the third component of this strategy in this paper and found serious deficiencies with that component. Focus on the other two components merits a different paper. In respect of promotional jingles, I have shown however that radio and television stations in Nigeria need to radically rethink their approaches for designing communication messages. If the mass media are to fulfil the potential of communicating knowledge of immunization services, then the content of messages targeted at nursing mothers must be knowledge specific and culturally relevant to mothers' perception of vaccination services. At the time of my study, this was not the case. A critical component for evolving such knowledge-specific information is to make producers engage in pre-production planning, something which is presently lacking in the production of vaccination messages.

Among other things, pre-production planning means local officials managing vaccination exercises and women who are targets of immunization services must be coopted into the planning and presentation of vaccination messages, both as message designers and message disseminators. Nursing mothers are more likely to know which information is relevant to mothers' frame of reference than are producers, considering that most producers hardly take the time to investigate how much understanding there is of the messages they produce. The need for the involvement of local officials in the production of messages is also important because of the thinking among many local health officials that their contact with people at the local level enables them to tell how best to reach local people, especially those in rural villages. The thematic analysis of vaccination messages I have provided in this paper, along with the inventory of themes contained in feedback from nursing mothers and from the UNICEF Fact book on immunization should be regarded as a starting point for the redesign of vaccination messages for use on Nigerian radio and television stations.

Finally, the case of the Nigeria immunization program I have related in this paper demonstrates that it is not enough to assume that the use of the mass media by themselves, radio and television in particular, is sufficient to mobilize people without paying close attention to the content of vaccination messages. Hornik's reference to "theory failures" and "program failures" in the deployment of communication media for the promotion of development programs are doubly relevant in this context. Many communication scholars have pointed out moreover that a major problem with the deployment of the mass media in developing countries is the lack of proper definition of how the media can contribute to the goal of national development (Barghouti, 1974). The case of the Nigerian Expanded Program on Immunization presented in this paper underscores the relevance of that observation.

Endnotes

1. One estimate put the numbers of death and disability from measles alone at 100,000 for children under 24 months (United Nations, 1989:4). Nigeria's Infant Mortality Rate of 105 per 1,000 live births for 1985-1990 was higher than Africa's average of 101 per thousand or the mean of 79 per thousand for less developed countries. By comparison, more developed countries have an IMR of 14 per thousand. The lowest figures recorded for Africa are for Reunion, 11 per thousand, Mauritius 23 per thousand and Madagascar 59 per thousand (UN, 1986).

2. These NIDs were held on the last Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays of those months. These were work days, ordinarily. But that was not a major problem for public sector workers who usually were allowed to take time off to attend to children without loss of wages. This was not usually the case for private sector workers though.

3. Information based on several interviews with program officials in the field, including interview with UNICEF Regional director, R.N. Tuluhungwa, in Lagos, Nigeria on August 24, 1989.

4. Interview with R.N. Tuluhungwa (Ibid). Tuluhungwa did not say exactly how much was spent on technical support for radio and television equipment and training in Nigeria. But the social mobilization and technical support budget in the past was as high as 50 percent of total expenditure on EPI and ORT programs.

5. This pattern has been constant over the years. In 1988, federal grant to radio and television was 79 percent of the Ministry of Information budget (Nigeria Approved Budget, 1988).

6. In 1987-1988, defence expenditures accounted for the biggest share of total recurrent spending (6.1 percent), followed by education (2.2 percent), health (1.9 percent), and information (1.1 percent).

7. The producers of the promotional jingles were not identified. However, the director of the programs division at the Nigerian Television Authority at the time was a woman, Victoria Ezeokoli. The head of the NTA Child Survival Unit in charge of Jingle #1 was a man, Aitsen Ahua. The other two jingles were radio productions.

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Table 1

Thematic Analysis of Nigeria's EPI Jingles

Type of production	Key themes identified in reference to EPI vaccines
(Jingle #1) **English language** **Foreign musical**	1. Longer life expectancy 2. Resilience against diseases 3. Assures peace of mind 4. Reinforces love of babies 5. Reinforces value of well-being
(Jingle #2) **Yoruba language** **Husband-Spouse dialogue**	1. Concern and admonition 2. Non-compliance dangerous 3. Rejection and skepticism 4. Knowledge dissemination, derision **(why EPI important)** 5. Dissemination, reinforcement **(names EPI diseases)** 6. Debating skepticism 7. Knowledge confirmation, derision 8. Conviction, decision, acquiescence 9. Reaffirming superior knowledge **(names dates of vaccination)** 10. Concordance and conformity
(Jingle #3) **Pidgin language** **Two Males in dialogue**	1. Information seeking 2. Ignorance, information seeking 3. Knowledge dissemination 4. Social mobilization, conformity **(names diseases, date, place, target)** 5. Knowledge dissemination, conformity **(says vaccination is free)**

Table 2

Thematic Analysis of Focus Interviews of Nursing Mothers

Key Themes Identified
in reference to EPI vaccines

1. Suspicion EPI vaccines sterilize women. **(Sterilization syndrome).**

2. Concern over side-effects of vaccines. **(Side-effects syndrome).**

3. Concern over social pressures by family, friends and neighbors who think vaccinations are bad. **(Peer pressure syndrome).**

4. Tendency to base vaccination decision on experience **(Natural experiment syndrome).**

5. Mention of specific examples of fatality resulting from non-immunization **(Personal testimonial syndrome).**

6. Vaccination schedules conflict with women's occupational activity. **(Occupational constraint syndrome).**

7. Religious objections to vaccination. **(Religious belief syndrome).**

8. Poor treatment of mothers at vaccination centers. **(Depersonalization syndrome).**

9. Mothers can't afford vaccination fees. **(Economic poverty syndrome).**

10. Food and nutrition for children more pressing concerns than child immunization. **(Hunger syndrome).**

Appendix A

Excerpts of Facts on Immunization Used for Judging Knowledge of Immunization Services and Content Analysis Mass Media Messages

(Cf: UNICEF, WHO, UNESCO. *Facts for Life: A Communication Challenge*. New York, NY: UNICEF, n.d.; pp. 33-38)

Item No. Category Theme

1. Immunization offers protection against most diseases.

2. Non-immunized child could get measles, whooping cough; could suffer death; survival results in weakened child plus threat of malnutrition and other illnesses.

3. Measles causes malnutrition, mental retardation, blindness.

4. Non-immunized child could be infected with polio; 1 in 200 get paralyzed for life.

5. Tetanus germs grow in dirty cuts, kill most infected persons if not immunized.

6. Breast feeding offers immunization against most diseases; mother's resistance is passed on to child in her breast milk, especially in first few days after birth.

7. Vital for infants to complete full course of immunizations, otherwise vaccines may not work.

8. Parents must know a child should be taken for immunization five times in the first year of a child's life.

9. Schedule of Immunization: (a) Birth: Tuberculosis (and polio in some countries); (b) Six weeks: DPT1, OPV1 (c) 10 weeks: DPT2, OPV2; (d) 14 weeks: DPT3, OPV3; Nine months: Measles (12 - 15 months in more developed countries.

Item No. Category Theme

10. Measles is one of the most dangerous of childhood diseases. For first few months of life, the child has some natural protection against measles, inherited from the mother. This interferes with the Measles vaccine. But after about 9 months, this natural protection comes to an end. Child now at risk and should be immunized.

11. If child not fully immunized by end of first birthday, important to have child immunized soon as possible thereafter.

12. It is safe to immunize a sick child. Fever, cough, diarrhoea, cold, or some other mild illness does not interfere with immunization.

13. After injection, the child may cry, develop a fever, a rash or a small sore. As with any illness, a child should be given plenty of food fluid. Breast-feeding is particularly helpful. If problem persists for more than three days, contact a health center.

14. Every woman between the ages of 15 and 44 should be fully immunized against tetanus. If the mother is immunized against tetanus, then 1 in 100 babies will die from tetanus.

15. Remember, tetanus germs grows in dirty cuts. Avoid using unsterilized knife to cut umbilical cord, or putting anything unclean on the stump of the cord. To sterilize, first clean object, then boil or heat in flame, then allow to cool.

16. Mothers can protect themselves and new-born babies against tetanus by making sure they are immunized before or during pregnancy.

17. If a woman is not already immunized, a first dose of tetanus vaccine should be given as soon as pregnancy is known. The second dose can be given four weeks after the first, and should be given before the last two weeks of the pregnancy. A third dose should be given Six to 12 months after the second dose or during the next pregnancy. These three tetanus vaccinations protect mother and new-born baby for five years. All infants should be immunized against tetanus during the first year of life.

Appendix B
EPI SONG IN YORUBA
(duration: :50 seconds)

Embedded Themes

Abere a jesara
O se pataaki O (vaccine importance)

Abere a jesara
O se pataaki O (vaccine importance, reinforcement)

Abere a jesara
O se pataaki O (vaccine importance, reinforcement)

Abere a jesara
O se pataaki O (vaccine importance, reinforcement)

Ekinni n'ko
Ojo ta bimo O (knowledge dissemination -- 1st shot)

Ekeji n'ko
Olosu meji O (knowledge dissemination -- 2nd shot)

Eketa n'ko
Olosu meta O (knowledge dissemination -- 3rd shot)

Ekerin n'ko
olosu merin O (knowledge dissemination -- 4th shot)

Ekarun n'ko
olosu mesan O (knowledge dissemination -- 5th shot)

Ise to n'se
OOun to wafun (knowledge dissemination -- function)

Jedo jedo (knowledge dissemination -- tuberculosis)
aarun ipa (knowledge dissemination -- measles)
iko awule (knowledge dissemination -- whooping cough)
gbofun gbofun (knowledge dissemination -- diphtheria)
ropa rose (knowledge dissemination -- polio)
aarun eyi (knowledge dissemination -- tetanus)

Ko ni s'omo mi O (cultural reinforcement -- a vow)

Abere ajesara O'se pataki O (importance, reinforcement)

Aug. 4, 1992/ AEJMC Montreal/Commission on the Status of Women

The Role of Women Journalists in Philippine Political Change

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Introduction

This paper addresses some of the historical, political and sociological factors influencing the emergence of a small but powerful group of relatively young Philippine women journalists who were primary actors in using the press to hasten the downfall of President Ferdinand Marcos between 1982 and his exile to Hawaii beginning in 1986. We begin with a brief historical background of press controls imposed by the Marcos regime, then illustrate how these women journalists led a major effort to resist these controls, and finally provide data from interviews with women journalists we identified as critical actors in the mass media's participation in the "People's Power" movement ending Marcos' rule. We then proceed to detail how these women viewed gender as a factor in their success at becoming leading adversarial journalists of the period.

Of particular importance is whether the rise of these women journalists was an anomalous event resulting from a peculiar set of conditions affecting Philippine journalism at the time, or whether these women comprised a vanguard of skilled and effectively politicized Philippine women journalists who will continue to maintain a strong voice in national affairs through the mass media.

Background to the problem

During the decade of martial law beginning in 1972, many

Philippine journalists were enlisted as paid agents of the Marcos national propaganda machine. Most others continued to work for muzzled private news organizations, foregoing the adversarial style of journalism adopted during the American colonial period (1898 to 1942) - a style that remains a hallmark of the Philippine press (Maslog, 1988:25-30).

In the early 1980s, as Marcos' political grip began to weaken, a group of about a dozen women journalists began writing the first barely veiled critical stories and columns exposing the corruption of the regime, as well as exposes on the military and the economic elite, that had prospered from Marcos' favoritism as the country generally sank into poverty. Most of these adversarial stories and columns were published in the Sunday magazine sections of the Manila newspapers. These Sunday supplements were the traditional domain of women journalists and had previously been devoid of the kind of controversial political fare Filipinos had been used to reading in stories and columns in the daily papers before martial law. It was a dangerous time to be writing against the power status quo Marcos had crafted so well.

The critical stories and columns these women wrote in the early 1980s, especially for Panorama, the Sunday supplement of the nation's most influential newspaper, Bulletin Today, and for the magazine, Mr. and Ms., would hardly carry the bite under the current permissive Philippine government that they did when Marcos was in power. But during the last years of Marcos' rule, the collective output of these women was a powerful and effective expression of dissent against the authoritarian rule he imposed.

The Philippine Press Under Siege, published by the Philippine National Press Club Committee to Protect Writers (1985), documents how the most popular woman columnist of the time, Letty Magsanoc, then Panorama's editor, used biting satire in her article, "The Lady at Maynila" (Magsanoc, 1980:3), to describe then First Lady Imelda Marcos' opulent lifestyle. The column was ordered removed from the magazine. Another Magsanoc column, "Survival: Variations on the Human Condition" (Magsanoc, 1981), was her parable about the sense of economic hopelessness experienced by the average Filipino. It too was pulled by Bulletin Today owner and publisher, Hans Menzi, a close friend of Marcos'. In July of 1981, after Magsanoc wrote a scathing satire on Marcos' most recent inauguration charade, Menzi forced her to resign from Panorama. Magsanoc remains a heroine of the profession and continues as a columnist for the Philippine Daily Inquirer.

Magsanoc's successors at Panorama continued to challenge the Marcos government. Menzi, perhaps anticipating the downfall of Marcos, on occasion tolerated adversarial and critical columns by the women journalists working for him. He was quick to offer legal counsel when the women writers incurred libel suits initiated by the government officials or military officers whom the women had criticized in their stories and columns. When Menzi forced Magsanoc to resign, he replaced her as editor of Panorama with another equally vociferous critic of the Marcos regime, Domini Suarez. In an early column, "The Little Town that Roared to Triumph," (Suarez, 1981), Suarez dramatically narrates how the people of the town of Tanauan fought to legitimate their ballots. This column was also withheld from publication on Menzi's orders.

In other columns and stories by women journalists, who included Arlene Babst, Chelo R. Banal, Lorna Kalew-Tiorol, Doris Nuyda, Ceres Doyo, Mila Garcia, Jo Ann Maglipon, Sylvia L. Mayuga, Ninez Cacho Olivares, Melinda de Jesus, and Sylvia L. Mayuga, political killings, exploitation of ethnic minorities, illegal detainment, human rights violations, press censorship, suppression of labor movements, military violence against civilians, and other government abuses were brought to light. All of these women were among those punished by libel suits, threats of dismissal and imposition of tight controls on what they were subsequently able to publish. The National Press Club book (pp. 53-54) concludes that:

> Life would have remained cozy for the women writers had they kept to the safe zone where they all began their careers in the Bulletin: art book reviews, fashion, theater, movies, feminism, food and parenting; in short, concerns of the true, the good, and the beautiful. But in less than a year of exposure, they become highly politicized, pushing the limits of censorship and suppression with columns and articles that show the rebirth of surveys, fables, parables, fairy tales, allegories, innuendoes, satires, and yes, even recipes, as tongue-in-cheek journalistic commentaries on the sorry state of affairs in the country and government.

Historical influences on Philippine women journalists

That these women were able to rise to confront a long-established and particularly powerful authoritarian order is partially a result of historical conditions in the Philippines, where women have had a stronger involvement in journalism than has been characteristic of most Asian societies (Lent, 1985). For instance, a women's weekly was published in the Philippines as early as 1891. The first radio station in the world devoted to women's programming was established there in 1958, and a women's daily newspaper was started in 1972. Women journalists worked for the revolutionary newspaper La Solidaridad, the leading propaganda organ supporting liberation from the Spanish and national self-determination. There is also evidence that Philippine women during the Spanish colonial period held a relatively high status as compared to women in other societies experiencing European colonization (Israel-Sobritchea 1990).

Following the three-year Japanese occupation (1942-1944), and Philippine independence from the United States in 1946, Philippine women began to enter journalism in large numbers, although primarily in the traditional women's domains of society and education editors and Sunday feature writers. Women remained in these traditional journalistic roles during the nation's first 26 years of independence, when the Philippine press developed its reputation as the least restrained, and consequently most adversarial, in Asia. The imposition of martial law in 1972 brought this era to a close. Lent calls Marcos' declaration of martial law a watershed, ending a time when Philippine women journalists were largely assigned to these lesser beats, and beginning a time when they were to assume a more active and influential role on a number of large publications. Lent concludes that Philippine women have since made more substantial progress as journalists, than have women in other Asian nations. He suggests that recent conditions of great political flux in the Philippines have been more crucial to the empowerment of Philippine women journalists than are journalistic traditions and practices resulting from colonial relations with the United States.

From 1972 to 1986, the dominant media in the Philippines was known as the "Crony Press." It was both directly and indirectly controlled by Marcos and his cronies. Although they often professed to a development orientation, the newspapers constituting the Crony Press uncritically lauded government projects and the officials in charge of them, while ignoring massive theft of public funds, abuses by the military, and other shortcomings of the Marcos government. Although with the advent of martial law in 1972, women journalists began moving into domains usually dominated by male reporters and editors, few women were active in writing news or political commentary until the early 1980s, when martial law was coming to an end. The male journalists remaining in the profession through the martial law decade had been censored and intimidated for so long that they were unable to take an adversarial stance when the Marcos regime was no longer able to effectively control the press. The intimidation was real since scores of mostly male journalists had been detained for martial law violations, fired, threatened with violence, or even killed in the line of duty.

With the easing of martial law and the hesitancy of male journalists to lead a press offensive in synch with the rising "Peoples Power Movement," it appeared the opportunity was open for a new generation of women journalists to step in and do so. The critical historical event inspiring women journalists to accelerate their journalistic offensive against the Marcos government was the murder of Benigno (Ninoy) Aquino at the Manila Airport upon his return to the Philippines in 1983, after a long forced exile in the United States. Marra Lanot (Mananzan, 1989:71) says of revolutionary efforts by women at the time that:

> **Today the sprouting of women's groups will be remembered as a phenomenon of 1983 Philippines. It was a reaction to the cold-blooded murder of Ninoy. Old and new groups, after a seeming hibernation, became visible like a fixture of the streets. They united in trying to understand issues such as Ninoy's death, military bases, nuclear power plants, economic crisis, political alternatives, etc.**

Philippine women journalists successfully took advantage of the political and historical conditions existing just prior to and during Peoples Power Movement of the early 1980s to make significant gains with regard to controlling the newsgate and determining the course of the nation, by helping to instigate and guide the Philippine Revolution of 1986. But recent evidence provided by the Philippine government suggests their progress hasn't been sustained into the 1990s. Although women have continued to move into traditionally male beats such as police, military and politics, President Corazon Aquino's Philippine Development Plan for Women, 1989-1992 (1990) notes that the Philippine mass media under her administration remained male dominated, with only a few women holding policymaking or top management positions. Except for two daily newspapers, the rest of the print and broadcast media were said to be owned and managed by men. In 1990 women were reported to comprise 32.7% of the editorial staff of most newspapers, while 36.4% of "desk jobs" or managerial positions were held by women. The report further concludes that:

> **Media's long and irregular hours, for one, are deemed irreconcilable with a woman's primary duty to the home and family. Such natural affiliation to the hearth has also been cited as one factor that automatically enables female journalists to land such minor assignments as the lifestyle section, and the education, health or culture beats. The police or defense beats are often regarded as too tough for women, while the business beat or**

> **politics may be too technical or complicated for them. Thus given our Western orientation on news value, whereby politics and military affairs are regarded as top priorities and therefore front-page materials, female reporters continue to languish in the inside pages and secondary sections - with their corresponding lower prestige, thinner paychecks and less opportunities for advancement.** (p.160)

The interviews we conducted generally present a more favorable view of the progress of women journalists in the Philippines than does the Philippine Development Plan for Women. Certainly the period in which women have risen in the profession has been a short one, with much of what has been accomplished occurring since the early 1980s. The government report might be viewed as an attempt to accelerate this progress, and the statistics it cites on what positions women in the profession occupy, might be interpreted as either positive or negative indicators, depending on the expectations of the interpreter.

Why the women journalists we interviewed were able to recognize the favorable conditions existing for them in the early 1980s and to take advantage of these conditions to pursue a markedly adversarial and ultimately politically successful style of journalism, is the focus of the remainder of our discussion and analysis.

Gender and gatekeeping in Philippine journalism

If for whatever reasons men and women perceive and act upon their environment in fundamentally different ways, then these differences will influence their actions regarding the production, dissemination and interpretation of information by the mass media. In the case under study, the outcome of involvement by women journalists in the political changes that culminated in

1986 with the Election of President Corazon Aquino, was clearly both substantial and positive. We attempt to identify the characteristics of women journalists who effectively engaged in the political life of their nation at an important historical juncture, as well as speculate more generally on how the influence of gender on the production and interpretation of news and information might either further change or hinder it in developing nations such as the Philippines.

We proceed on the assumptions that mass media are potentially effective tools for social change and national development, and that female and male journalists will approach some tasks of producing, disseminating and interpreting news and information differently. Women journalists are likely to reflect different values, priorities, and understandings on some issues than men do, and they are also likely to manifest in their professional work the unique position they occupy in the social structure.

The existence of a separate and identifiable women's perspective is certainly important if it affects the content of mass media messages, as well as the traditional mass media functions of gatekeeping and agenda setting. The nature of the application of alternative perspectives on news raises important theoretical and practical questions extending beyond the analysis of gender differences, particularly when viewed in the context of the problem of applying very limited mass media resources to the task of modernizing, democratizing and developing peripheral (non-industrialized) nations.

Are women journalists in these peripheral nations likely to have a perspective that more effectively lends to utilization of the mass media to further societal integration, political consensus, economic growth and reduction in conflict? Since the broad scope of the question prevents a definitive answer, we address it in an exploratory manner by providing this case study of one important nation. Regarding the relationship of gender to the promotion of an effective journalism for national or political development, a fundamental issue for us is the intent of the journalist to promote change, as opposed to an intent to remain objective and neutral.

Adherence to objectivity in this context means that the journalist neither concentrates on promoting change or on hindering it. Implicitly, however, such a stance supports the status quo. Thus we are interested in the existence or absence of a conscious intent on the part of the journalist to promote change and development at a local or national level, and in what influences the emergence of such an intent, particularly with regard to gender.

The nature of the interviews

The women journalists we sought to interview were recognized as some of the most actively dissident by the Marcos regime itself. Particularly, eight women journalists achieved fame for being invited to the "Merienda Interviews" in December 1982 by a Philippine military tribunal called the National Intelligence Board. That same month military intelligence units had closed down the dissident publication We Forum and jailed its entire staff, including the circulation and production workers.

The summoning of journalists before the tribunal was unprecedented in Philippine history. To charge journalists with violating martial law decrees and to even jail them for such violations had become routine by the early 1980s, but to order these women before a military tribunal that had no clear mandate even under martial law decrees to censor the press, was viewed as a significant expansion of authoritarian rule by the Marcos regime.

The fact that only women journalists were chosen to face the military interrogators indicates either that the tribunal thought women would be less likely to resist intimidation, or that women were being perceived as the most threatening to the stability of the regime. The women proved tough. The eight who were called before the tribunal were joined by 21 other journalists in filing a class action suit with the Philippine Supreme Court on January 25, 1983 (Babst, et al. vs. the National Intelligence Board, et al.), demanding that the court order the military to cease the hearings. Before the case was even heard, Gen. Fabian C. Ver ordered an end to the interrogations. Although it was an impressive victory for the journalists, the military soon turned to another form of intimidation. Individual military officers began to file libel suits against the journalists, particularly against women journalists (National Press Club Committee to Protect Writers, 1985:139-142).

Of the original eight women who were called before the National Intelligence Board, we were able to locate and interview five in 1991. They were: Eugenia D. Apostol, founder and publisher of the Philippine Daily Inquirer; Domini Torrevillas (formerly Suarez), staff writer for the Philippine Star; Lorna Kalew-Tiorol, managing editor of Sunday Inquirer Magazine; Ceres P. Doyo, staff writer for Sunday Inquirer Magazine, and Doris G. Nuyda, editor of Mr. and Ms. magazine.

Letty Magsanoc agreed to be interviewed, but flooding in Manila prevented our meeting with her. Arlene Babst reportedly emigrated to Canada and we were unable to locate her. We also failed to locate Ninez Cacho Olivares. We have, however, collected articles by and about both Magsanoc and Babst, that record their views on the work of women journalists during the martial law period (National Press Club Committee to Protect Writers, 1985:165).

In addition to the five women we located, we also interviewed Sheila Coronel, executive director of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism; Alice Cole Villadolid, executive director of the Philippine Press Institute, and Penny Azarcon de la Cruz, desk editor for the Philippine Daily Inquirer. Coronel, Villadolid and de la Cruz were prominent journalists both during and after martial law was in effect. Reporter Thea Rinean and Editor Eileen Mangubat, both of the Sun Star Daily in Cebu City, were interviewed to provide a perspective women journalists working outside Metro Manila. Both Rinean and Mangubat were Cebu reporters during the 1986 "Philippine Revolution." Cebu is the second largest city in the Philippines and was a stronghold for the Marcos opposition forces.

Analysis of interviews and presentation of findings

In utilizing our interview data we have identified and extracted the most representative statements and personal reactions addressing questions raised in the introductory sections of this paper. The statements best articulate the historical, political and social circumstances related to the guiding questions and the overall goals of this study. Pertinent statements are organized under these five categories: (1) evidence as to why only women journalists were summoned by the National Intelligence Board; (2) the reaction of the women to being summoned and interrogated by the military tribunal; (3) the self-perceived collective characteristics of these women journalists; (4) evidence as to how the Philippine social structure hindered or furthered their success as journalists, and (5) gender-based advantages or disadvantages for Philippine women in the journalism profession.

Since it is our contention that the military interrogations of women journalists in 1982 provide the best proof that women were the most adversarial and politically powerful journalists during the years leading up to the Philippine Revolution of 1986, we first turn to an analysis of interview statements providing evidence to that effect.

In viewing their December 1982 interrogations by the military tribunal retrospectively, the women interviewed said when they were summoned they felt a range of emotions beginning with fear. This fear was attributed to anticipation of the effects their possible imprisonment or detention would have on their families, or on their ability to continue to produce the news. Fear appeared to evolve rather quickly into contempt and disdain for the actions of the military tribunal, and for most of the military officers who comprised it. This evolution in emotions was greatly facilitated by such factors as: (1) communication and solidarity among those women who were summoned; (2) the strong support expressed by fellow journalists, both male and female; (3) free legal aid from the "Mabini Group" of attorneys, whose members remain famous as civil liberties defenders, and (4) the ability of the women to develop a small group culture that included a shared dark humor directed both at the interrogation process and at the foibles of the military officers who comprised the tribunal. This humor later evolved into satirical skits the women journalists performed before fellow members of the National Press Club, lampooning both the tribunal and the government that had authorized it. This collective humor was a bonding device allowing the women to better come to terms with facing the tribunal, while performance of the skits indicates recognition by their colleagues of the courage and power of these women.

I. Speculation as to why only women were summoned

We have already outlined some of the possible reasons why it was exclusively women who were recognized by the National Intelligence Board as the strongest journalistic adversaries of the Marcos government by the early 1980s. As we have already pointed out, by that time these women had emerged from the relative obscurity of the Sunday supplements and women pages, to carry out an effective political battle against the Marcos regime using those media as their base. Also, during the decade of martial law suppression beginning in 1972, male journalists tended to be more intimidated into avoiding political confrontation in what they wrote and published, than women journalists were. It is also evident that the most powerful publisher in the Philippines at the time, Hans Menzi, may have been using the women journalists he employed, particularly those on the staff of Panorama, to test Marcos' political strength and his capability to continue press controls. Menzi may have guessed that the male-centered Marcos government and its military establishment would not want to be perceived as persecuting women. The fact that the National Intelligence Board backed off when the women journalists did not allow themselves to be intimidated, especially after they carried the fight to the Supreme Court, indicates Menzi guessed correctly.

When asked why it was only women who the military chose to interrogate in December 1982, responses by the women journalists interviewed included:

> **I guess it was because it was the women who were writing the bolder articles during that period, rather than the men... The military did not like some of the articles we had written. These were related to human rights violations and atrocities committed by the military in the provinces. Mostly they didn't like those on human rights violations...**(Tirol)

> **There seems to have been a lot of women who were active in the this post martial law press, with Mr. & Ms. and Panorama. These were the women who were called before the Military Board.** (Nuyda)

> **They thought we were a bunch of vocal women, in the sense of defending people. I guess the military might have thought they could intimidate this bunch of noisy women, or whatever - let's see what they really have, you know.** (Doyo)

> **I would consider their sex as a factor in their not being arrested by the police. Another factor is that these women became somewhat public figures, so it would be difficult for the authorities to run after them and put them in prison, because then they would become celebrated cases.** (Torrevillas)

II. Reaction to being summoned by the National Intelligence Board

The reactions of the women to being summoned for interrogation illustrate an effectively courageous and peculiarly feminine style of resistance before a very powerful body of military men engaged in both subtle and overt forms of intimidation. The initial fears and reactions to being summoned are expressed in the following statements by the women journalists extracted from both our own interview data and from National Press Club files. Relevant statements by the women journalist include:

> **I was more irritated** (than fearful about the summons). **I was worried about my children. Not for myself but for my children, because at that time my husband was leaving for abroad. I thought that if I was going to be detained, then who was going to take care of my children? So that was my worry.** (Tirol)

> **I was the first one called by these people. It was hard. During this time the pressure was already brought to bear on me because I was already editor of Panorama. I was the only woman and there were about 20 colonels. It was like facing the firing squad you know.** (Torrevillas)

> **I don't think I was afraid. I may have had my fears of being picked up while I was working on a day-to-day basis. But when we were invited to attend the interview, I don't think I was scared at all. I did take it seriously - as a matter of fact I was outraged because of the wording of the invitation. It said something to the effect that you were very cordially invited - very social. The first paragraph was a very social invitation. The second paragraph says that they would take it as a refusal to cooperate - something to that effect - if we rejected the invitation. I got so angry when I read that.** (Nuyda)

> **I think they were trying to make it appear that they were being very polite about it. I even got a nice little summons. What was really said was that they wanted me to help them get to the bottom of the matter, I think that was how it was stated. But, actually, it was a reprimand.** (Doyo)

In similar statements published by National Press Club Committee to Protect Writers (1985: pp. 144-145), other members of the group of women journalists summoned said:

> **The invitation was received Monday evening, Dec. 20, 1982, at the Bulletin Today office. I later learned that two military men had gone to my parents' old house in Quezon City looking for me, causing much distress in my bewildered household....My reaction to the interrogation? I felt helpless about being insulted, but I didn't have to smile at the insults. I was indignant that I was invited at all. By what legal authority was I brought there?** (Babst)

It definitely disturbed my parents to receive the military invitation in the evening of December 10, 1982.....In the long run, no amount of conviviality can make up for what is an attempt to "remind" the press that this authority exists, is above, ever present, ever watchful, and that therefore in this season of supposed cheer, the press had better watch out, better not cry and better not pout. And the military is there telling us why. (Maglipon)

They (the other women summoned) **received their invitations with amused fear, called the Mabini lawyers, dressed in various fashionable statements and went through the most inquisitorial two to three hours of their lives.** (Apostol)

How do I feel about the interrogation? Exasperation, amusement, disdain. A combination of all that. I felt crucified, but I felt it was also my moment of triumph. (Doyo)

That the National Intelligence Board was wholly comprised of male military officers, carrying on a very officious and formal interrogation, may partially explain why these women reacted by quickly bonding as a group and constructing a culture of resistance epitomized by a black humor directed against their interrogators. The rigid military sub-culture they confronted was as much at odds with the more fluid journalistic sub-culture the women were members of, as the masculine culture (macho) of the military tribunal was at odds with the feminine (Filipina) culture of the women summoned. The extreme pretense at chivalry exhibited by the military officers, (as reported by the women journalists), contrasts sharply with the mockingly compliant behavior of the women, some of whom said they purposely dressed in very distinctly feminine attire as a symbol of resistance at their interrogation.

It appears as if the military tribunal was going through an elaborately staged exercise in intimidation of the Philippine press, and that this group of women journalists was assumed to be potentially the most susceptible to such tactics. Those military officers comprising the tribunal, however, were very much in error regarding that assumption.

III. Self-perceived characteristics of the women journalists

When asked what characteristics the women journalists shared that made them more openly adversarial than the male journalists were at the time, and what subsequently led to their selection by the National Intelligence Board for interrogation, the responses of the women journalists included:

> **I think most of us had a convent education, although I sort of emerged very differently from what our education was shaping us to be. Among all the convent schools, I think St. Scholastica is the most inclined towards social awareness, although other schools are also inclined the same way....I think our generation was still educated in such a way that we were meant to be mothers or wives to senators and congressmen. But then I don't know how it turned out that so many convent women became so militant.** (Doyo)

> **Men think they are in control. They put down all sorts of rules and restrictions. But women are raised to be very strong because they are given more responsibility in the home, for instance, than boys are. And so they grow up being more responsible and more self-reliant. I think that this is really a matriarchal society that we have.** (Tirol)

> **It was the women writers who were attacking the administration. But I feel that the men had their own reasons for staying away and not touching subjects that would affect their livelihood, because these men were the breadwinners in their family. It was the women who had husbands to support them who had the guts, really the courage to attack the administration...But I also think it was really their conviction that allowed women to become so successful or so brave, or whatever...I think that a lot of women were there for their politics and I don't think that these women were really concerned about feminism...Of course, you can't disassociate politics or development from feminism, the development of feminist ideas.** (Torrevillas)

IV. The influence of Philippine social structure on the political success of women journalists

That women in a developing nation would be able to succeed as adversarial journalists to the extent we document here, is contrary to our own initial expectations that they would be restricted by the demands of their roles as wives, mothers and homemakers. What is clear is that in an essentially non-industrial society, where the cost of labor remains relatively low, the middle and upper classes are able to pay others for childcare and the domestic work they might otherwise perform. The married women journalists tended to say that their husbands were progressive in the sense that they supported their careers. No one said their husband objected to the long hours they worked or to the dangers they faced by attacking the political and economic elites. Only one of the women was single and the rest were married to professionals. Two husbands were also journalists.

There are several evident forces contributing to this situation. One is traditional - a condition in which an elite and educated class to afford domestics, allowing women of that class to pursue full time employment. However, because most women journalists are not paid enough to independently attain middle or upper class status, they are often dependent on the incomes their husbands provide. The only unmarried member of the group interviewed said she had other income derived from property she inherited. Since these women were not primarily dependent on the income their newspapers provided, they may have been able to take greater risks than their male colleagues, who they said tended to be the "breadwinners" of their families. This underscores but fails to resolve the issue of whether the relatively high social status and economic independence of these women contributed more to their ability to use the press for political change, than factors related to being women did.

None of the women expressed fear of the professional consequences of confronting the political power structure by publishing adversarial stories and columns. Some said they assumed they could find another job.

Another factor that seemed to contribute to the ability of these women to pursue an adversarial type of journalism is a modernizing force in Philippine society where both men and women of the upper and middle classes are encouraged to pursue advanced educations leading to professional careers. The statements below explain how the women journalists resolved the conflicts between their roles as wives and mothers, and their role as adversarial journalists:

> **Well, my husband asked me what our plans were in such events** (if arrested or detained)**. So I said that what Eggy (Eugenia Apostol) advised me to do was to pack a bag for whenever we needed it....My husband said you just do what you have to do. He was very supportive during that time.** (Nuyda). Note: She has six children.

> **There might be more pressure on men because they might be the breadwinners. But I don't want to justify it that way. They should move on to another profession where they can earn more** (if men can't be ethical)**. I wouldn't want it said that we are more honest because we're not breadwinners.** (Doyo)

> **The demands on my children have been great. I've often in the past felt torn between staying home with my children and giving them more time, and pursuing a career. In fact, I've had to lie low for many years because I've always believed that my children take priority over any job. So I've lost a lot of opportunities, for instance to travel or to study abroad, because I've preferred to be a mother before anything else. Journalism places more demands on a woman than a job like being a secretary or teacher.** (Tirol)

Although a broad discussion of feminist political and social influences on Philippine journalism failed to emerge from our interviews, one respondent did credit such women's movements in the United States for inspiring women journalists in the Philippines to lead the political struggle in the mass media. She said:

> **I think there was some kind of perception that maybe the women were being somehow discriminated against in the profession. So, the women felt that they had to band together. So you see it wasn't any kind of political grouping, it arose from the women's movement in the United States, and it filtered down to the Philippines. This was a manifestation of the Filipina** (female Filipino) **journalist's desire to have equal rights with the men in the profession.**(Tirol)

This raises the issue of post-colonial relationships among societies, particularly the effect of currents of political and social change occurring in core (industrialized) nations on peripheral (non-industrialized) nations. The scope of this paper does not allow for adequate analysis of that factor but we cannot overlook the fact that very strong ties with the United States have continued since Philippine national independence in 1946. Many thousands of Fililpinos travel to and from the United States each year, resulting in a significant cultural, economic and political exchange between the two nations. It's no wonder that the American feminist movement has influenced a similar movement in the Philippines. The Philippine feminist movement, of course, retains many characteristics unique to Philippine society. We cannot, unfortunately, further pursue that topic. Our focus here remains on how men and women differed in performing their roles as professional journalists at a given point in Philippine history. This raises the question of what advantages these women had that allowed them to succeed so well in influencing the political direction of the country at such a critical juncture.

V. Gender-based advantages for women journalists

It is common in studies such as this one to focus on factors related to male domination of structures or organizations women must live and work within. In setting the agenda for this study and by guiding the interviews, we sought to discover differences regarding men and women within the journalism profession in the Philippines after 1980. We found evidence contradicting the spirit of the Philippine Development Plan for Women, 1989-1992 (1990), which reported that women were making little progress in the journalism profession. It appears by quantitative measures, (including salary levels and numbers in management), their progress has not been impressive. Our own evidence, however, suggests an optimism among the women journalists and a level of satisfaction with existing professional conditions. This optimism may reflect lingering positive effects for women of martial law suppression of male journalists, or a trend in the 1990s toward male journalists seeking out more economically rewarding careers than journalism now offers, leaving greater professional opportunities for women. Before turning to our theoretical discussion and conclusions, we present statements the women journalists made concerning opportunities in the 1990s for women to advance in the profession:

> **I would think the opportunities are the same for men and women now. We have so many newspapers, and as far as I know the women write better than the men, although I hate to be quoted on that.** (Nuyda)

> **I think we women really get a better deal here professionally. There is hardly any discrimination. Men here are more open minded than maybe the American male journalists are. I think many Filipino men have very strong biases about what women can do, but strangely enough, male journalists don't have that kind of mindset. Maybe they feel that women journalists are prepared and go into it with their eyes open, better able to deal with the difficulties that the profession entails. They've stopped categorizing women as fit only for the society pages or entertainment.**

> **I think there is a lot of respect for women in the profession from the men because the women have proven themselves to be just as good.** (Tirol)

> **I think that when a male reporter or a male editor sees that a female reporter is very intelligent and produces really good work, he has respect for that female journalist. So, I think it is really a matter of proving your worth and showing that you can do a very good job. I think the opportunities are almost the same for women journalists. As a matter of fact, in the newspapers, the very good beats are being covered by young, female reporters. Malacanang** (Presidential headquarters), **for example, and defense, these are covered by female reporters, whereas before the women were relegated to covering education and cultural events.** (Torrevillas)

Theoretical discussion and conclusions

An important question guiding the analysis of the interview data was the question of why, given the assumed existence of substantive barriers to the success of women as professionals and as journalists in a male-dominated society, this particular group of Philippine women journalists was more successful at instigating political change. Rather than imposing an a priori theoretical scheme over the experience of the women we studied, however, we chose to use relatively unstructured interviews that sought to reveal what these women themselves saw as the reasons for their success and the barriers that they needed to overcome (see Langellier and Hall, 1989, and Nelson, 1989, on the use of unstructured interviews in the study of women's life experiences).

We now review what other researchers have identified as both barriers and opportunities for professional women generally and for women journalists in particular, and discuss our results in the context of available theoretical explanations.

Steeves' (1987) analysis of feminist theory in media studies is useful for classifying these ideas. Steeves divides feminist theory into three main types: radical feminism, emphasizing biological differences and sometimes arguing for separatism; liberal feminism, which assumes that enhanced opportunities for intellectual and professional growth would be possible within existing social systems if stereotypical conceptions of women's roles could only be erased; and Marxist/socialist feminism, which builds on classic Marxism by noting that gender oppression exists alongside class oppression and by recognizing the role of ideology (including media imagery) in supporting the existing power structure. As Steeves points out, liberal feminist theory is generally concerned with individual behavior, while Marxist/socialist feminist theory is generally concerned with societal-level (sociocultural and economic) explanations.

We might extend Steeves' analysis by suggesting that barriers to women's professional success can be classified as individual-level barriers and societal-level barriers. Individual-level barriers include such things as stereotypical perceptions of gender-appropriate roles and individual acts of discrimination. Such barriers include women's own senses of themselves and their abilities. Societal-level barriers include systematic, institutionalized denial of access to education, technology, economic and political power, and support services such as childcare.

Clearly societal-level barriers contribute to the perpetuation of individual-level barriers. If women are denied equal access to education, for example, their aspirations are likely to be limited and their self-images damaged. Thus it is hard to see how individual-level barriers could be eliminated without altering the broader distribution of power within society. Our analysis of how these barriers were overcome for a period of time by a particular group of Philippine women journalists was thus guided by an interest in whether individual-level or societal-level factors seemed most important. Our data suggest societal-level factors are more critical under the conditions we studied, as we detail below.

Since our study is in one sense a reconstruction of history, albeit recent history, we asked ourselves how journalism history should be done from a woman's point of view. Henry (1989) identifies five concepts developed by women's historians that she feels are especially useful for guiding the development of journalism history, including the history of women in journalism: (1) the concept of women's culture, "the separate, self-created culture of women" (p. 43); (2) the concept of women as community-builders who create new institutions responsive to social needs and who pass on community values to the next generation; (3) a focus on women's formal and informal connections with one another, often constituting support networks that have been seen as critical for women struggling to enter previously all-male worlds; (4) the concept of women's work as encompassing both paid and unpaid labor; and (5) the historical importance of woman as media audiences.

The first two of these five concepts -- the existence of "women's culture" and women's roles as community builders -- are particularly important to the present study of women journalists in recent Philippine history. The women we studied have, for the most part, decided to focus their more recent journalistic work on social issues reporting--for example, on worker conditions on sugar plantations, environmental destruction, the proliferation of street children, and prostitution around U.S. military bases (currently being vacated). They thus reflect, in their present work, a fairly traditional set of values that we might analyze as being compatible with socialization into "women's culture" (Lerner, 1980), just as social welfare work of various kinds has traditionally been defined as appropriate for women in the U.S. We see these women as being primarily concerned now with the disruptions to "hearth and home" caused by a particular set of political and economic circumstances, rather than addressing those circumstances themselves more directly. By their choice of work they are assuming the "community building" role Henry describes.

We might also have expected the availability of networking opportunities to have been a strong influence on these women's success, but the women interviewed did not report this to be the case, from their own point of view. They tended to discount, for example, the importance of women's journalistic organizations. (Compare this, for instance, to the important role of the Women's National Press Club in the U.S. as reported in Beasley, 1988.) However, it is important to remember that these women were all members of a relatively small, interconnected, elite stratum of society and almost certainly benefited by membership in that group even though they did not identify this as a factor in their success in the context of discussions of "networking."

Finally, Ching (1985) provides an additional perspective in describing the emergence of women journalists in China over the remarkably short period from 1902 to 1905, in the context of the general atmosphere of reform and social upheaval characteristic of that nation at that time, and also characteristic of the Philippines from 1983 to 1986. This suggested to us an additional factor that may have been important in the case we studied: conditions of general social and political turmoil may assist women (and perhaps others) in breaking through structural barriers that would otherwise hold them back. Once political conditions settled in the Philippines, however, barriers to the professional success of female journalists appear to have reemerged.

Our own interview data do not provide much support for a "social upheaval" hypothesis, at least in terms of how these women perceived their own situation, but we do not believe this factor can be discounted. It was under conditions of crisis that structural barriers to these women's success appear to have been swept away. The women in this study were brought up in a strongly patriarchal Catholic society, although it was also one with both a pre-colonial tradition of leadership roles for women and some exposure to the Western women's movement. A unique set of historical and social circumstances diminished the influence of many of the structural barriers women have faced in other times and places.

However, when the political crisis in the Philippines subsided, many of these women seemed content to return to more limited roles as "women's pages" editors and writers, Although the content of these pages has evolved to include investigation and analysis of controversial issues such as concentration of wealth, exploitation of children, ethnic conflict, military abuses and environmental destruction, such issues fall primarily under the "social issues" category and are addressed in ways that cause them to remain within the parameters of traditional women's culture--concern for social values. So while membership in women's culture did not limit the ability of these women to function effectively in a male-dominated world when they had the opportunity and motivation to do so, it seems to represent a persistent source of values that has influenced their later work.

We would not want to discount the likelihood that the internalization of diminished social expectations has limited the professional success of countless women. But the story of these Philippine journalists suggests we might do better to conceptualize the influence of socialization on gender roles as a source of positive value choices, as well as a "limit" on women's abilities, and to concentrate on the elimination of structural rather than individual psychological barriers. Nevertheless, as long as women's concerns remain marginal to those of the patriarchy, their economic and political power will remain secondary to that of men, and their ability to effect social change in any area will be restricted.

Overall our data confirm the primacy of societal-level structural barriers over individual-level social psychological ones: when, due to accidents of historical circumstance (including the elite social class membership of these women), structural barriers are removed, these women were successful. But at the same time, values internalized by these members of a present-day "women's culture" strongly influenced the career choices these women made as the political crisis culminating in the overthrow of Marcos subsided. We see these decisions as representing positive, value-based choices made by these women as individuals, rather than choices imposed upon them by others or by the existence of structural barriers. But we wonder whether these journalists will have the power to alter conditions about which they write as long as concern with social issues is marginalized by the male-dominated power structure of Philippine society, including those who control the newsgates.

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The Role of Women Journalists in Philippine Political Change

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Abstract

This paper addresses historical, political and sociological factors contributing to the emergence in the early 1980s of a small but powerful group of relatively young Philippine women journalists, who quickly became primary actors in using the press to hasten the downfall of Marcos. Their success is attributed to such gender-related factors as the reluctance of a male-dominated (macho) regime to openly persecute women, the social consciousness instilled in women through Catholic convent education, and the general economic independence that marriage to professional men provided them. Other factors related to their success were found to be: the acquiescence of male journalists as a result of being repressed by martial law, and the mass support these women received for daring to write about the alleged complicity of the Marcos government in the assassination of Benigno Aquino. The paper also provides a brief historical background of Philippine press controls, outlines how women journalists led efforts to resist these controls, and finally provides a general theoretical discussion of women journalists and their role in social change and national development.

ANTI-AMERICANISM IN SOUTH KOREA:
The Mass Media and The Politics of Signification

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Abstract

ANTI-AMERICANISM IN SOUTH KOREA

The Mass Media and The Politics of Signification

Existing studies of anti-Americanism, in Korea and elsewhere, have discussed the phenomenon mainly as a political and international relations problem. This paper seeks to contribute to the literature by suggesting a new conceptualization of the problem. The main argument is based on what now has become a plain idea in media studies that the realities are "constructed," "mediated," and "framed" by the media and by the "politics of signification." The United States is definitely a part of such realities for the Korean people. This essay asserts that problematization of the process of construction of public pictures of the United States is essential in understanding the phenomenon. Drawing on Gramsci, Williams, Hall and Gitlin, it proposes to define the phenomenon as a product of the "hegemonic" struggle between the ruling authoritarian regime and the challenging democratic forces over how to re-define the United States.

ANTI-AMERICANISM IN SOUTH KOREA:

The Mass Media and The Politics of Signification

INTRODUCTION

South Korea saw rather intense expressions of anti-Americanism throughout the 1980s. Because the phenomenon constituted a significant break in the pattern of decades-long Korean-United States relationship, it has drawn a considerable amount of attention in both countries (Auh, 1986; Chang, 1987; 1988a; 1988b; Kim, 1988; Kim, 1988; Kim, 1989; Kim, 1990, Lee, 1988; Lee,1989; Park, 1988;). Academic discussions of the problem, however, have been conducted largely with a conspicuous exclusion of communication elements such as the problem of media representation, the emergence and expansion of anti-American rhetoric, authoritarian control of the media, and formation and reformation of public perception of the United States.

The purpose of this essay is twofold: (1) to assert the centrality of communication in the rise and understanding of the phenomenon, and (2) to propose a communication-centered analytic framework that not only sheds light on significant yet neglected aspects of the problem, but also offers an opportunity to rethink the desirable relationship between the media and society in light of South Korea's efforts for democratization.

ANTI-AMERICANISM AND COMMUNICATION

Anti-Americanism is a complex phenomenon which has been widely observed across the globe. As various case studies suggest, it involves not only political and international relations elements, but also cultural and ideological ones (Rubinstein and Smith, 1985 and Thornton, 1988). Surprisingly, however, regardless of varying contexts, little attention has been given to how people of a country come to develop collective hostility toward the United States. This question, in essence, is immediately related to the epistemological problem concerning how people come to know about and act upon reality, in this case, the country named the United States.

There are realistically only two channels, (1) direct contacts or (2) some forms of mediated understanding, through which foreigners come to know about and determine their attitude toward the United States. Collective hostility or anti-Americanism is a consequence of the nature of the knowledge acquired through these two channels of experience. Whether some people turn pro- or anti-American depends on what kinds of knowledge they receive and what judgement they make. As Berger and Luckmann (1967) suggest, it is ultimately a matter of defining realities. Without some form of understanding or interpretation of the empirical reality called the United States, people are not expected to take any definitive position on the country.

Lippmann's (1922) well-known distinction between "the world outside and the picture in our head," aptly explains this mechanism of human action. He maintains that "what each man does is based not on a direct and certain knowledge, but on pictures made by himself or given to him" (p. 16). He also adds that "the way in which the world is imagined determines at any particular moment what men will do" (p. 16). These pictures are named as "pseudo-environments" or "interior representations" of the world.

Boulding's (1959) observation on national images also convincingly confirms the same point. Boulding stresses that "it is always the image, not the truth, that immediately determines behavior." He further states that "we act according to the way the world appears to us, not necessarily according to the way it is" (p. 120).

The manifestation of anti-Americanism, as Rubinstein and Smith (1985) suggest, may take various forms such as attitudes, verbal expressions, demonstrations and violence (p. 19). Regardless of its manifestation, however, it is essential to remember that these expressions of anti-Americanism are products of reality constructions, interior representations or images, resulting from interpretations or understandings of the United States by a foreign people.

A study of anti-Americanism then cannot be conducted without an adequate analysis of how the collectively shared pictures or images of the United States are produced. Conceived of this way, the problem of anti-Americanism is legitimately incorporated into the central realm of communication inquiry because it deals not only with 'construction of pictures of realities,' but also with social 'reproduction' and 'massification.'

The relevant literature ranges from what Beniger (1987) calls studies of cognitive effects of the mass media (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Noelle-Neumann, 1984, Gerbner and Gross, 1981) to phenomenological inquiry into the process of social construction of reality (Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Tuchman, 1978) and to various neo-Marxist analyses of ideological media effects (Hall, 1977, 1978, 1982; The Glasgow University Media Group, 1972; 1982; Bennett, 1982; Halloran et al., 1970; Morely, 1980; Gitlin, 1980; Herman and Chomsky, 1987).

These studies have grown out of different practical concerns and theoretical assumptions. However, what is important to note is that they commonly emphasize that communication is essential in constituting a social reality, and that the media are extremely powerful in shaping, maintaining and changing people's perception or definition of the world. Bennett (1982), for instance, argues that power of the media as effective definers of social reality has a direct bearing on the way people act in the world:

> ....what 'events' are 'reported' by the media and the way in which they are signified have a bearing on the way in which we perceive the world and thus, if action is at all related to thought, on the ways in which we act within it. It is to affirm that the media are agencies of mediation, that in reporting events they also propose certain frameworks for the interpretation of those events, molding or structuring our consciousness in ways that are socially and politically consequential (Bennett, 1982, p. 288).

Tuchman (1978), drawing on Berger and Luckmann's (1967) observation on the nature of social reality, also emphasizes that our everyday realities are largely structured and mediated by news reporting. A "window on the world" is her metaphor for the news, through whose frame the realities of the world are constructed (p. 1). Nimmo and Combs (1990) as well, in an analysis of the relationships between the mass media and political realities, state that "communication does more than report, describe, explain: it creates" (p. 4). They further stress that the media of communication intervene "to create and recreate our realities of the moment and over the proverbial long haul." Gitlin's (1980) observation on the "framing" effects of the media and Halloran et al's (1970) argument for "mainstreaming" of consciousness by television also have a close relevance to this discussion.

In sum, the conceptualization of the problem of anti-Americanism in this essay derives from the plain recognition that the United States is a part of concrete social realities for the Korean people. Because realities are constructed, created and framed, as the above studies emphasize, through processes of communication, the phenomenon of anti-Americanism as well is in large part a problem of the communication process.

OUTBREAK OF ANTI-AMERICANISM IN SOUTH KOREA

The South Korean people had held an "absolutely" positive view of the United States up to the beginning of the 1980s. Expressions about the United States such as the "midwife" of the republic, the "ultimate guarantor" of South Korean security, and a "generous provider of economic aid" (Kim, 1988), represent the traditional tendency of the general popular perception of the United States in South Korea. This image of the United States was not only grounded on a decades-long alliance, but also continuously reinforced through formal and informal education.

Under these circumstances, as Kim (1989) states, "the idea that 'America is a virtuous country' dominated the Korean perception as a 'faith' before the 1980s" (p. 751).

It is against this background that the drastic change of climate in the 1980s becomes more conspicuous. Beginning abruptly in 1980, anti-Americanism has become an everyday phenomenon in South Korea. Street demonstrations, whether staged by students, activists, farmers or workers, featured anti-Americanism as a main theme. The number of intellectual and literary publications critical of the United States has increased dramatically. The phenomenon does not stop at mere verbal attacks or symbolic acts such as, burning of the American flag, but became most problematic with violent attacks against diplomatic and military installations. Since the first arson attempt at an American Cultural Center in 1980, various groups of activists have launched 29 attacks against American installations during the last decade.[1] An American Cultural Center in the city of Kwangju alone experienced seven such attacks. Kim Dae-jung, a prominent opposition politician in Korea, estimated in an interview that "more than 90 percent of Korean university students have anti-American feelings."[2] Opinion polls began to reflect the changed perception among the general public. A 1988 opinion poll of 2,000 Koreans compiled by the Dong-a Ilbo, a leading daily newspaper in Seoul, showed that while only 26 percent of those interviewed regarded the bilateral relationship as "positive," 54 percent considered it as "negative."[3] Another opinion poll in 1989 conducted by a Japanese newspaper, Asahi Shinbun, reported that only 24 percent of Korean respondents said they liked the United States.[4] This figure compares dramatically with a 58 percent positive response in a poll conducted by the South Korean Ministry of Information and Culture in 1973.[5]

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[1] The Choongang Ilbo May 10, 1989.

[2] Newsweek January 2, 1989.

CAUSES OF SOUTH KOREAN ANTI-AMERICANISM

The immediate question is why did anti-Americanism erupt suddenly in the 1980s and what caused it. There are three contrasting positions representing mainstream, revisionist, and the United States government views.

The Mainstream View

The mainstream view, represented by Chang (1987, 1988a, 1988b), Kim (1988), and Kim (1989), does not question the fundamental structure or the historically friendly nature of the Korean-United States relationship. It focuses, instead, either on controversial events that transpired in recent years or issues that have been points of dispute between the two countries.

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[3] Index to International Public Opinion, 1987-1988 (p. 600)
[4] Index to International Public Opinion, 1989-1990 (p. 580).
[5] Index to International Public Opinion, 1978-1979 (p. 72).

The prime event that virtually all researchers, who share the mainstream view, point to as the origin of South Korean anti-Americanism is the Kwangju incident. Briefly, the Kwangju incident was a ten-day long civil uprising that broke out in the city of Kwangju on May 18, 1980. The incident started as massive street demonstrations before it developed into a series of armed clashes between citizens and the Korean military. The military regained control of the city on May 27 after about two hundred people from both sides were reportedly killed.

What matters in this incident, given the current military arrangement under which most South Korean troops are under the control of an American general, is the question of how the United States was involved in it. It has been a widely held belief in Korea that the United States endorsed the use of force in the bloody suppression of the civilian uprising. Mainstream analysts maintain that this belief sparked the flame of anti-Americanism in South Korea. For instance, Chang (1988b) states that the wide-spread negative interpretation of the American role in the Kwangju incident resulted in the radical revision of the American image in South Korea. Kim (1989) comments that the:

> Kwangju incident has inspired much of the anti-American rhetoric echoing through the subsequent demonstrations across South Korea. Anti-government dissidents have charged the U.S. with acquiescence and complicity in the slaughter, and many Koreans have believed that the United States was at least indirectly responsible for this tragedy by approving the commitment of Korean troops under the authority of Combined Forces Command (joint command arrangement to control both the Korean and the United States forces in South Korea) (p. 761).

An equally important and closely intertwined argument is that the United States has continuously supported successive dictatorial regimes in South Korea, while at the same time ignoring the growing popular aspiration for democratization. The Kwangju uprising, in fact, was the last of a series of massive demonstrations since the assassination of president Park Chung-hee, the eighteen year-long dictator, by his own intelligence chief in October 1979. After Park's sudden death, the streets of Seoul were filled with hopes for democratization and liberalization. Students demanded sweeping reforms and political leaders started negotiating about the form of new government and the timetable for other necessary political change. The press described this period as the "Spring of Seoul."

In spite of this popular aspiration, however, a new military group led by General Chun Doo-hwan succeeded in grasping power through a coup de-tat in December, 1979. The successful suppression of the Kwangju uprising several months later was an essential step for this new military group to consolidate its control over the nation. It apparently was not stopped by the United States in its unconstitutional rise to power. Consequently, the Korean public strongly perceived the United States as not only supporting the new military group, but actively assisting its rebellious operations.

Kim (1989) confirms this point and observes that "the general attitude changed drastically after 1980 because U.S. real politik led the United States to side with the authoritarian regime of Chun Doo-hwan" (p. 758). Another analyst also comments that:

> South Korean students were critical of the United States because Washington neither helped prevent general Chun's coup of December 12, 1979, nor stopped the use of forces for the suppression of the Kwangju uprising (Kim, 1988, p. 226).

The mainstream argument asserts that these two causes constitute the core origin of South Korean anti-Americanism. Changed structural conditions, such as the growth of the postwar generations without a memory of past American assistance, and the rise of national pride fostered by a rapidly growing economy offered a fertile ground for the expansion of the negative views.

The Revisionist View

By contrast, relatively younger analysts (Kim, 1990; Chun, 1990; Ryu, 1990 among others) approach the problem from a completely different perspective. Inspired mostly by the Marxist-Leninist literature, these analysts define the United States as an imperialistic nation which came to Korea after the Japanese surrender not to "liberate" but to "occupy" the country. The Korean war for them was not a civil war between two Koreas, rather it was an international war between super powers over the control of the region. These writers maintain that the continued American support of military dictators is consistent with its Korea policy the main objective of which has been to maximize American national interests rather than to promote democratic development of South Korea. Consequently, the previous sense of

Korean gratitude was a falsely manufactured and reinforced conception by the United States and its Korean collaborators.

Therefore, the rise of anti-Americanism for them is an inevitable consequence of the imperialistic structure of domination, and the American endorsement of a forceful suppression of the Kwangju uprising was simply a pronounced manifestation of the fundamentally imperialistic nature of the relationship. For instance, the preface to a collection of essays by this group of writers reads:

> It seemed the tunnel of illusion about the United States would not come to an end. For almost forty years after the Korean war, the southern half of the Korean peninsula was the land where no wind of anti-Americanism blew. People who came across the great ocean never imagined that the Korean people would be able to find an exit from this tunnel. They have disguised their identity with chameleon-like skills. Koreans were groping in the labyrinth without knowing where the exit was. Once, however, a ray of truth penetrated from out of the tunnel, the Korean people began to rush for the light at a formidable speed. As is well known, this light was given as the Kwangju uprising.[6]

With this line of reasoning, the revisionist group sought to re-interpret and re-write the history of the Korean-United States relations and to re-educate the general populace. Analysts in this group commonly hold the view that most contradictions in contemporary Korean society have their roots in the United States and its Korea policy (Ryu, 1990; Chun, 1990). These authors maintain that the postwar Korean society, its political institutions and economic framework, have been planned and shaped by the United States mainly to serve American interests.

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[6] Preface to A Re-Interpretation of the Korean-U.S. Relations. (1990) Seoul: Dureh.

Given this conception, their major objective is to expose the identity and undisclosed intentions of the United States as an imperial nation. Anti-Americanism, therefore, is not merely an object of academic analysis, but a cause to be praised and promoted (Kim, 1990. p. 119-120). Individual incidents like the Kwangju incident are important catalysts for a popular awakening. However, it is more fundamental and desirable to systematically educate the people to acquire a structural picture of the United States as an imperialistic exploiter.

The United States Government's View

The United States raised another important point. It concerns the central problem of communication and the mass media. The gist of the argument is that the general Korean understanding about American involvement in politically sensitive events is a product of distorted communication. In other words, the extreme measure of communication control by the military authorities over the media and nearly all other spheres of public and private communication, resulted in extensive distortions of not only what happened and why, but also of how things happened during that critical period.

For instance, a document issued by the United States Embassy in Seoul unequivocally states that:

> One cause of increased anti-Americanism in Korea in the 1980s is the false impression held by many Koreans that the U.S. was directly involved in, and significantly responsible for the Kwangju tragedy - a misperception

> in part fostered by the deception of the Korean authorities at the time, and in part by the restriction on the dissemination of facts about the Kwangju incident during the Fifth Republic.[7]

Much earlier in June 1980, immediately after the Kwangju incident, Michael Armacost, then acting Assistant Secretary of State, made the same point at a Congressional hearing, probably without envisioning the subsequent eruption of anti-American sentiments:

> Beginning on December 12, a group within the Army took progressive steps culminating on May 17 in the extension of emergency martial law to the entire country and a political crackdown. Contrary to the impressions the authorities in Seoul have conveyed, the United States neither knew in advance nor expressed its approval regarding any of these actions. On the contrary, we regarded these events, particularly those of mid-May, as a considerable setback to the evolution of the broad-based government we had hoped to see in Korea. Both publicly and privately, we expressed our deep concern that actions taken by the martial law authorities could exacerbate rather than alleviate the nation's problems. The Korean public may not fully comprehend our position due to rather strict censorship.[8]

Studies on press freedom in South Korea in the 1980s (Youm, 1982 and Lee, 1990 among others) confirm the presence of an extensive degree of media control by the authorities. Youm (1982), for instance, notes that "the Korean press was allowed only the freedom of applauding and marching in line with the government" (p. 91). Lee (1990) as well describes the situation in early 1980s that:

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[7] "U.S. Government Statement on the Events in Kwangju, Republic of Korea in May 1980." June 19, 1989.

[8] Testimony at the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia. June 27, 1980.

> Unlike government in an advanced country that has subtle news management policy, a dictatorial Korean government made no secret of its intention to whip the press into line with its idea that the press should be an instrument to mold public opinion in support of government policies and to reinforce the government's political legitimacy (p. 18).

Under these circumstances, it is reasonable, to assume that the representation of events related to the United States was under the careful scrutiny of military censors and resulted in significant political coloration.

Limitations of the Existing Views

These three distinct views on the causes of anti-Americanism in South Korea originate from different hermeneutic positions. It may be unwise, therefore, to attempt to find the more relevant one, because each has its own validity claims. Instead, it may be more constructive to examine the limitations of these arguments and to explore how they might be incorporated into a more holistic explanatory framework.

The central problem of the mainstream argument is its treatment of the negative interpretation of the United States by the Korean people as a "pregiven" and unchallenged "social fact." This position ignores that virtually all realities are "constructed" through mediation. Given this crucial mistake, mainstream analysts categorically exclude from their consideration the processes of communication - that is, government control of the media, efforts by various social groups to articulate their positions, news production by the mass media and news interpretation by the general public - which are truly central to the generation of the phenomenon.

While sharing the same mistakes, the revisionist view also explains the phenomenon from an overly normative and deterministic standpoint. The fundamental presupposition underlying the revisionist position is the inevitable "law of history" that the unjustifiable imperialistic domination of South Korea by the United States will end. By depending on this rather naive deterministic basis, the revisionists generally fail to make a fundamental distinction between "what is" and "what ought to be." Their work needs to be seen more as a means of ideological struggle rather than as the products of academic analysis.

The argument proposed by the United States government that censorship and distorted representation are important causes of anti-Americanism, indeed, is a legitimate observation. However, the phenomenon involves more than these two elements. The South Korean media, for one thing, have not been under consistent government control. By mid-1987, most media in South Korea had regained much of their long-desired freedom as the democratization movements finally succeeded. However, the intensity of anti-American sentiments grew even stronger when censorship, along with most other forms of media control, was removed. How might this be explained?

A GRAMSCIAN FRAMEWORK

The preceding discussion leads to four premises of this essay concerning the approach to anti-Americanism. First, anti-Americanism is a product of the complex communication process in South Korea that involves mediation, signification and interpretation of events related to the United States, rather than a consequence of either direct popular understanding of a single event (for example, the Kwangju incident), or a fixed definition of the United States as an imperialistic power. Second, plural social forces were involved in the rise of anti-Americanism as active participants in a struggle over how to define the United States. The media were the main site of the struggle. The South Korean government and oppositional civic groups, including revisionist intellectuals, were the main contending forces. The United States was an important occasional participant. Third, South Korean media were neither neutral nor objective. They were consistent in serving the dominant group of the moment. As the center of power moved from the authoritarian regime to the anti-American democratic forces, they incorporated anti-American rhetoric into the news coverage. Fourth, the elements presented above worked together in association, rather than as unrelated individual causes. In other words, anti-Americanism is a multi-causal structural phenomenon.

These premises require a fundamental re-conceptualization of the phenomenon that reflects not only problems of representation and media control, but also issues of contending social forces struggling over power.

Hegemonic Struggle over Re-definition of the United States

Drawing on Gramsci (1971), Williams (1980), Hall (1979; 1980; 1982) and Gitlin (1979; 1980), this essay proposes a conceptualization of anti-Americanism as a product of the "hegemonic" struggle between the ruling authoritarian regime and the challenging democratic forces in South Korea over how to define or redefine the United States.

According to Gramsci (1971), hegemony refers to the domination of a society by a ruling class through both, material power and ideological manipulation. However, he also stresses that "one should not count solely on the power and material force to exercise political leadership" (p. 57), suggesting that it is more effective to generate consent from subordinate groups through securing "ideological" leadership.

This argument has been one of main thrusts of a Gramscian framework that has stimulated the subsequent theoretical inquiry into problems of culture, common sense and the ideological role of the media. Following Williams (1980), for instance, hegemony is not only limited to the "articulate upper level of ideology," rather, it includes a "whole body of practices and expectations" which "constitute a sense of reality for most people in the society" (p. 38). Therefore, hegemony secures power for the ruling classes by "impressing their definitions of the situation upon those they rule," and by "limiting what is thought throughout the society" (Gitlin, 1980, p. 10). Gitlin further notes that:

> Hegemonic ideology enters into everything people do and think is "natural" - making a living, loving, playing,

> believing, knowing, even rebelling. In every sphere of social activity, it meshes with the "common sense" through which people make the world seem intelligible; it tries to become that common sense (p. 10).

Nevertheless, hegemony is neither simple nor uniformly dominant. Williams (1980) insists that "its own internal structures are highly complex, and have continually to be renewed, recreated and defended" (p. 38). He further emphasizes that the hegemonic structures are continually "challenged" and even "modified." Gitlin (1980) notes that "people only partially and unevenly accept the hegemonic terms; they stretch, dispute and sometimes struggle to transform the hegemonic ideology" (pp. 10-11).

Hall (1980, 1981, 1982) further elaborates this argument to define communication as a struggle over meaning or a struggle for signification between contending ideological forces. He (1982) stresses that the struggle over meaning consists of the process of discursive articulation and disarticulation; its outcomes "depend on the relative strength of the 'forces in struggle,' the balance between them at any strategic moment, and the effective conduct of the 'politics of signification'" (p. 78).

According to Grossberg (1980), Hall's commitment to a principle of struggle is

> "not as an abstract possibility but as a recognition that human activity at all levels always takes place with and over concretely "contested terrain" (p. 63).

The analytic notions used by Hall, such as "encoding," "decoding," "preferred reading," and "oppositional reading," reflect the underlying assumption about communication as a struggle for meaning.

In sum, a hegemony is an outcome of an ongoing struggle for signification between contending social forces at a specific time in a given context. It assumes that the power relations between alliances of forces are intimately interwoven with the struggle for signification. The change in the balance of power is reflected in hegemonic contents and the shift in ideological configuration affects the order of the material structure.

The struggle for signification and the shift in hegemonic ideology become more prominent, particularly, when, what Gramsci calls, a "crisis of authority" occurs. According to Gramsci (1971), this is the moment when "the ruling class loses its consensus and the great masses are detached from their traditional ideology, thus no longer believe what they used to believe" (p. 10). When this happens, the dominant hegemony begins to come apart and the dominant class resorts solely to coercive measures.

The South Korean society in the 1980s was clearly developing symptoms of a "crisis of authority." Because of the lack of legitimacy since its birth in 1980, the new military regime mobilized nearly all possible means to "manufacture" popular support. It put the media under strict control and took measures to limit the available public sphere to the minimum (Youm, 1982; Lee, 1990). However, in spite of the extensive signifying efforts, the ruling regime was unable to create much needed popular consent, and thus increasingly relied on coercive means for its maintenance.

The absence of domestic legitimacy made the support of the United States, which was still widely perceived as the "guardian" of the country, a crucial element for the regime's survival. Virtually all media coverage of the United States regarding Korean affairs was closely orchestrated by the authorities to construct the picture of the United States in this direction.

Under the circumstances, when physical force (both the military and the police) was extensively used to maintain the regime, democratic groups had no other choice but to initiate their struggle in symbolic realms -- in academic publications, underground journals, pamphlets, wall papers, and street demonstrations -- to win the support of the "detached" public. Intensive efforts were made to disarticulate the ideas of the ruling hegemony (Lee K.R., 1990). Given that a friendly Korean-United States relationship was one of the fundamental assumptions of the ruling group, re-defining the United States became a central element in the struggle for democratization (Kim, 1988; Lee, 1989). The widely accepted "constructed" image of the United States as the supporter of the ruling regime provided a fertile ground for the expansion of anti-American arguments.

In sum, it is the main contention of the paper that South Korean anti-Americanism should be conceived of as an outcome of actions for articulation and disarticulation by contending political forces over the public definition of the United States. The mass media were the central means used by these forces. The strength of this conceptualization lies in its capacity to explain not only the distortion of media representation under the authoritarian regime, but also the rapid expansion of anti-Americanism after the collapse of the regime in 1987, when the media were under the hegemonic influence of the anti-American civic forces.

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Development Journalism in an Asian Setting: A Study of Depthnews

A paper for the International
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Development Journalism in an Asian Setting: A Study of Depthnews

The independence movements of the post-World War II era brought with them an awareness of the importance of communication in the establishment of national identity and in the promotion of economic and social growth. The new national leaders saw in the press a powerful tool for forging a national image. The press, still heavily influenced by colonial patterns, was torn between western journalistic standards and the needs and desires of nationalism.

By the mid-1960s, communication had moved to the center of the debate over Third World development. Researchers in the emerging field of communication created models of development with communication as the engine.[1] Development communication, and development journalism, emerged in much of the Third World.

While development communication was deeply rooted in communication theory and closely tied to debates over new economic and political structures in the emerging nations, development journalism had a distinctly practical bent, and in Asia focused on improving the sensitivity and professional training of Asian journalists and publications.[2]

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[1] See particularly Daniel Lerner and Wilbur Schramm (eds), *Communication and change in the developing countries,* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1967); and Wilbur Schramm, *Mass media and national development: The role of information in the developing countries,* (Stanford: Stanford University, 1964; and Paris: Unesco).

As the political debate became increasingly divisive at Unesco in the 1970s, journalists who had pioneered development reporting in Asia a decade earlier struggled to steer a path between politics and journalism. Attempting to maintain independence from strong-man government, development journalists found a stable home in the Press Foundation of Asia, founded in 1967 by a group of leading Asian editors and publishers.

The new organization avoided direct governmental funding, relying on the private press of Asia, international foundations and United Nations agencies to mount a training program for Asian journalists, a center for press freedom, and a development news service, Depthnews, serving clients throughout the region.

Nearing its 25th anniversary, the Foundation in 1991 was awarded the prestigious Ramon Magsaysay Award, for contributions to international understanding. The Foundation has maintained the ideal of development journalism in Asia, and Depthnews provides a service distinctly different from western news services. Depthnews emphasizes coverage of women, environmental concerns, and regional science and health issues, as well as topics of economic and political interest in Asia.

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[2] General use of the term probably dates to Alan Chalkley's 1970 *Manual of Development Journalism*: "What we would like you to do is give yourself a new title. Call yourself from now on: 'Development Journalist'. Let the editor and the salary accountants call you by any other name if they wish--but the title you will work to is: 'Development Journalist' (New Delhi: Vikas Publications): 1.

This paper will examine the development of an Asian form of development journalism, within the context of the international debate of the last 25 years. The role of the Press Foundation of Asia and Depthnews will be explored in greater depth, and an analysis of 13 months of Depthnews files will be used to draw a picture of the content of a successful development news agency.

Early stirrings: The Asian experiments

Development journalists were operating in India and the Philippines before their practice had a name. But most practioners trace its roots as a formal branch of journalism to about 1967-68.[3] Journalists writing in the new style saw themselves practicing "not a new kind of journalism at all--but a new attitude towards the treatment of certain subjects." The new style grew from a concern that the traditional Western model of reporting was not adequate for a developing region.

"Following the western concept, the press was still preoccupied with reporting events, thus disregarding the processes which produced the events," noted Depthnews editor S. M. Ali, adding that Asian reporters must find ways to deal with a continual problem such as famine or disease, rather than treating it as episodic. "There are differences between reporting a political process and covering the development one, because here we are reporting on the exceptional when it becomes ordinary."[4]

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[3] For discussions of the roots of Asian development journalism, see Romeo Abundo, Training population and development reporters: The PFA experience, *Populi* 13, No. 3 (1986): 17-23; S.M. Ali, Notes on the changing role of the press in Asia's economic development, *Media Asia* 7 (1980): 153-155; Adlai J. Amor, (ed), *Journalism training in Asia*, (Manila: Press Foundation of Asia, 1984). Alan Chalkley, Development journalism: A new dimension in the information process, *Media Asia* 7 (1980): 215-217;

Development journalists were committed to playing a more active role in actually pressing for change, and this marked a departure from the western notion of objective reporting.

Alan Chalkley, in a widely-used training manual for development reporters, introduced the difference:

> A journalist's main task is to inform, to give his readers the facts. His secondary task is to interpret, to put the facts in their framework, and where possible to draw conclusions...But you have a third task, a positive one. Perhaps the best word for it is 'promotion.' It is your job not only to give the facts of economic life, and to intrerpret those facts, but to promote them, to bring them home to your readers. You must get your readers to realize how serious the development problem is, to think about the problem, to open their eyes to the possible solutions--to punch a hole in the vicious circle.[5]

Asian development journalism and the Press Foundation of Asia emerged from a series of 1967 meetings where Asian journalists addressed problems of newsflow within the region, and between the region and the West. But the emphasis of Asian development journalists was to reform the reporting and editing practices of *the Asian press itself* rather than concentrate on North-South differences.[6] Asian journalism, with a number of strong and influential newspapers, had a base to build upon, unlike many regions of the developing world. Prominent journalists from developed nations in the region, Japan and Australia, would also play a role in the process.

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[4] Ali, 1980, op cit: 154-155.

[5] Chalkley, 1970, op cit: 2.

[6] Abundo, op cit; Juan L. Mercado, *Development reporting: Some observations*, Paper for the Press Foundation Assembly, Bali, Indonesia, Aug. 23-25, 1971.

Asian development journalism, then, would proceed along two tracks: addressing global imbalances common to all developing areas; but also attempting to redirect the attention of an established and influential press in major Asian capitals.

Development communication in an Asian setting

Asian scholars met in 1975 at a conference on information imbalance sponsored by the Asian Mass Communication and Research and Information Center (AMIC). A paper by Asok Metra listed four major areas of imbalance in the Asian context:

> 1. The distance that the operation of information giants generates between neighboring countries in Asia and the inertia that grows against reducing it.
> 2. The opinion-forming sector in Asian countries seems to be rapidly passing into multinational hands. The gravest danger is inflicted on the educational system--where the reading of American or British publications is a measure of excellence--and the information system, where the multinational news agency is preferred to the national.
> 3. The tremendous pace at which the distance widens hourly between the giant multinationals in the information industry and the tiny nationals.
> 4. The area of television and film, where the lack of resources and techology in Asian countries makes it more difficult to resist the tidal wave of multinational offerings.[7]

Newsflow studies in Asia and the Pacific confirmed the concerns of Asians. Schramm and Atwood in 1977 found that 90 per cent of stories used in Asian newspapers came from the four major international news agencies, and that news decisions indicated that the news agenda was set by western style journalism and journalists. A study of Pacific Basin newsflow by Richstad and Nnaemeka in 1976 revealed a classic one-way flow, with virtually no South-South movement; the flow was almost entirely along prior colonial ties.[8]

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[7] Quoted in rearranged sequence by Vijay Menon, Information flow in Asia: An overview. *Media Asia* 12 (1985): 63.

Asian scholars joined in the international communication debate, positioning themselves in the "reformist" camp headed at Unesco by Sean MacBride, and rejecting the more radical "structuralist" approach of European Marxist scholars.[9] Asian scholars and journalists resisted governmental controls over news, a recurrent problem in a region of one-party or strong-man rule. As the Unesco debate increasingly revolved around this issue, Indian journalist Narinder K. Aggarwala urged the West to consider development journalism as capable of exerting independence:

> Development news should not be damned as synonymous with government-dictated news. Development news is not identical with "good" or "positive" news, lack of which is constantly bewailed by the politicians and government officials of not only the developing but also developed countries. Development news is not an official PR handout, issued by Third World countries concerned with image-building. In its treatment, development news is not, and should not be, any different from regular news or investigative reporting.[10]

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[8] Jim Richstad. Flow of news and information in Asia and the Pacific. *Media Asia* 15 (1988): 68-80.

[9] The Unesco divisions were described by William H. Meyer as "conservative", led by the United States, emphasizing free information flow; "reformist", urging free and balanced flow and training and technological aid; and "structuralist", linked to broad social and economic restructuring. See Meyer, *Transnational media and Third World development: The structure and impact of imperialism*, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988).

[10] Narinder K. Aggarwala. A Third World perspective on the news, *Freedom at Issue* (May/June 1978): 16.

The development news philosophy expressed by Aggarwala was identical to that of the Press Foundation of Asia, which recognized that reform must begin with the Asian press itself.

The Press Foundation of Asia at 25 years

Asian editors and publishers met at Kandy, Sri Lanka, in March of 1967 to develop a replacement for the International Press Institute's Asian Programme for the Development of the Asian Press, which was being phased out. A participant described the mood:

> Almost to a man, the participants agreed that the era of development unfolding in Asia had been without an enlightened and insightful coverage from the mass media. As pointed out by an Indian editor, newspapers neither understood themselves nor reported to the masses the full implications of development, its consequences as well as the discipline it entailed...This failure had resulted in yawning communication gaps: one between ideas about development and journalists and another between the mass media and the public.[11]

From the Kandy meeting emerged the Press Foundation of Asia. Incorporated as a nonprofit trust for "consultancy, training and development in the field of media communications in Asia," PFA was given a charter with two major challenges: "To take the daily printed word to every literate home in Asia, and to make PFA a truly independent institution."[12] The founders approved the framework for a program to train Asian journalists. With funding support from the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), PFA commissioned Robi Chakravorti of California State University to prepare a syllabus in consultation with regional editors. The 12-week program integrated lectures, seminars and practical writing assignments. Advanced courses expanded upon the original curriculum in 1973, along with a series of workshops throughout the region. By 1988, over 2,550 journalists had attended 150 training courses sponsored by PFA, and were active in Asian print and broadcast journalism.[13]

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[11] Abundo, op cit: 18.

[12] Press Foundation of Asia, *PFA in the Pacific Century.* (Manila: PFA, circa 1989).

The Foundation also serves as consultant to Asian newspapers, develops intern programs, and since 1987 has served as a center for press freedom in the region. The latter role emphasizes the PFA's commitment to independence in its funding and operation.

Governmental interference has long been considered a major problem for media credibility in Asia, as leaders of developing nations increasingly saw the media as a tool of development and retention of political power.

In a paper for the 1964 East-West Center Conference on Communication and Change in the Developing Countries, Lucien Pye, without using the term "development journalism," raised some of the major concerns the emerging field would face, particularly that of trying to serve dual roles of critic and agent of development:

> These two extremes point to a basic dilemma inherent in the role of the press in new countries. On the one hand, it is expected to be inspector general of the political process, while

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[13] Abundo, op cit; Press Foundation of Asia, op cit.

> on the other hand it has also the legitimate mission of trying to inspire people to a vision of a new political world.[14]

For the Press Foundation of Asia, the mission would be accomplished with a combination of funding that would include public funds from outside the region, in the form of United Nations aid and contracts; but would not include financial support from Asian governments.

Press Foundation of Asia is financed by an endowment fund of US$600,000 (1990) and donations and grants from newspapers, foundations and agencies in the region. PFA also has contracts with United Nations agencies, including UNDP and UNEP, to disseminate news of these agencies. PFA in 1990 published a population and development report with support from the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), and has sponsored conferences on women in media with support from Unesco. The Foundation in 1990 sponsored a "One Asia Assembly" in Manila, attended by some 500 journalists and publishers.

Governance is by a board of trustees, which handles financial matters; and a separate board of directors, handling press issues. Members of both boards represent leading publications in the region; none are governmental officials. The boards are linked by several life members who serve on both boards.

In presenting the Magsaysay Award in July, 1991, the award foundation said PFA "dared to look to the day when the Asian press itself, not powerful Western news agencies, would speak to the rest of the world for Asia."[15]

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[14] Lucien Pye. Communication, institution building and reach of authority, in Daniel Lerner and Wilbur Schramm (eds) *Communciation and change in the developing countries*, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 3d ed, 1972): 38.

That goal remains elusive--PFA's Depthnews service has not been able to penetrate North publications--but within Asia and in some additional Third World nations, Depthnews presents its brand of development journalism, centering on Asia.

Depthnews: Asian development journalism

The launching of an Asian development news service in 1969 served dual purposes for the Press Foundation of Asia. It provided a practical outlet for journalists trained in the PFA development journalism curriculum, and it made available to Asian newspapers and radio stations a weekly package of professionally written articles focusing on development issues.

Depthnews stands for Development, Economics and Population Themes. The basic Depthnews packet, airmailed to member newspapers, contains about 13 items, divided into four categories. The bulk of the service (over 50% of the stories) is Depthnews Asia, consisting of news reports and features from various Asian locations. Each packet also contains two or three In Focus: Women features; about two Science Features; an Arjuna's Diary feature column; and occasionally a guest column.

Depthnews claims to reach a potential audience of 2.3 million readers and 56.5 million radio listeners, from 300 regional newspapers and 700 radio stations.[16] Subscribers, who pay fees based on circulation, range from national newspapers such as the Bankok Post of Thailand and The Statesman of India, to community newspapers which publish in the vernacular (the service is available in 20 languages).

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[15] Press Foundation of Asia wins Magsaysay Award, *Kyodo News Service.*, (Manila, July 24, 1991).

A Depthnews analysis of 1989 clippings from about 70 percent of users revealed a total of 126,659 column inches was printed in those newspapers during 1989. The heaviest usage was environmental reports, among a list of categories used by Depthnews.[17] (Table 1) More recently, according to Editorial Director Romeo Abundo in 1992, "we note that from the clippings lately that articles on population, the environment and development are more frequently used."[18]

A more recent examination, using a smaller sample comprising Depthnews coverage of United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) activities, indicated that in 1991 some 52 Depthnews stories dealing with FAO were printed in English-language newspapers, almost entirely in Asia. Slightly over half appeared in Indian and Indonesian papers, and another 36 percent in Nepal and the Philippines. The topics used most frequently were depletion of tropical forests, other environmental issues and fisheries. Newspapers using the Depthnews service for FAO stories ranged from major urban papers such as the Manila Bulletin, The Statesman of New Delhi and the Bangkok Post, to smaller publications in India and Nepal. Although nearly all the stories appeared in Asian papers, two clips were reported from Saudi Arabia, with single clips from Australia, Malawi and the United States.[19] (Tables 2 and 3)

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[16] Ibid.

[17] Usage of Depthnews Asia Articles, 1989, *Press Foundation of Asia*. (Manila: undated).

[18] Personal communication, February 19, 1992.

A more precise study of the usage pattern of Depthnews would be a suitable subject for further study. Despite the lack of comprehensive data, it is apparent that the service has passed the important commercial test: it has charged for its services since 1972, and maintained clients throughout Asia.

There is a particular demand for this type of service among the vernacular press, typically lacking a strong financial base and often located in rural areas. A 1977 content analysis found significant differences between vernacular and English-language newspapers in India, in coverage of development news; but even the vernacular newspapers ignored several major categories of development news.[20] And interviews and surveys of journalists in India and the Philippines show that although there is interest in development journalism, the difficulties of practicing in non-urban settings and the general economic troubles of many vernacular papers pose severe barriers for this style of reporting.[21] In India, the prestigious *Statesman* newspapers, of New Delhi and Calcutta, annually sponsor a contest for "rural development reporting;" sponsors note that the major entries are from the vernacular press, or small city and free-lance reporters rather than the English-language prestige newspapers.[22]

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[19] C. Anthony Giffard, *Coverage of FAO in international newspapers,* (Seattle, Wash: unpublished report, 1992).

[20] John V. Vilanilam, *An evaluation of press performance in India through content analysis of four newspapers, 1973*, (New York: State University of New York at Bufalo, Council on International Studies, 1977).

[21] Hemant Shah, A preliminary examination of journalistic roles and development reporting at three Indian newspapers. *Media Asia* 16 (1989): 128-131. Richard Shafer, Provincial journalists in Third World development, *Media Asia* 17 (1990): 123-130.

Despite its standing in Asia, Depthnews has not been able to break into the North American or European market, after attempts in 1977 and 1987. In 1977, Ali presented to a New York conference a plan for a joint venture with an American news agency, but was unable to find an American partner. In 1987, a similar marketing venture was undertaken, again without a breakthrough into the lucrative northern market. The service has developed some clients and a small network of correspondents in Africa and the Middle East, however.

In his analysis of the success of Depthnews in 1977, Ali listed three reasons for its stability and standing in Asia: 1) Depthnews does not compete with the wire services or established west-based feature services; it supplements them both qualitatively and quantitatively; 2) correspondents are encouraged not only to see economic, social and political developments in human terms, but also to judge these developments in the light of future developments in Asia; and 3) the predominantly Asian staff of Depthnews has access to sources not readily available to visiting Western correspondents.[23]

The product itself, the weekly Depthnews packet, is written in the standard news format of western agencies; but content and selection of topics differs from these agencies, and also somewhat from the other major Third World service, Inter Press Service (IPS).

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[22] Personal interview with S. Datta-Ray, editor of *The Statesman*, Calcutta, Jan. 2, 1992, Honolulu, Hawaii.

[23] S.M. Ali. *"Depthnews"--A model for a Third World features agency*, Paper for conference on the Third World and Press Freedom, sponsored by Edward R. Murrow Center of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, New York City, 1977.

A content analysis of Depthnews

The purpose of this study is to examine the Depthnews file to determine whether the service is offering an alternative to traditional news wires, and what the actual content of that alternative is, after 20 years of experience.

The regular weekly English-language packets of Depthnews were analyzed from August of 1988 through August of 1989, a total of 13 months.[24] Alternate-week packets were selected for analysis, a total during the period of 28 packets. All stories were coded similar to a system originally used for a survey of foreign news conducted by the International Association for Mass Communications Research (IAMCR) in 1980, and used again in IAMCR's 1991 study of Inter Press Service.[25] This allowed a comparison of Depthnews' content with IPS, the major international agency specializing in Third World coverage and development journalism. IPS is not limited to Asia, but the goals of IPS and Depthnews are sufficiently alike to make meaningful comparisons.

The Depthnews sample was analyzed as a whole, but also by divisions: Depthnews Asia; In Focus: Women; Science; Arjuna's Diary;

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[24] The time period selected was a factor of availability of the Depthnews file. The most current file available to the author was at the East-West Center, for the time period stated.

[25] Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi, *Foreign news in the media: International reporting in 21 countries* (Paris: Unesco, 1984). C. Anthony Giffard, Carolyn Byerly and Catherine Van Horn, The world of Inter Press Service: A report for the IAMCR. (Leicester, IAMCR, 1991).

and guest columns. The content analysis examined news geography, topics, focus, slant, and sources and actors.

The news geography of Depthnews was determined by coding for dateline and national location of the story; Asia-wide or global issues were listed as "global". Coding allowed for a maximum of four topics in each story. Particular attention was paid to topics stressed by development journalists, such as as rural development, social issues and the environment.

Stories were analyzed for their slant (positive, negative or balanced), as viewed from the perspective of the nations where they were set. Stories were identified as to whether they focused on domestic or international subjects or events--South-South, North-South or North-North. Within each story, the gender, nationality and position of both sources and actors was analyzed. Actors were defined as people (as distinguished from organizations, which were not tallied) who were described or discussed in the coverage. Sources and actors were coded to a maximum of four per story, by gender, nationality and position.

Findings

News Geography: Both the datelines and the locations of the stories were heavily South. Of 245 stories in which the national location of the event was clearly identified, only seven were set in the developed world, and both nations (Japan and New Zealand) are within the region. Nearly 97 percent of Depthnews stories were set in the developing world. Datelines of stories had a similar cast, with 91 percent from South locations. This compares favorably, from a development standpoint, with IPS (72 percent South datelines and 78 percent South locations), although it must be noted that IPS covers development news from North capitals such as Washington and Paris.

Within Asia, locations were dominated by three nations: India, the Philippines and China made up 41 percent of all locations for Depthnews stories, which covered 50 different nations in Asia and elsewhere. (Table 4)

Topics: When topics in Depthnews dispatches were collapsed into nine categories, these categories were mentioned 628 times in the sample. Sixty percent of these mentions could properly be defined as "development" topics, dealing with social, cultural, environmental, agricultural or rural development topics. The remaining 40 percent, classified as "traditional" issues, were of the type typically stressed by western agencies, emphasizing economic and political topics. (Table 5) This compares closely with Depthnews' own analysis of its 1989 clippings (Table 1), which shows about 68 percent of their clips falling into a development category.

Focus: The largest share of Depthnews coverage (57 percent) dealt with domestic events or topics. Stories of a global or all-Asia nature account for 21 percent, and North-South interactions account for 14 percent; with only 7 percent of a South-South nature and only one story classified North-North. This is similar to IPS, with the major difference being a slightly higher "global" or all-Asia emphasis in Depthnews dispatches. (Table 6)

Slant: Depthnews presented a more positive face to the news than did IPS, with a 71-29 percent ratio of positive-negative news, where a definite slant was determined; compared to an IPS ratio of 49-51 percent (Table 7). This study of Depthnews, however, also included a category of "balanced," which when added to the others produced a ratio of 47 percent positive, 19 percent negative, 33 percent balanced. Within the world of Depthnews, the highest rate of positive stories came from China, Malaysia and Thailand, all over 70 percent positive--and this during the time of Chinese political turmoil and Tianenmen Square.

The small number of political stories coming from these nations is a factor in their positive slant. The Depthnews China file, originating in Beijing, avoided any political discussion until after the Tianenmen Square incident; dealing almost exclusively with social, economic and cultural topics of a domestic nature. As late as April, the Beijing file was touting international tourism. But following the June crackdown on dissidents, two critical reports appeared in July with Shanghai datelines and bearing a non-Chinese byline (Philip Gorton) for the first time in the year's file. Both reports tied problems of Shanghai to the new Chinese Communist Party chief, Jiang Zemin, who had been party boss in Shanghai.

Nations with the most balanced coverage were India, the Philippines and Sri Lanka; those with the highest negative ratio were Bangladesh, Burma and Lebanon (a major location for Middle East stories, primarily political). All 11 stories set in Burma during this period were domestic in nature; six of the 11 were coded as negative.

Stories were more likely to have a positive slant if they dealt with global or all-Asia topics, frequently involving United Nations projects or programs. Those with the highest negative ratio (39 percent negative) were South-South stories, often dealing with conflicts between Asian nations.

Sources and Actors: Depthnews had a high proportion of news sources and actors who could be described as "intellectual" in the sense of an academic or scientific background. This category accounted for 40 percent of sources quoted in Depthnews stories and 25 percent of actors; compared to only 16 and 9 percent of the sources and actors in IPS. The Science feature, two stories in most Depthnews packets, relied on the "intellectual" category for 55 percent of its sources and 41 percent of its actors. (Table 8)

Due largely to its greater emphasis on politics, IPS relied more upon officials holding governmental, legal or military positions; they appeared as IPS sources 51 percent of the time, compared to 40 percent for Depthnews. Sixty-one percent of IPS actors were officials, compared to 51 percent for Depthnews. Both services relied upon "citizen" or "ordinary people" sources from 7 to 9 percent of the time, and among actors 14 to 18 percent were "citizens"

Although difference in categorization may lend some imprecision to the comparisons, one general pattern is very clear: Depthnews relied more upon sources and actors from the intellectual, scientific and academic community than did IPS.

Source nationalities were overwhelmingly (89 percent) from Asia; this may be compared to the 75 percent of IPS sources from the developing world. Actors in Depthnews dispatches were 85 percent from the developing world; 39 percent of all actors were Indian, due in large measure to the heavy reliance on Indian actors by In Focus: Women.

Gender of sources was 76 percent male and 24 percent female for Depthnews; a similar ratio was seen in actors, with a 72 to 28 percent division. In both sources and actors IPS had a ratio of about 90 to 10 percent. (Table 9) One reason for the higher female percentage in Depthnews is the In Focus: Women feature, where females were 75 percent of sources and 80 percent of actors. (Table 10)

Within Depthnews: Although the Depthnews packet goes as a total package to clients, some comparisons may be made between the service's feature elements. Although In Focus: Women accounted for only 16 percent of Depthnews stories, the feature carried 36 percent of the social reports and 20 percent of the cultural reports in the Depthnews service. The other major subset of Depthnews, Science, accounted for only 14 percent of the Depthnews packet, but 36 percent of the environmental reporting. The Science feature had a slightly higher reliance on North sources and actors, with 19 percent of sources and actors linked to the United States. (Table 10)

Discussion

Depthnews and the parent Press Foundation of Asia are an unusual, and successful, blending of North and South. They have adopted North writing style and format, and are financed primarily by the private media within Asia, rather than relying on direct governmental support. But the service, as recognized by the Magsaysay Award, speaks with an Asian voice, keeping to the goals of the founders of development journalism.

The service relies less upon political and governmental topics and sources than does its counterpart, IPS, and places greater emphasis on social issues. It also uses a high percentage of Asian sources and actors, and turns to women and ordinary citizens to a significant degree. Particularly with its radio service, it reaches rural areas of Asia with material prepared in the vernacular. No other service offers as many languages (20) within the Asian region, and the emergence of television interchanges such as AsiaVision and CNN World Report will not penetrate rural areas to the same extent as radio and rural newspapers served by Depthnews.

Part of the success of Depthnews appears to be its emphasis on news of women and of science, two areas stressed by the founders of development journalism. These features are particularly high in their coverage of development issues such as health, rural development and environmental concerns.

Depthnews survives in a competitive arena, with paying clients in most of Asia and some areas of Africa and the Middle East. Its survival may be credited to several factors:

•The development journalism training program, which provides a corps of committed and trained correspondents throughout the region, as well as gatekeepers who are knowledgeable in development issues.

•Independence from governmental sponsorship, and relative avoidance of political coverage allow it to operate with relative freedom in a region noted for governmental scrutiny of media.

•Financial support from the region's media leaders, which in turn lends credibility to the product on the part of media gatekeepers.

•The high professional standing of the founders, most of whom are still active.

•Press Foundation of Asia's commitment and role as a clearinghouse for press freedom.

•Support from several United Nations programs, providing an additional source of income in addition to the private sources.

•The general economic health of the region, which is reflected in media budgets capable of supporting an auxiliary service.

Paradoxically, the insistence that Depthnews maintain a distinct Asian flavor has prevented its expansion into the West, expansion which seems even more difficult in an era of tighter budgets and news space allocated to international coverage. After two unsuccessful efforts to move North, Depthnews is beginning to penetrate Africa and the Middle East, furthering the South-South dialogue that is essential to the development journalism concept.

In the 25 years since development journalism moved from India and the Philippines to an international stage and was caught up in a wider debate, Asia has had more economic success stories than any other Third World region. But the problems of income disparity, of environmental and social burdens, and divisions within and between nations remain a regional concern.

Development journalism addresses those issues with a voice that is uniquely Asian, through the Press Foundation of Asia and Depthnews. Despite its inability to break into markets in the developed world, the service has clearly established itself in its region, and is a proven force for greater understanding and dialogue within Asia.

Tables

Table 1

Usage of Depthnews Asia articles, 1989

Category of article	Column inches	Percent
Agriculture/food	7,203	5.7
Consumerism	1,681	1.3
Culture/religion	1,378	1.1
Rural/urban development	4,542	3.6
Education	6,220	4.9
Energy	686	0.5
Environment	19,059	15.0
Health	12,467	9.8
Population	14,421	11.4
Science/technology	4,753	3.8
Tourism	3,314	2.6
Women/children/youth	10,097	8.1
(subtotal: "Development")	85,821	67.8
Government/politics	13,177	10.4
Industry	3,984	3.1
Labor/income	833	0.7
Media	815	0.6
Trade/economy	4,270	3.4
Transportation/utilities	1,424	1.1
(subtotal: "Traditional")	24,503	19.3
Other	16,335	12.9
	126,659	100.0

Source: Depthnews
Note: Categories are those of Depthnews; divisions for subtotals are assigned by the author, to correspond generally with studies following the pattern of Sreberny-Mohammadi. Data relates only to Depthnews Asia, and does not include the other Depthnews services: In Focus: Women; Science; Arjuna's Diary; and guest columns.

Table 2

Countries using Depthnews FAO articles, 1991

Country	Articles	Percent
India	14	26.9
Indonesia	13	25.0
Philippines	9	17.3
Nepal	8	15.4
Others	8	15.4
	52	100.0

Source: Giffard, unpublished report.

Table 3

Newspapers using Depthnews FAO articles, 1992

Newspaper, Location	Articles	Percent
Indonesia Times, Jakarta	13	25.0
The Rising Nepal, Kathmandu	8	15.4
Business Times, Davao City, Ph.	6	11.5
The Pioneer, Lucknow, India	6	11.5
Arab News, Jeddah, S.A.	2	3.8
Bangkok Post, Bangkok	2	3.8
Economic Times, New Delhi	2	3.8
Madhya Pradesh Chronicle, Bhopal	2	3.8
Business World, Manila	2	3.8
The Statesman, New Delhi	2	3.8
Others	7	13.8
	52	100.0

Source: Giffard, unpublished report.

Table 4

Location of stories

Major Locations	Number	Percent
India	37	15.1
Philippines	35	14.2
China	30	12.2
Nepal	18	7.3
Sri Lanka	13	5.3
Malaysia	13	5.3
Burma	11	4.5
Thailand	11	4.5
Other	77	31.6
	245	100.0

(84 stories had no specific national location)

Table 5

Development emphasis in Depthnews

Topic	Number	Percent
Development Topics		
Agriculture, rural issues	51	8.1
Cultural	60	9.6
Human rights, refugees	18	2.9
Social issues	118	18.8
Environmental	45	7.2
United Nations programs	87	13.9
	379	60.5
Traditional Topics		
Finance, economics	123	19.6
Political, governmental	106	16.9
Military	20	3.3
N=628	249	39.8

Table 6

Focus of articles

Category	Depthnews articles	Percentage of articles	IPS (%)
Domestic	187	56.8	51.0
Global	72	21.9	13.0
North-South	46	14.0	20.0
South-South	23	7.0	14.0
North-North	1	.3	2.0
	329	100.0	100.0

Table 7

Slant

Slant category	Depthnews articles	Percentage of articles	Alternate*	IPS (%)
Positive	156	47.4	70.8	49.5
Negative	64	19.5	29.2	50.5
Balanced	109	33.1		
	329	100	100.0	100.0

*calculated only for positive-negative.

Table 8

Position of sources

Source category	Depthnews sources	Percentage of sources	IPS (%)
Intellectual	225	40.4	16.0
Governmental	220	39.5	51.0
Citizens	50	9.0	7.0
Other	62	11.1	26.0
	557	100.0	100.0

Position of actors

Actors category	Depthnews actors	Percentage of actors	IPS (%)
Intellectual	103	25.4	9.0
Governmental	203	50.0	61.0
Citizens	75	18.5	14.0
Other	25	6.1	16.0
	406	100.0	100.0

Table 9

Gender of sources

Source gender	Depthnews sources	Percentage of sources	IPS (%)
Male	363	76.1	90.0
Female	114	23.9	10.0
	477	100.0	100.0

Gender of actors

Actors gender	Depthnews actors	Percentage of actors	IPS (%)
Male	287	72.0	90.0
Female	112	28.0	10.0
	399	100.0	100.0

Table 10

Gender of actors by Depthnews category (in %)

Gender	DepthnewsAsia	Women	Science	Arjuna	Column
Male	83.8	20.0	83.3	85.2	100.0
Female	16.2	80.0	16.7	14.8	0.0

N=Depthnews Asia, 121; Women, 33; Science, 23; Arjuna, 17; Column, 2.

Gender of sources by Depthnews category (in %)

Gender	DepthnewsAsia	Women	Science	Arjuna	Column
Male	89.9	24.2	84.8	85.3	83.3
Female	10.1	75.8	15.2	85.3	16.7

N=Depthnews Asia, 129; Women, 44; Science, 40; Arjuna, 18; Column, 4.

The Legal Foundations of Mass Media Regulation in Guyana:

A Commonwealth Caribbean Case Study

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The Legal Foundations of Mass Media Regulation in Guyana: A Commonwealth Caribbean Case Study

The legal structure of Guyanese media is typical in many ways of other Commonwealth Caribbean developing countries. As such, Guyana can be used as an example to discuss media control and regulation in former British colonies. To better understand the role the media play in Guyana, this paper examines the legal framework in which the media exist and operate. The paper discusses Guyana's Commonwealth heritage, its Constitution, specific media legislation and cases related to media freedom. The practical implications of media policies and recommendations to increase media openness conclude the paper.

Guyana does not have a favorable reputation for either electoral fairness(1) or balanced media coverage.(2) A scheduled general election in late 1992 provided an opportunity to change both these perceptions. Guyana belied many notions of homogeneity found among its neighbors. It sits as a relatively small state atop principally Iberian South America, culturally and ethnically more connected to the Caribbean islands. It is unique among its mainland neighbors for its English tongue, relative lack of Roman Catholics and large populations of Hindus and Moslems. Ethnographically, it boasts principally East Indians and Africans with small enclaves of Chinese, Europeans and Amerindians.(3) Economically, the country is moving to reintroduce a free-market system following a disasterous post-independence experiment with socialism.(4)

The Guyanese Media Environment

Mass media in Guyana have undergone three distinct phases -- colonial, post-colonial/developmental, and recommercialization. Colonial newspapers and radio in Guyana were fairly typical of those in other British possessions. Both were commercial in orientation and functioned to provide information to the colony from the metropole in London. Following independence in 1966, media came under increasing control of the government headed by Forbes Burnham. This period saw Guyana emerge as a key player in the New World Information Order debate. Politics became more socialist and development support communication became the country's information policy.(5) After Burnham's death in 1985, the country sought to reintroduce a freer market approach and relaxed restrictions on some of the media.

One of the direct results of this easing of control was the decision by the current government to allow an independent newspaper to begin publishing in 1986. The Stabroek News became the newest print player and operated on the understanding that the government would not dictate editorial content but neither would it provide foreign exchange concessions necessary to buy paper and supplies. The News, which began as a bi-weekly, became an economically fluid daily and was regarded as one of the few objective voices in a country dominated by papers tied to doctrinaire political and social ideologies. Its editorial policy was "to be guided by the principles of good journalism and print both sides of a story." This was a welcome change for the average Guyanese who also looked to the News

Letters to the Editor pages as a welcome escape valve to vent frustrations about daily affairs in a deteriorating social scene.(6)

There were four other newspapers printed in Guyana. The Catholic Standard, published weekly by the Catholic church, served as an active independent voice for over fifteen years although it traced its roots to 1905. The Standard's editors were subjected to death threats; one of its photographers was stabbed to death during a government demonstration in 1979. It recently lost a libel suit brought by President Hoyte. This prompted a former ruling party official to comment that the tactic of filing and winning libel lawsuits remains a very effective device to intimidate the opposition media. He concluded, "In the view of legal scholars, Guyana may well have the most liberal interpretation of what constitutes libel of public figures. This arrangement also solidifies the anti-democratic formula of nonaccountability under which the PNC (ruling party) thrives." (7)

The other major newspaper was the government-owned Guyana Chronicle. The Chronicle traced its origins to the early 1800's when it was started to serve as a mouthpiece of the British plantation owners. It evolved from a voice for big business in the 1940"s to what many considered a public relations organ for government poicies in post-colonial Guyana.

The ruling party People's National Congress newspaper New Nation focused on political happenings within the party and country. The opposition People's Progressive Party (PPP) publishes the Mirror. The PPP leadership has traditionally followed a hard Marxist line which was reflected in the paper's content. The demise of communism and the potential for a free and fair election in 1992 dramatically affected the Mirror's editorial policies. The party leadership appeared to be softening its left-leaning rhetoric during the current election period. The two party news organs frequently engaged in vigorous political debate since the late 1950's when the country's two most prominent politicians Forbes Burnham and Cheddi Jagan established separate political agendas. (8)

Radio broadcasting in Guyana followed the colonial model through independence. By 1935, British Guiana had commercial radio, which continued until government nationalization of both private stations in 1968 and 1979. The Guyana Broadcast Corporation operated both stations and offered a daily menue of news programs. The 1988 U.S. State Department's Human Rights report said GBC was "selective in reporting the views and activities of opposition parties" and "in general, reflectes government policies." Foreign radio services provided a plurality of broadcast voices for Guyanese forced to look abroad for nongovernmental radio broadcasting.(9)

Visual media development in Guyana took an interesting turn from traditional technological diffusion patterns of cinema - television - video tape. Establishment of a television system was a high priority at the time of independence in 1966. However, the socialist government feared cultural imperialism from too much foreign programming. Their goal was local programming grounded in the tenets of indigenous socialism. The decision was made to postpone the introduction of television. Until the mid-1980's Guyana remained one of only about twenty countries in the world without television broadcasting.

Popular creativity filled the visual vacuum. In addition to the movie houses which dotted the country, showing foreign features and a weekly government produced news film magazine, the early-1980's saw Guyanese returning from abroad with video players. Guyana's linguistic isolation in South America, its cultural ties to the Caribbean and its large emigrant population abroad made the country ripe for the VCR invasion -- an invasion which overwhelmed the country's regulatory mechanism and deprived it of two important policy decisions. Not only did the returning Guyanese import VCRs set to the inferior NTSC (North American) color standard, the home-made tapes were recorded off-the-air in New York City, Miami and Toronto and entered the country commercials and all. This circumvented the government's goal of using the powerful television medium to forge a socialist state without the interference of capitalist commercialization. The opportunity was lost. Local programming was hampered from a lack of funding and the inability to compete with foreign production values. (10)

Local entrepreneurs brought television broadcasting to Guyana in the mid-1980's by rebroadcasting the pirated signals of geosynchronous communication satellites. The two stations featured a variety of

American programming including CBS and CNN news. Funding for the Guyanese rebroadcast stations came from the sale of local commercial inserts and rental fees on descrambler boxes (which were marginally effective). Through 1987 the government chose to abrogate television program control by allowing the rebroadcasting services to select programs. In early 1988 the government did regain some initiative in programming control by inaugurating a modest daily ten-minute locally produced newscast. The daily evening newscast, aired by the two satellite rebroadcast stations, was supplemented by a weekly news magazine aired over a limited-coverage government transmitter in the capital. Government produced material began to preempt the foreign-dominated programming as government production capability grew. (11) Mid-1992 saw five television stations operating in Guyana, four of which were satellite rebroadcasters. Six other stations were making plans to begin transmitting. One estimate put the number of TV sets at 70,000. (12)

Commonwealth Legal Heritage(13) --

One might tend to think of the Commonwealth Caribbean as composed entirely of English settled colonies utilizing the common law framework in their jurisprudence. However, such was not the case, especially with Guyana. Britain established final claim to Guyana in 1803 when it received the territory from the Dutch. As such, Guyana was considered "conquered territory" in the legal sense, in that England achieved control over the area by conquest. This was also the case with Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Trinidad and Tobago. These contrasted with the "settled territories" of Anguilla, Antigua, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, the British Virgin Islands, Montserrat, Nevis and St. Kitts. Here Britain established control without having to vie with other colonial powers or indigenious populations. The distinction is important in understanding the legal doctrines of reception and imposition.

Under the concept of reception, the "settled territories" simply received the applicable English common law and statutes brought during the settlement process. Whereas, in conquered or ceded territories the English acknowledged the established system of laws until it was changed by them to their liking. The doctrine of imposition was much less intellectural and much more grounded in raw force. Britain needed control over the Caribbean colonies and simply imposed their legal system. However, one might argue that in reality the legal framework of the British Caribbean was the result of both doctrines, and that there was only a philosophical distinction between the two -- a difference in outlook. The migrating English colonists brought with them their established mores and customs as expressed in laws, but on arrival imposed and created additional laws as necessary to establish a working government.

The underpinnings of these laws were most predominantly English common law, with equity, local custom and other literary and historical sources included. The concept of common law evolved from literally the laws which were common to all of England to that law which included court decisions but not Parliamentary legislation. Common law was common in another way -- it was subordinate to the acts of Parliament should a question arise as to legal superiority. Equity law was best explained through its expressions which provide additional relief should the common law be deficient. Equity is usually used in contract and property disputes. Local customs were exceptions to common law and were restricted in their influence to specific locations or group of people. In the case of Guyana, local custom had import in cases affecting the Amerindians and the African and East Indian heritage of many of its citizens. Historical and literacy sources for Caribbean law included merchant law, canon law, legislation, judicial decisions, constitutions (discussed below) and roman or civil law.

Guyana was unusual among its Commonwealth neighbors because it retained vestiges of civil law doctrine from its days as a Dutch colony. Civil law traced its roots to rules by which Roman citizens maintained civility toward each other. Civil law was a separate family of law along side common, islamic or socialist and was the basis of the legal systems of Western European countries and their former colonies. Under the Dutch, the Guyanese legal system (as was also the case to some extent in Trinidad and St. Lucia) was civil law, Dutch statutes and customary laws. But after Britain acquired the territory, pressure from the merchant class who saw the benefits in English commercial law moved the legal system toward common law. Today civil law remnants dealt primarily with real property.

Constitutional Foundations --

Guyana's early Dutch colonial history provided it with over 170 years of institutionalized government before the British finally assumed definitive political control in 1814. Dutch governance facilitated effective commerce and was in essence a West Indian Company-created managerial council. The council was later expanded to include judicial with administrative functions as the Court of Justice. This evolved into the Court of Policy and Justice when it added the executive function of government. The British used the Dutch plan on which to build a new constitution in 1814. A key provision credited to the Dutch was the balancing of individual representation with company representation. Democratic notions increased under the British during the nineteenth century following the freeing of the slaves in 1833 and the importation of indentured workers.(14)

Populism was codified by the 1891 Political Constitution Ordinance which further diminished planter influence by reducing income qualifications for the franchise. But this was countered by the increasing economic power of the principal sugar company, Booker, McConnell. Impending financial problems were cited by the British in establishing a new crown colony constitution in 1928. By the 1953 election the constitution had been amended to include univeral adult franchise, a ministerial system and a unicameral legislature, but effective control remained in the hands of the governor.(15)

Guyana began its flirtation with socialism after the popular election in 1953 of Cheddi Jagan. This so alarmed the British they suspended the new constitution and landed troops. By 1957 representative government had returned to Guyana; internal self-governance began in 1961 and independence was granted in 1966. With independence came the pro-forma Westminster-type constitution.

The traditional Westminster monarchical system of government featured the British sovereign as the Head of State, with political power resting with the Prime Minister and his cabinet. Thus the executive branch of government was parliamentary, given that the ministers were duly elected members of parliament. The Westminster model also included guarantees of fundamental human rights and judicial review of legislation. In the Caribbean, independence legislation provided for the supremacy of the constitution over parliament. However, because Guyana was undergoing political unrest at the time of independence, the 1966 Constitution saved emergency provisions which included preventive detention and arbitrary searches.(16)

By 1970, the new nation of Guyana had amended its constitution to provide for a president rather than a prime minister as government leader. In 1980 it adopted a new constitution based on cooperative republicanism which borrowed heavily from a variety of countries, including many with established socialist political systems.(17)

The 1980 Constitution firmly established the power of the executive branch and the Presidency in Guyana. The President replaced the Queen as Head of State, and the Prime Minister became simply the President's prinicipal assistant. Final judicial appeal was removed from the Privy Council in London and vested in the Guyana Court of Appeal. The parliament was composed of the President and National Assembly. The President was given extraordinary powers. He could ignore the wishes of his cabinet and act in his own best judgement. If he should violate the Constitution, he would be answerable only to the courts. This would occur only after action by the National Assembly; however, this point was moot because the President could dissolve the National Assembly at his discretion and had veto power over its legislation.(18) Also, the President was personally absolved of all criminal and civil responsility for his actions as President. Provisions such as these were both applauded as a bold attempt to break away from the typical British-based formulaic constitution (19) and admonished as "creating what seems to be an all-powerful and potentially dictatorial Head of State."(20)

Fundamental Rights --

There was no Bill of Rights in Great Britain. In fact, the constitutional and legal system of Britain did not guarantee the basic right to communicate and receive information with certain exceptions. As one scholar put it,

> From a legal perspective, freedom of speech, British-style, is what is left to us by the constraints of statute law and common law. In other words, the right to public communication is merely the residuary legatee, after the claims have been met of the rapidly spreading common law of contempt of court, of confidentiality, and of personal privacy, of the old and the unreformed

> law of defamation, and of the streamlined and enforceable new criminal legislation on official secrets.(21)

Britain also did not have a freedom of information law to authorize right of access to government information; nor did it have statutory protection against unwarranted invasions of privacy. And except for libel, Blackstone's dislike of prior restraints on publication was "regarded by English judges as radical American nonsense."(22) It should also be noted that in Britain civil law offered the possibility of prior restraint on publication via interim injunctions. This was in cases where a breach of confidence was alleged. Civil actions required lighter burden of proof and involved no juries.(23)

British colonies gaining independence after the late 1950's had rights provisions inserted in their constitutions. Such was the case with the 1966 Guyana constitution; the 1980 constitution included these rights as directive provisions of state policy. Among the fundamental rights and freedoms bestowed on the citizens of Guyana in the 1980 Constitution was freedom of expression.

> Except with his own consent, no person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of expression, that is to say, freedom to hold opinions without interference, freedom to receive ideas and information without interference, freedom to communicate ideas and information without interference and freedom from interference with his correspondence.(24)

There was no specific provision for freedom of the press or other media in the 1980 constitution, but a liberal reading of the above article might suggest it could be used to safeguard mass media. The courts have ruled there was little difference constitutionally between the average citizen and the media.(25) The 1980 provision was essentially the same as the 1966 independence constitution (26) with two potentially chilling additions.

Both constitutions provided derogation clauses(27) immediately following which qualified freedom of expression lest it abrogate public safety, morality, health, or harm personal reputation. However, the 1980 constitution allowed freedom of expression to be checked by legislation

> ...ensuring fairness and balance in the dessemination of information to the public; or
> (c) that imposes restrictions upon public officers or officers of any corporate body established on behalf of the public or owned by or on behalf of the Government of Guyana.(28)

The former could be a powerful weapon in the government's arsenal to silence hostile non-government media given the announced information policy of development support communication.(29) The latter provision gave the government the authorization to more easily inhibit media access to information from state employees.

Another issue in freedom of expression cases concerned how the standing of appeals to constitutional protection would be viewed by the courts. Guyana's constitution, along with those of most of the Caribbean, provided that the High Court not consider constitutional relief on issues involving fundamental rights and freedoms if adequate alternative redress was available. This doctrine of constitutional restraint and several other judicial policies would seem to mitigate against active involvement by the higher courts on issues such as freedom of expression. In fact, one legal scholar offered little hope for adequate redress in such cases,

> 'there are certain unique political and constitutional features in Guyana's history which are sufficiently important to destroy any optimism that the Guyanese can find protection from a Bill of Rights and the Government and its agencies can be forced to observe such principles.'(30)

Legislation, Ordinances & Rules --

Legislation was regarded as second only to the Constitution as a source of law in the Commonwealth Caribbean. It encompassed a variety of law from statutes and other subsidiary or subordinate legislation such as rules, regulations, proclamations and by-laws. This included all forms of law enacted by a state's law-making entities except court decisions.(31) Legislation specifically related to mass media was a relatively small body of law in Guyana. For this paper, mass media included both the established forms of information dissimination (newspapers, broadcasting, cinema, etc.) and the general concepts used to attempt to control their organization or output (defamation, surety, censorship, etc.)

The Defamation Act of Guyana(32) enacted in 1959, consolidated the law of slander and libel and was rather straightforward in its interpretation of established common law precepts. Mass media received special mention in several areas. The broadcasting of words was treated as libel because it was considered publication in permanent form. A significant portion of the act dealt with unintentional defamation in which a newspaper and its staff may be sued if they unintentionally published a defamatory statement. Fortunately, the Guyana provisions(33) provided that the newspaper may claim innocence in the defamation because the words were not defamatory on their face and it exercised reasonable care in publication. Offers of suitable correction and sufficient apology, if accepted by the plaintiff, end the action, but if not accepted, may be used in the publisher's defense. In any libel action, newspapers may plead lack of negligence and malice and print a full apology for the offending libel.(34) Fair and accurate reports of court proceedings and public meetings are privileged (with certain exceptions), but published defamatory statements by candidates are not.(35) Other standard defenses include justification and fair comment.(36)

Several other catagories of libel should be noted. First -- the criminal element of defamatory libel. Libel could be considered criminal because it might result in a breaching of the peace. In Guyana the definition of what constitutes defamatory libel was found in the Criminal Law (Offenses) Act rather than the Defamation Act. Publication of the following was considered grounds for criminal charges:

> 'matter published without any legal justification or excuse, designed to insult the person to whom it is published, or calculated to injure the reputation of any person exposing him to hatred, contempt or ridicule.'

There was concurrently the civil right of action for defamatory libel. While there was no statutory definition of civil defmation, the distilled common law description of defamation was "'a statement concerning any person which exposes him to hatred, ridicule, or contempt, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his office, profession or trade.'" For civil action there must be publication to third parties because the civil law was concerned with private reputation; whereas the criminal law was designed to protect public order.(37)

Seditious libel in Guyana depended on both the common law and statute. Violation of the Criminal Law (Offenses) Act carried a misdemeanor fine and two-year prison term. Common law provided the test of seditious libel as "whether or not the words used 'were calculated...to promote public disorder or physical force or violence in a matter of State.'"(38) In such a case truth was no defense, innocent motive was no defense, nor was distance from the actual writing of the sedition.(39) The author knows of no prosecutions for seditious libel in Guyana's media history.

Contrasted with the strict provisions for seditious libel, Guyana's blasphemous libel law was quite liberal. It was considered a misdemeanor, came under the Criminal Offenses Act and carried a one year prison sentence. Blasphemy was "'the publication of words concerning the Christian religion so scurrilous and offensive as to pass the limits of decent controversy and to be calculated to outrage the feelings of any sympathiser with Christianity.'" The delimiting issue was whether such words would lead to a breach of the peace. As a guide between decent controversy and blasphemy, it was not blasphemous to "'express in good faith and in decent language or attempt to establish by arguments used in good faith and conveyed in decent language, any opinion whatever upon any religious subject.'" Given Guyana's diverse ethinic make-up, this definition "' does not render criminal the mere propagation of doctrine hostile to the Christian faith. The crime consists in the manner in which the doctrines were advocated.'" (40)

Publication of obscene libel was punishable by up to two years in prison. The law, Summary Jurisdiction (Offences) Act, was directed against publication, distribution and advertising in obscene periodicals. The test of obscenity was "'whether the tendency of the matter is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences.'" However, "'writing is not obscene merely because it is in bad tase or undesirable.'" Publishers must have exercised caution to avoid violation of common laws on corrupting public morals, public mischief and conspiracy to outrage public decency. This would include publishing ads telling readers where they could indulge in immoral activities. Even though a newspaper had privilege in judicial proceedings, this did not hold true for obscene or indecent details of such proceedings.(41)

Publication and Newspapers Act -

One of the primary purposes of this act was to require that publishers had enough money available to pay damage awards in libel suits. Additionally, the 1839 act sought to compile a public record of published Guyanese books and newspapers, avoid problems from anonymous publications and establish "...the Liberty of the Press on a just and proper basis."(42) Specifically the act provided a rather routine cataloguing function found in most Commonwealth Caribbean countries. All newspapers or books must have included the publisher's name and place of business or be liable for a seventy-five dollar fine (about 75 US cents).(43) This allowed those libeled to name and locate potential defendants for legal action. Copies of all published books must have been supplied the University, the Archives and the Library (unless exempted by the President), and newspapers must have been provided to the Archives.(44)

The heart of the Publications Act was the requirement for G$10,000 (US$100) in bond and two sureties for each newspaper enterprise to cover judicial awards for defamatory libel against either the State or any person (unless exempted by the President).(45) Directors and officers of corporations could be held accountable for libelous actions of their newspapers unless they could show lack of knowledge, due diligence to prevent the offense and agreed to a public apology.(46)

Cinematograph and Video -

Regulations governing the exhibition of films and videos dealt with the issues of content censorship and advertising plus technical standards for fire prevention in film handling and theatre construction.(47) The Cinematograph and Video Act required all films and videos as well posters or advertising to be approved by a censorship committee appointed by the government. Films and posters must not depict "any matter that which is against public order or decency" or where such exhibition was "undesirable in the public interest."(48) Objectionable portions of films may be edited. Approved films and posters were then certified by the government. Decisions of the Board of Film Censors were final.(49) Approved films were content classified for age groups.(50) Provisions of the act did not apply to free exhibitions of government educational films, films in private dwellings not open to the public or films on licensed broadcast or cable television.(51) One provision related to film studio construction prohibits anyone from operating a cinematograph studio in Guyana without government permission.(52) Given the increased availability of portable video equipment, one might question whether such a provision could be used to control video production centers.

Broadcasting --

There was no broadcasting act as such in Guyana, although there was increasing discussion on the need for one. Governmental regulation of radio fell under rather all-encompassing wireless telegraphy legislation.(53) The Guyana Broadcasting Service was created in 1972, and its mandate was simply to provide "adequate and comprehensive programmes ... and to serve the best interests of the public generally."(54) Television came late to Guyana by way of two satellite pirate rebroadcasters, and television legislation had yet to arrive. The current private television stations were allowed to use the airwaves, but were not licensed to do so. As such, they did not qualify as government run stations. This lapse proved to be legally beneficial to the government because the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBI) contained two very specific antipiracy provisions designed to retard outright theft of copyrighted video signals. The restrictions applied to government owned systems which pirated signals. Thus, the Guyanese government was able to sidestep any legal complications. From a practical business standpoint such pirating appeared to be moot. Cable News Network officials said Guyana was of little commercial importance to them.(55)

The government established a commission to draft broadcasting policy and regulations in April 1991. Following public hearings, the committee submitted its report in July 1991. Calls were increasing in mid-1992 for some form of television legislation to set both programming and technical standards. There was growing concern about mutual technical interference among the stations, lack of available spectrum space for all those wishing to broadcast and fear that out-of-band broadcasts would endanger airline safety communications. One interesting legal programming anomaly did exist. Cinemas were required by obtain approval for their material before it was shown to the public; however, broadcasters could show the same feature uncut on Guyanese television without violating any legal prohibitions.

Political groups were urging licensing guidelines be established quickly so they could take advantage of television's persuasive power before the scheduled 1992 elections.(56)

On the technical side, provisions for both audio and video cable programming signals were included in the 1990 Telecommunications Act.(57)

Development Communications --

Much of the government's overall information strategy was consolidated with the creation of the Guyana Public Communications Agency in 1988. GPCA effectively set the nation's information policy. It controlled the television service and the Guyana News Agency, but did not have a direct line of authority to the radio broadcasting service or the government newspaper. The GPCA had the broad charge of "developing and professionally managing a national public information and public relations service, including co-ordinating all...public information and media services of the...government...so as to support the Government's development priorities programmes, plans and projects."(58)

The agency's philosophical underpinnings were expressed as development support communication(59) which used mass media to further national development.(60) This was a return to late 1970's policies strongly espoused by the government. In development theory, media accepted national economic advancement as an overriding objective coupled to possible reductions in complete journalistic freedom. This ran counter to traditional Western press perspectives in that it linked media output to government goals. The notion of a press system free to report on matters which it considers newsworthy was abrogated and replaced by a press agenda, if not controlled by the government, at least heavily influenced by it. The first director of GPCA said , "I have reservation about importing all the libertarian ideas of a free press from the large developed Western countries," but it was not the policy of his organization to intervene directly in the editorial policies of the state media However, the Anglican Bishop for Guyana complained that "the Burnham and Hoyte governments have stifled public opinions by curbing the free flow of accurate information through the manipulation of the government-owned newspaper and radio stations." The GPCA director also hinted at possible retaliation for media which they felt printed or broadcast an unbalanced view, "If information is repeatedly distorted...we reserve the right to censure that arm of the media."(61)

Mass Media Related Cases --

There were not a large number of significant mass media cases from Guyana; almost all dealt with newspaper libel and many involved political figures suing independent newspapers. One might infer the lack of broadcasting cases was a measure of the extent of state countrol over the broadcasting industry. With one exception (Antigua Times), the cases offered below were Guyanese -- both pre- and post-independence. None of the Guyanese cases on appeal reached the Privy Council of the House of Lords before Guyana's decision to no longer be bound by Privy Council decisions.(62)

In Hope, Attorney General v. New Guyana Ltd., the court of appeals supported two government laws which required licenses to import either printing presses or newsprint. The constitutional questions centered on whether the import laws violated the newspapers' right to freedom of expression by constituting a prior restraint on publication. The newspaper argued and the lower court judge agreed that "'freedom of the press' necessarily involves freedom to obtain the essential means of communication, viz, newsprint and printing equipment, since possession of those means to put the ideas, views, etc, into permanent form is essential to the 'exercise' of the right of expression." (63) The trial court said the import license and requisite fees were a hindrance to the enjoyment of the newspapers' freedom of expression because it "'takes away or abridges' their freedom to 'communicate' ideas and information in writing without interference."(64) And that, in effect, the government sought to control the newspapers rather than newsprint or printing equipment.(65)

The court of appeals said the trial judge erred because while the license was a direct hindrance to the importation of newsprint, the legal test was "whether it hinders the fundamental right to freedom of expression or any integral part of that right."(66) They continued,

> The importation of newsprint and printing equipment by licence is not a matter directly related to, or any integral part of the fundamental right to freedom of expression of the press. Therefore the trade orders can only have had an indirect or consequential effect on that right, so they cannot be struck down as unconstitutional.(67)

The appeals court downplayed the larger question of whether its decision was infringing on the flow of information to the Guyanese people by putting the case into a more philosophical perspective. Citing the desire to "avoid a drift towards totalitarianism" and alluding to libertarian spirit of Thomas Paine, Thomas Jeffereson, Patrick Henry and James Madison, the court wrote,

> So long as a legislature or some executive authority makes no direct assault on fundamental rights and freedoms but merely creates remote and incidental consequences in relation thereto, there is no cause for alarm, for tyranny will not have reared its head. It is only when there is a clear

> and direct violation of those rights and freedoms that disquitet results and an occasion for legal redress arises.(68)

The decision was considered a blow to press freedom and was widely discussed in local opposition and regional publications.(69)

The government used the Publication and Newspapers Act in 1975 to silence an underground newssheet. In Bhagwan v. Chester(70) police charged a vocal opposition attorney with "printing a newspaper without making a stautory declaration and printing a newspaper without having executed and delivered a bond" as required in the newspaper act. The mini-paper (Dayclean) "contained scandalous and defamatory articles on political personages in Guyana, including the Prime Minister."(59) The Court of Appeals said the duplicating machine used to create Dayclean was printing under the law, that Dayclean was indeed a newspaper and a majority said there was enough circumstantial evidence to call the attorney the printer of the paper. The court did hold that the act's phrase "knowingly and willfully printed or caused to be printed" was duplicitous and bad law.(72)

The Constitutional issue of Freedom of Expression was the basis of Attorney General v. Antigua Times.(73) At issue were Antigua's newspaper registration and surety law. The Antigua Times newspaper (which published for just one year - 1971) did not have the necessary funds to fulfill the requirements of the laws and claimed the license fee was a hinderance to its right of freedom of expression. The Privy Council disagreed and said the license fee was constitutional. It also said that under the laws a "person" included a corporation.(74) One scholar critical of the Privy Council decision commented, "...a very general power to take away from the right to freedom of expression has been given sanction."(75)

Several of the post-independence cases involved prominent political figures suing, in some cases, rival party's newspapers for libel. The most damages($25,000) ever awarded by a Guyanese court went to Prime Minister Forbes Burnham in a 1973 libel action he brought against the wife of the leader of the main opposition party, who was also the editor of the party newspaper. The high court upheld the award, saying it was justified because Burnham was the leader of the country. The court also said the awarding of the judgement against the opposition newspaper was not a deprevation of the constitutional right of freedom of expression.(76)

Current President Desmond Hoyte lost a 1975 case in which he sought damages from nine directors of a newspaper when it was determined the newspaper did not possess sufficient funds to fulfill a court-ordered award. The High Court refused Hoyte's request, saying the libel occurred before a 1972 amendment to the Newspaper Act which made corporate directors liable.(77) However, one might argue the issue was one of press harassment by Hoyte, given that the President's case appeared on the surface to have little to substantiate it. Hoyte won a much more recent press libel case against the Catholic Standard which included an award substantial enough to require the newspaper to solicit financial support from overseas to help satisfy the debt incurred by the judgement (78)

In another case which might be viewed as legal harassment, Prime Minister Forbes Burnham sued the Liberator newspaper to obtain the name of the paper's editor. The Newspaper Ordinance required the printer, publisher and proprietor be named, but not the editor. Burnham's attempt failed as the court ruled that it was not the place of the court to assist a plaintiff in gathering names against whom he would bring charges.(79)

At a less lofty political level in Singh v. The Editor, The Evening Post, an East Indian magistrate sued for libel from an article which he said implied his sentencing was based on race rather than merit. The newspaper pleaded fair comment on a public matter and that the words carried no defamatory meaning. The court awarded the magistrate damages saying the language did injure the magistrates's reputation and the writer (an opposition party operative) was dishonestly motivated, showed malice and simply got his facts wrong.(80)

The remaining cases involved primarily libel suits against newspapers brought usually by public figures or state corporations. Several were dated from the late 1960's but stretch back to 1924. In most cases the courts ruled against the newspapers. Appendix One contains case citations and judgements.

Practical Implications --

The results of the legal framework outlined above were a mixed blessing for the Guyanese media consumer. Progress had been made in providing a diversity of opinion in Guyana; however, certain areas, principally state controlled broadcasting, were in need of further liberalization. Without question the two most important media results of a freer and more open information policy in Guyana during the current administration were the establishment of the Stabroek News newspaper and the introduction of television. Neither medium was implimented without incident, but the mere fact of their existence could be considered either a move toward openness or an acceptance of the political reality that the populace would no longer tolerate life without them.

The Stabroek News, begun in 1986 as a bi-weekly, expanded later to a daily. Initially, the Starbroek News' most valuable function was as a much-needed escape valve for public frustration. Its "Letters to the Editor" pages were filled with at times impassioned accounts of life in a society which was crumbling under its own policies.(81) The paper's reportage improved as it established itself as a free press voice in Guyana. The paper provided a chronicle of the realities involved in moving toward a more free-market economy. Its creation, survival and flowering were a testimony that the established legal framework for print media was acceptable to the functioning of a free and independent press. Such was not the case with broadcasting.

The government seemed unwilling to confront the realities of broadcasting and deal with it in a unified fashion. The need for detailed broadcast legislation was evident; the government approach was piecemeal. Television was initiated by private enterprises' desire for profit, spread by popular fiat and condoned by a government seeking to skirt the provisions of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). The *de facto* operation of the two satellite rebroadcast systems by private entrepreneurs relieved the government of any culpability in violations of the CBI, which withheld trade and economic aid benefits to governments that pirated U.S. satellite signals. The entertainment portion of the Guyanese television service was comprised almost exclusively of United States programming. The legal issue of copyright violation was practically moot, although Guyana possessed colonial copyright legislation which included broadcasting provisions.(82) One scholar summarized the situation of satellite piracy in the Caribbean,

> Many of these countries do not adhere to any multilateral copyright convention. Some have antiquated copyright laws. Some impose difficult procedural hurdles to expeditious litigation. Finally, the sheer number of countries and the fact that none of them constitutes a substantial market for the legitimate copyright owner, makes it difficult to mount an economical legal campaign in the region."(83)

Guyana wanted a television service which reflected the values and interests of its chosen path of economic development. The government wanted to minimize the influences from externally produced programming, which carried unacceptable social, economic and political messages. The government got the entertainment programming and the full range of national and international news available to American viewers. This forced the government to play legislative catch-up and resulted in television regulation by ad hoc approach rather than formal communication policy. The government was either unwilling or unable to continue to resist the pressure to introduce television. From the broad perspective of nation building, Guyana's uncertain efforts to establish a television system were indication of the qualified success of its cooperativist economic stance. They were faced with failure if they opted for an early foreign-dominated televison system and witnessed similar discontent in waiting to develop their own.

It was in local television news where the potential for use and abuse was greatest. The results were still out on the performance of the locally produced television news during the recent election. Given the direct administrative connection between the local television news and the Guyana Public Communications Agency, there was some concern about questions of balance. Few could argue with the partial use of a nation's only television information outlet to further national development, but one would hope the amount of television time given opposition political parties during the recent election would indicate at least a measured sense of objectivity. Incumbency brings media rewards in any society, but the fairness issue became more acute during the recent campaign, given it was the nation's first exposure to a televised electoral contest.

The credibility of the political reportage by the government radio services (GBC) and newspaper (Chronicle) had long been in question. However, newspaper coverage was more objective during the 1992 election campaign.(85)

Recommendations --

This review of the legal framework for Guyanese media showed two distinct directions: One, that of former British colony dutifully implementing legislation and policy from the metropole. The other, that of newly independent nation state embarking on a path of indigenous socialism with its emphasis on strong state media control. Neither path appeared to be the direction of the future.

The election of 1992 provided an opportunity for the political parties in Guyana to formulate and articulate their media platforms.(84) Collectively, the parties shared a strong desire for a more open and balanced media system in Guyana. They agreed on the need for continued state ownership of media, but expressed a strong desire to allow private ownership of radio and television stations. A careful reading of their proposals pointed up the emphasis on the need for changes in the broadcasting rather than print media. The statements seemed to indicate that the current climate for independent print journalism was satisfactory. It would appear that the victors in the 1992 election would authorize additional private broadcast media.

From a legal standpoint, the key to insuring journalistic freedom for broadcasting stations in Guyana would be to institutionalize an infrastructure which promoted more open access to media -- both established and newly authorized. This could best be achieved by the creation of a central broadcasting authority (possibly an amalgam of the BBC and IBA from Great Britain) which would most importantly offer a renewed sense of credibility in the media. Improved credibility would be especially crucial for the state-owned media. The details of the broadcasting authority should be the province of the duly elected government.

Without a reorganization of state media to depoliticize its control and content, and increased opportunities for private ownership of media, Guyana would be doomed to years of further media abuse and a continued waste of valuable resources which could further its intellectual as well as economic development.

Appendix One

Libel Cases in Guyana 1969 - 1924
(with annotation)

Clifton Mortimer Llewelyn John v. Peter Taylor & Co. Ltd. (1969) Law Reports of Guyana 162. Minister of Agriculture sued Evening Post for libel based on two 1966 articles dealing with lack of administrative competence. Court judgement for Minister as defense of fair comment not established, no apology offered, and newspaper wrote with malice.

British Guiana Rice Marketing Board v. Peter Taylor and Company Limited (1967) Law Reports of Guyana 206. Rice Board sued for libel over newspaper story detailing late or non-payment by Board to area farmers. Court held for Board saying fair comment defense will not work when entire article is based on facts (which are defamatory and libelous) rather than comment.

Guyana Marketing Corporation v. Peter Taylor & Company Limited & Another (1967) Law Reports of Guyana 61. Court held in a procedural matter involving a newspaper libel suit, that fair comment and justification are considered totally distinct and separate defenses. Also that libel defendant may not deny he wrote falsely or malicously but must set out facts for either justification or privilege as his defense.

Peter Taylor & Co., Ltd. v. G.S. Gillette. B.S. Rai v. G.S. Gillette. (1966) Guyana Law Reports 208. Director of Public Prosecutions sued newspaper over letter to editor which claimed incorrect conduct on D.P.P.'s part. Appeals court ruled on procedural matter favoring D.P.P.

Ramsahoye v. Peter Taylor and Co. Ltd. (1964) Law Reports of British Guiana 329. Attorney General sued for libel, and court held for A.G. and allowed submission of other printed libels to increase damage award.

Anderson v. DeCorum and Peter Taylor & Co. Ltd. (1963) Law Reports of British Guiana 159. Procedural ruling involving innuendo, fair comment and rolled up plea.

The Demerara Turf Club, Ltd. v. J. Phang (Junior), B.F. Fernandes, J.G. Fernandes and The Argosy Co., Ltd. (1963) West Indian Reports 177. Turf Club sued for unauthorized use of its racing sheet program. Court held newspaper violated Turf Club's copyright of its material and printers as liable as other defendents.

White v. Guiana Graphic Limited. (1962) Law Reports of

British Guiana 502. Court ruled on procedural question involving differences in English and Guianese judicical practice.

Collymore v. The Argosy Co., Ltd. et anor. (1956) Law Reports of British Guiana 183. Supreme Court ruled in favor of Collymore saying the newspaper failed to prove its story on open court session was fair and accurate.

Seal Coon v. B.G. Lithographic Co., Ltd., et al (1956) Law Reports of British Guiana 69. Court ruled newspaper did not have to reveal identity of writer using pseudonym even though newspaper was being sued for libel on writer's story.

Gonsalves v. The Argosy Co., Ltd. et al (1953) Law Reports of British Guiana 61. Court ruled in finding newspaper libeled dentist that, "a man's moral character is not a permissible subject of adverse comment and that is so even though the person attached occupies some public position which makes his character a matter of public interest."

Kendall v. The Daily Chronicle and Others (1952) Law Reports of British Guiana 73. Court, in ruling against newspaper in libel case, set forth partial requirements for use of qualified privilege as defense, to include statements made in aid of justice which were reasonable and "not calculated to inflict more harm than was necessary."

G.R. Clapham v. Daily Chronicle, et al. (1944) Law Reports of British Guiana 71. Court ruled in case involving newspaper review of piano performance, that exaggeration as expression of one's views does not necessarily destroy protection afforded those who criticize public acts of another.

A.J. Parkes v. Argosy Co., Ltd., and Others. (1942) Law Reports of British Guiana 143. Court in ruling newspaper libeled secretary of boxing associaion, said any libel against secretary issuing statement for board of directors was libel against every member of the board.

Clarence Bedford v. Daily Chronicle, Ltd., et al (1942) Law Review of British Guiana 118. Court, acting as jury, in ruling against newspaper for libel, could express disapproval of libel by determining amount of damages newspapers would pay.

S.M. Luther v. The Argosy Co. Ltd. (1940) Law Reports of British Guiana 88. Court, in ruling against newspaper in libel of former convict who was constable, said because newspaper allegation of fact not truly stated, fair comment defense failed.

E.G. Woolford v. O.W. Bishop & Or. (1940) Law Reports of

British Guiana 92. Court, in ruling against newspaper in libel action, said a printer of defamatory matter was considered to have participated in the publication.

Wight v. Daily Chronicle, Ltd., & Webber. (1924) Law Reports of British Guiana 106. Court made several points in ruling against one newspaper (Chronicle) in libel action brought by chairman of other newspaper. Private business matters are not province of public interest. In joint publication of libel, each involved was liable for the malice of the other in assessing damages. Mere correction was not an apology. An apology must be unreserved withdrawal of imputations, expressed with regret and promptness. Only judicial or legislative proceedings are priveleged.

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2. Editorial, "Abuse of Media" Catholic Standard, Georgetown, Guyana. October 13, 1991. p. 2. Cited past media manipulation and called for increased diversity of opinion during election campaign.

Jurist, "The Press and the President" Catholic Standard, Georgetown, Guyana. October 13, 1991. p. 2. Discusses docility of press corps.

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17. Phillips, pp. 57-62. While Guyana had experimented socially and politically with a Marxist-oriented cooperative socialism, its laws tended to remain in the Westminster camp. For a discussion of Marxist legal theory see: Bob Fine, Democracy and the Rule of Law: Liberal Ideals and Marxist Critiques (London: Pluto Press, 1984); Hugh Collins, Marxism and Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); Bernard Edelman, Ownership of the Image: Elements for a Marxist Theory of Law (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979); Colin Sumner, Reading Ideologies: An investigation into the Marxist Theory of Ideology and Law (New York: Academic Press, 1979).

18. Newton, pp. 30-35.

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21. Dimity Kingsford-Smith & Dawn Oliver, eds., *Economical with the Truth: The Law and the Media in a Democratic Society* (Oxford: ESC Publishing Limited, 1990), vii.

22. *Ibid*.

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24. *Constitution of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana Act 1980*. Guyana Act No. 2 of 1980. Assented to by President A. Chung, 20 February, 1980. Article 146(1).

25. *Attorney General and Minister of Home Affairs v. Antigua Times, Ltd.* (1975) 21 *W.I.R.* 560.

26. The *Constitution of Guyana* (1966) Chapter II, article 12(1)(2).

27. For a discussion of the tension which arises between the demand for free expression and the need to preserve public order, see Dorcas White, "Legal Constraints and the Role of the Mass Media in A Caribbean in Transition," Faculty of Law, University of the West Indies, Barbados. No date. pp. 1-6.

28. *Constitution of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana Act 1980*, article 146(2).

The government later amended the *Public Corporations Act* (Section 63) to make it a criminal offense for officers of such corporations who were not specifically authorized to do so to give information to the press about the business of such corporations. "A sort of Official Secrets Act, but based on much less potent material." Letter to author from David de Caires, publisher of *Stabroek News*, January 24, 1992.

29. For a discussion of the concept of development support communication and its implementation in Guyana see M. Kent Sidel, "The Public Commmunications Agency as a Method of Information Control: Guyana -- A Case Study." Paper presented at the Seventh Annual Intercultural and International Communication Conference. Miami, Flordia. February 22-24, 1990.

30. R.W. James "The State of Human Rights Enforcement in the Co-operative Republic of Guyana" *West Indian Law Journal*, May 1983, p.17 quoted in Phillips, p. 71. For additional discussion see Phillips, pp. 66-72; Newton, pp. 36-41; Margaret DeMerieux *The Delineation of the Right to Freedom of Expression* (London: Stevens

and Sons Ltd., 1980) Reprinted from Public Law, Winter 1980. pp. 359-366; and Conrad F. Richards "Some Legal and Political Aspects of Freedom of Opinion in the Developing Societies of the Commonwealth Caribbean." (LL.B. thesis, University of the West Indies Faculty of Law, no date) pp. 1-9.

31. Newton, p. 46.

32. Defamation Act, Chapter 6:03 15 August 1959 in 1973 Revised Statues of Guyana.

33. Ibid., Article 12.

34. Ibid., Article 11.

35. Ibid., Articles 13,14,15.

36. Ibid., Articles 7,8.

37. Quoted in Dorcas White, The Press and the Law in the Caribbean (Bridgetown, Barbados: Cedar Press, 1977) pp. 20-21.

38. Seditious publications were those with seditious intention, which unfortunately were not defined by the Guyanese provision. However, the common law defined seditious intention as "'the intention to bring hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection against the Queen or the Government and Constitution...as by law established or either House of Parliament, or the administration or justice, or to excite (inhabitants of a country) to attempt otherwise than by lawful means the alteration of any matter in church or state by law established, or to promote feelings of ill-will and hostitility between different classes.'" Ibid., pp. 14-15.

39. Ibid., p. 15.

40. Ibid., p. 18. Guyana was comprised of Christians, Hindus, Muslims and Amerindians.

41. While both indecent and obscene conveyed the idea of offending the recognized standards of propriety, indecent was lower on the scale of violation than was obscene. Ibid., pp 19-20.

42. The official title is, "An Act to prevent the mischiefs arising from the printing and publishing of Books, Newspapers and other Papers by persons not known and for regulating the printing and publication of such Papers in other respects, and for compiling a public record of all Books and Newspapers published in Guyana and for establishing the Liberty of the Press on a just and proper basis," enacted 23rd November, 1839. Cited as "Publication and Newspapers Act" Chapter 21:01, 1973 Revised Statutes of Guyana.

43. Ibid., sections 3, 7, 8. The Guyana dollar recently underwent excessive devaluation and was worth approximately one U.S. cent. Given more established exchange rates of one Guyana dollar = 33 U.S. cents, the fines listed in the act would be considered significant for a developing country.

44. Ibid., sections 6, 12.

45. Ibid., section 14. The issue of a bond such as this formed the basis of the Antigua Times case discussed below.

46. Ibid., sections 17, 18.

47. "Cinematograph Act" of 1912. Guyana Public Laws 1973, Chapter 21:02. The "Cinematograph (Amendment) Act 1986" added video concepts and terminology to the original legislation. Act No. 9 of 1986 signed by President D. Hoyte 22 August 1986. Additional video terminology was added by the "Cinematograph Films, Video Tapes and Posters (Censorship)(Amendment) Regulations 1987" and the "Cinematography and Video (Amendment) Regulations 1987" regulations no. 1 & 2 of 1987.

48. "Cinematograph Act" section 5(4).

49. Ibid., sections 5(6),(7) and 9(2).

50. Category "U" films are suitable for universal exhibition.

Category "A" films are not to be shown to those under 16 without accompanyment by a person over 21 or a parent.

Category "X" films are not exhibited to those under 16.

Found in Subsidiary Legislation "Cinematograph Films and Posters (Censorship) Regulations, section 8. Appended to "Cinematograph Act."

51. "Cinematograph Act" section 15 and "Cinematograph (Amendment) Act 1986, section 15 (2)(4).

52. Regulation 43 of "Cinematograph Act."

53. It was unclear whether the regulations for wireless telegraphy encompass broadcast transmissions; although the power to license broadcast receiving sets was included under this section. The emphasis was on transmission and reception of point-to-point telegrams by radio to ships at sea and airplanes as well as amateur radio stations. Sections 63, 64 & 65 of "Post and Telegraph Act." Chapter 47:01, 1973 Revised Statutes of Guyana.

Section 65(5) above gave the President emergency powers to control "transmission and reception of messages by wireless telegraphy or visual or sound signalling..." and gave the government authority to "make such rules as appear necessary with respect to the possession, sale, purchase, construction, and use of apparatus for wireless telegraphy or visual or sound signalling..."

Also, in a public emergency the President had the power to censor communications including publications. National Security (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, Chapter 16:02, section 30(2)(a).

54. "Public Corporations (Broadcasting) Order" number 76 of 1972. Section 4(b). Effective date 1 December 1972. Chapter 19:05, Statutes of Guyana - 1975. The Guyana Broadcasting Service became the Guyana Broadcasting Corporation in 1979. Order number 11 of 1979. Effective 27 January 1979.

55. Sidel, Video Policy, pg. 533.

56. Catholic Standard, March 15, 1992, pg. 4.

57. "Provision of Cable Programme Services" Part IV of "Telecommunications Act 1990." Number 27 of 1990. Effective 12 December 1990.

58. "The Guyana Public Communications Agency Order 1989" Section 4(2)(a). Order number 3 of 1989. Effective 23 January, 1989. The Official Gazette 28th January, 1989, Legal Supplement -- B.

59. Ibid., section 4(2)(b).

60. For a general discussion of development communication see William H. Meyer, Transnational Media and Third World Development (New York, Greenwood Press, 1988) chapters 1 and 2.

For a specific application see Paul Sui-nam Lee, National Communication and Development: A Comparative Study of Four British Colonies -- Nigeria, Guyana, Singapore and Hong Kong. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1986.

For a discussion of the legal perspectives of developmental communication see White, chapter four.

61. Sidel, Public Communications Agency, pp. 6-9.

62. The doctrine of stare decisis (binding force of precedent), its application in the Caribbean and Guyana's decision to terminate the appeals procedure in country were covered in Newton, pp. 51-53.

63. Frank Hope, Competent Authority and Attorney General of Guyana v New Guyana Co Ltd and Vincent Teekah (1979) 26 W.I.R. 233, pg. 244.

64. Ibid., pg. 245.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid., pg. 235.

67. Ibid., pg. 234.

68. Ibid., pg. 318.

69. "Muzzled Media" The Nation (Barbados), January 23, 1980, pg. 14.

"Regional Concern Over Press Freedom" The Mirror (Guyana), September 16, 1979, pg. 2.

"Canada May Stop Guyana Newsprint" Advocate News (Barbados), October 31, 1979.

"IAPA: No Press Freedom in Guyana" Advocate News (Barbados), April 8, 1976, pg. 8.

70. Moses Bhagwan v. Bernel G. Chester, Detective Inspector of Police (1977) 25 W.I.R. 187.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid., pg. 188.

For additional political background material see "Guyana Court Upholds Verdict Against Bhagwan" Advocate-News, August 23, 1977, pg. 8; and "Illegal 'Newspaper' case: Drama in a Guyana Court" Caribbean Contact, April, 1976, pp. 5, 7.

73. Attorney General and Minister of Home Affairs v. Antigua Times, Ltd. (1975) 21 W.I.R. 560.

74. Ibid., pp. 563-566.

75. Margaret DeMerieux, The Delineation of the Right to Freedom of Expression (London: Stevens and Sons Ltd.: 1980), pg. 363.

76. Janet Jagan and Another v. Linden Forbes Sampson Burnham (1973) 20 W.I.R. 96.

77. Hugh Desmond Hoyte v. Liberation Press, Lt. and Another (1975) 22 W.I.R. 175.

78. Hugh Desmond Hoyte v. Catholic Standard, Father Andrew Morrison, ed. and Anglo Printing Establishment. Unreported case, 1981.

79. Linden Forbes Sampson Burnham v. The Editor of the

"Liberator", Liberator Press Limited and Post Papers Limited. Unreported. 1972 Number 1078 Demerara in the High Court of the Supreme Court of Judicature Civil Jurisdiction. In Chambers before Justice Mitchell, July 6, 11, 1972.

80. Satrohan Singh v. The Editor, The Evening Post, Post Papers Limited, Printers and Publishers of the Evening Post. Unreported. 1973 Number 2754 Demerara in the High Court of the Supreme Court of Judicature Civil Jurisdiction. Before Chief Justice Bollers, Februrary 9, 26, 1976.

81. Letters to the Editor have been used in other socialist societies as a controlled release mechanism and a prod to improve collectivist performance.

See Festus Brotherson, Jr. "Guyana's One Dominant Party System" Caribbean Contact, August 1989, pg. 7.

82. "Statutory Instruments 1966 No. 79 Copyright -- The Copyright (British Guiana) Order 1966." Effective February 5, 1966. See section 2.

83. Stephen de B. Bate, Television by Satellite -- Legal Aspects (London: ESC Publishing Ltd., 1987), p.143.

For additional discussion of this issue see:

Kenneth D. Eubanks "Pirates of the Caribbean Revisited: An Examination of the Continuing Problem of Satellite Signal Piracy in the Caribbean and Latin America." Law and Policy in International Business. Winter 1989, 21:33-52.

Judith S. Weinstein, "International Satellite Piracy: the Unauthorized Interception and Retransmission of United States Program-carrying Satellite Signals in the Caribbean, and Legal Protection for United States Program Owners." Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law. Winter 1985, 15:1-27.

Nicholas S. Freud, "Exchange of Information Agreements Under the CBI Program: The Monroe Doctrine Revisited?" Tax Management International Journal. April 1985, 14:111-116.

84. "Parties Stand on the Media." Catholic Standard November 17, 1991, pg. 2.

85. Telephone interview with correspondent Bill Steif regarding his just concluded trip to Guyana. June 1, 1992.

PROPAGANDA IN THE U.S. AND TAIWAN TELEVISION NEWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS

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ABSTRACT

This paper is a comparative analysis to examine two capitalist (the United States and Taiwan) countries' media performance on maintaining the status quo by quantitatively analyzing the thematic structure and news source diversity of television news within the propaganda framework proposed by Herman and Chomsky and under the hegemony assumptions.

The propaganda model and hegemonic function suggest that the media serve as instruments in campaigns of ideological mobilization to support the interests that dominate the government and as agents of legitimation to promote social stability.

Based on the theoretical assumptions, this study will analyze the theme of all newscasts and the news source diversity of political news over a sample week (September 24, 1991-- September 30, 1991). The object of political news analysis in Taiwan refer to all news in relation with politics, whereas, for American political news, it is confined to the news of the United Nation's inspection team in Iraq and of President's proposal to reduce the nuclear weapons.

The findings of this analysis provide evidence that, in both countries, the news content centers on the universal peace or political stability while heavily relying on government sources for explanation of political events. In Taiwan, the media are operated by the ruling party to mobilize public support for their interest and despite for the opposition party. In the United States, the media function to support the nation's foreign policy and to legitimize the nation's deeds toward foreign countries. Thus, the findings parallel those of Herman and Chomsky, suggesting that mass media serve to some extent as tools in ideological mobilization for government benefits.

PROPAGANDA IN THE U.S. AND TAIWAN TELEVISION NEWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Introduction

Some structural and behavioral factors affecting the content of news have been discussed in the newsroom and gatekeeper studies, as exemplified by the works of David White (1950), Warren Breed (1955), Leon Sigal (1973), Edward Epstein (1973), Gaye Tuchman (1978), and Herbert Gans (1979). They focus mainly on the conflict among the gatekeepers, and on negotiation between them and individuals and groups seeking to shape media outputs. However, these studies, as Edward Herman (1985 & 1986) points out, tend to produce static descriptions of factors influencing the media, rather than identifying an underlying "process" or its larger "social function."

Herman (1986) criticizes that gatekeeper analyses usually do not provide any extended treatment of actual media performance and impact on ideology and opinion. They also offer little in the way of dynamics that would show how the media mobilize public opinion, or are manipulated in mobilization by others.

Herman and Chomsky (Herman 1986; Herman & Chomsky 1988) argue that the primary function of the mass media of the United States is to mobilize public support for the special interests that dominate the government. They propose a "propaganda model," as an alternative way to look at the workings of the news media, in which mass media serve as instruments in campaigns of ideological mobilization.

The propaganda framework seems to be incompatible with the mass media's appeal for news diversity and objectivity. Even in a liberal capitalist society like the United States, there are underlying forces that make the mass media content being manipulated by the status quo to win the consent of the population.

Herman (1985) proposed that using the propaganda framework to analyze and compare the televisions news of different countries has the merit of simplicity. The comparative technique allows the analysis to place the interpretation within a larger context than gatekeeper models or isolated case studies.

This study will analyze and compare the thematic structure and news source diversity of the American and Taiwan television political news within the propaganda framework proposed by Herman and Chomsky (1988). Both countries are liberal capitalist societies in which the news media claim that their news judgements rest on unbiased, objective criteria.

This study will review the research literature related to the propaganda model. Following a review of the theoretical assumptions about the propaganda framework, this paper will reexamine the propaganda model from the perspective of the ideological mobilization and of media routines. Next, this study will analyze the American and Taiwan television evening news to examine the news media's role on ideological mobilization. Based on the findings, this paper will seek to locate the different extent to which the news media in the United States and Taiwan serve as the propagandist of power groups to maintain the status quo.

The Propaganda Framework

The term "propaganda" refers to any attempt to persuade persons to accept a point of view or to take a certain line of action (Harter & Sullivan, 1953). In the field of mass communication, it usually refers to the media system in Marxist or Socialist countries such as Cuba and mainland China where the mass media are operated to control the public's ideology for government aims. As the flow of information is controlled and the messages of media are officially censored, the news media offer only "one voice"--pro-government explanation. Quite to the contrary, the propaganda model advocated by Herman and Chomsky (1988) operates in countries where the media are independent and committed to discovering and reporting the truth.

Herman and Chomsky, after their years of studying the political economy of the mass media, argue that the primary function of the mass media of the United States is to mobilize public support for the special interests that dominate the government. They propose a "propaganda model" as an alternative way to interpret the performance of American news media.

Herman and Chomsky (1988) identify five essential elements for the propaganda model: 1) the size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth, and profit orientation of the dominant mass-media firms; 2) advertising as the primary income source of the mass media; 3) the reliance of the media on information provided by government, business, and "experts" funded and approved by these primary sources and agents of power; 4) "flak"[1] as a mean of disciplining the media; and 5) "anticommunism" as a national religion and control mechanism.

These elements, according to Herman and Chomsky (1988), interacting with and reinforce one another, serve as "filters the raw material of news must pass through, leaving only the cleansed residue fit to print." While fixing the theorem of discourse and interpretation, they identify the ideological function of media choices and illuminate the bases of news selection and the process of coverage.

The propaganda approach to media coverage also suggests a systematic and highly political dichotomization in news coverage based on serviceability to dominant political interests (Herman and Chomsky, 1988). Mass media usually put friendly countries in a favorable light and enemy states in a negative image.

The propaganda model would anticipate mass media's support for the state perspective and agenda. That is, the favored election in foreign countries will be found to legitimize, no matter what the fact; the unfavored election will be found deficient, farcical, and failing to legitimize. The media use different standards of evaluation to treat similar cases in different countries.

Moreover, the audience will expect official sources to be used heavily to support government's foreign policy when a controversial issue arises and the dissident sources will be neglected. The audience will also anticipate the uncritical acceptance of certain premises in dealing with self and friends; for example, the one's own state and leaders seek peace and democracy, oppose terrorism, and tell the truth--premises which will not be applied in treating enemy states. The enemy states are usually portrayed as terrorist and anti-humanistic.

In sum, the propaganda model focuses on the inequality of wealth and power and, therefore, identifies the main power within the media or those in the larger community that are able to mobilize bias to serve the "national interest". The public is effectively managed and major ideological points are manifest. In short, its end is to build the consensus and ideology.

Herman and Chomsky (1988) point out that the elite domination of the media and marginalization of dissidents that results from the operation of these filters occurs so naturally that media mews people are able to convince themselves that they choose to interpret the news "objectively" and on the basis of professional news values.

Propaganda and Hegemony

Underlying the propaganda framework is the assumption that content is a function of ideological positions and a tool of the status quo. The "hegemony" theory predicts that media content is influenced by the ideology of the powerful or the elite to win the consent of the population. The powerful groups control the massages of the media in search of an enduring basis for legitimate authority.

Gramsci[2], who was the first to specify the concept, says that hegemony is a ruling class's domination of subordinate classes through the elaboration and penetration of ideology into their common sense and everyday practice. The dominance over the powerless is not generally by coercion, but rather by leading and winning their consent.

Stuart Hall (1979) has elaborated the notion of hegemony and begun to use it in the analysis of popular culture. In Hall's words, "hegemony is in operation when the dominant class not only possess the power to coerce but actively organize so as to command and win the consent of the subordinated classes." But Gramsci argues, in the liberal-capitalist state, consent is normally in the lead, operating behind "the armor of coercion" (Gitlin , 1980).

In the liberal capitalist societies, the dominant class does not produce and disseminate the ideology directly and alone. Hegemony is accomplished through the level of the state, politics and the superstructure of religion, family, politics, the art, law or education (Hall, 1979). This is what Althusser (1971) calls "ideological state apparatuses."

As Gans (1980) points out, professional, organizational, directly economic and political and ideological forces "together" constitute, from the traces of events in the world, images of the news which are limited in definite ways and tilted toward the prevailing frames.

Shoemaker (1987) points out that this hegemonic approach suggests that U.S. media owners have a vested interest in seeing the status quo continue, because they are part of the U.S. power structure, defined by Dreier (1983) as "the top positions in the institutional structure of the society." The members of this powerful structure, Dreier says, may hold different opinions on some topics, but still retaining an overall high degree of cohesiveness.

Although the media will criticize the status quo to a certain extent, thus establishing their own legitimacy as news organizations, the media will never criticize the status quo enough to seriously threaten or change it (Gitlin, 1980). Harvey Molotch and Marilyn Lester (1981) say that the media do not mirror reality; instead, they reflect "the practices of those having the power to determine the experience of others."

Researchers have found that social forces (such as economic or cultural) are potential factors influencing the media content. But Gitlin (1980) emphasizes that hegemonic explanation extends this line of thought to include underlying reasons (generally ideological) for the economic or cultural forces. In short, hegemony tries to explain why the power is so manipulated.

The hegemonic assumptions, though not explicit, correspond to the framework of Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model which assumes that views challenging fundamental premises will be suppressed by the mass media. The diversity of news, as discussed frequently in studies of newsrooms and of gatekeepers, is only meaningful in the context of individual incidents or media, rather than in a frame of ideological patterns in which news play an important role (Herman, 1985).

The media are expected to function as agents of legitimation to promote social stability, despite the fact that they are independent of direct political control. Whatever is wrong in the world, it can be put right by authoritative (almost always official) agencies. Even if the story is about disorder, it likely turns out to the restoration of order under benign official aegis (Gitlin, 1980 & Gans, 1980). Consequently, content that starts out seeming de-stabilizing and threatening--a mass demonstration, a riot, a new style of political deviance, may thus end up confirming the inherent rightness and necessity of the core hegemonic principles (Gitlin, 1980).

Gitlin (1980) identifies the dominant hegemonic principles: the legitimacy of private control of commodity production; the legitimacy of the national security State; the legitimacy of technocratic experts; the right and ability of authorized agencies to manage conflict and make the necessary reforms; the legitimacy of the social order secured and defined by the dominant elites; and the value of individualism as the measure of social existence.

There are different arguments toward media's function as agents of social control. On the Left, Marcuse has suggested that the mass media lull the audience with modern equivalents of the Roman circus, persuading them to accept the political status quo. On the Right, Ellul has proposed that the mass media supply propaganda rather than information, confusing a poorly educated audience into becoming unwitting victims of the propagandists.[3]

Under this condition, although journalists try hard to be objective, Gans (1980) proposes that neither them or anyone else at the end can proceed without values. Gans (1980) further proposes a concept of "enduring values" which are rarely explicit and can be found in many different types of news stories over a long period of time. Moreover, they help to shape opinions, and many times, opinions are only specifications of enduring values.

Gans (1980) discusses eight enduring values in the news: ethnocentrism, altruistic democracy, responsible capitalism, small-town pastoralism, individualism, moderatism, social order and national leadership. The ethnocentrism value underlies why mass media cover the one's own state's policy or action in a positive image and portray the enemy state's policy or action being wrong and unreasonable if the two countries have different opinions toward the same issue. Similar to theorem of Herman and Chomsky propaganda model, the media news is often operated by the government to mobilize public support for the national interest and despite for enemy states.

Moreover, the values of social order and national leadership match the heavy reliance on government sources in the propaganda framework. Also, the capitalism fits to the profit-orientation of mass media in Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model.

Propaganda and Hegemony as a Process of Journalistic Routines

The hegemonic theory and the propaganda framework suggest that journalist news gathering habits or the "media logic" (Altheide, 1979) through which the media present and transmit information are susceptible to the dominant class's or the elite's ideological mobilization.

The work of ideological mobilization consists of imposing standardized assumptions over events and conditions that must be covered by the dictates of the prevailing news standards (Gitlin, 1980). Gitlin emphasizes that the work is fairly routine especially on television. According to Gitlin, television news processors "ritualize" news story format to release their burden.

Shoemaker (1986) identifies some examples of media routines that may affect the content of media news:

1) Deadlines, which make the journalist stop seeking information in order to file the story.

2) Story quotas, because a fixed minimum amount of news stories are needed each day.

3) Availability of sources, which affects who gets media access. Institutional sources are more readily available to the journalist than individuals and special interest groups, making it difficult for noninstitutional sources to get their ideas transmitted.

4) The inverted-pyramid style of writing news stories, which conveys the journalists' assessment of what is important to the reader.

5) The selection, shaping, and timing of stories--or gatekeeping--which influences what gets covered, how much, and when.

In general, the stereotyping solves an enormous number of practical problems for journalism. The time pressure and the desire of newsworkers for regular stories, rhythms, and authoritative dramatis personae induce the journalist to "wrap up" the package as neatly as possible.

Fico (1984) found that the number and type of sources reporters use is limited by constraints such as deadlines and geographic location. The more constraints the reporter operates under the pressure, the more narrow of the range of sources he relies on. Hacket (1985) showed that government spokespersons, ranking politicians, and leaders of organized groups have better access to television news that other people do.

Sigal's (1973) analysis of the origin of 2,850 domestic and foreign stories that appeared in the New York Times and Washington Post revealed that public officials were the source of 78% of the stories. Hornes and Croteau (1989) also developed evidence on the media's heavy reliance on the elites to verify the news. Their analysis of the ABC News Nightline showed that 80% of the guests were from the elite (professionals, government or corporate representatives), while only about 6% represented public interest groups (peace, civil liberties, environment, civil rights, labor).

Herman and Chomsky (1988) explain that the media need a steady, reliable flow of the raw material of news. They have daily news demands and imperative news schedules that they must meet. They can not afford to have reporters and cameras everywhere. Economic pressure pushes them to focus the resources where significant news often occurs and where regular press conferences are held, such as the White House, the Pentagon, and the State

Department. Moreover, taking information from sources that may be presumed credible reduces investigative expenses.

Another reason for the heavy weight allotted to official sources, Herman and Chomsky (1988) note, is that the mass media claim to be "objective" dispensers of the news. Partly to maintain the image of objectivity, but also to protect themselves from criticism of bias and the threat of libel suits, they need material that can be portrayed as presumptively accurate.

What can not be overlooked is that powerful sources regularly take advantage of media routines and dependency to "manage" the media, to manipulate them into following a special agenda and framework. Part of this management process consists of inundating the media with stories, which serve to force a particular line and frame upon the media.

Television in United States and Taiwan

Before the analysis of American and Taiwan television news, the backgrounds of television operation in both capitalist countries should be considered.

Television in the United States

Domestic television broadcasting in the United States is a private function carried on under the oversight of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which licenses stations on the basis of experience, financial soundness, and projected program policy.

There are approximately 1064 commercial television stations in operation during 1988, most of them owned or affiliated with one of three commercial television networks headquartered at New York city: American Broadcasting Company (ABC), Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), and National Broadcasting Company (NBC). Supported primarily by paid advertising, most stations present news highlights, evening news summaries, and programs of comments and analysis.

There is also a nonprofit Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), which services approximately 320 affiliated noncommercial television stations. In addition, nearly 9,000 commercial cable TV systems are in operation, serving 43.8 million subscribers.

Television in Taiwan

All broadcasting facilities are government-supervised, whether private or governmental in operation. The Information Agency regulates the broadcasting time and program content.

There are three commercial television networks: Taiwan Television Enterprise (TTV), China Television Company (CTV), and Chinese Television System (CTS). TTV, founded by the provincial government, is operated comparatively independently, although is supervised by dominant political groups and affected indirectly by the flak machines. CTV was founded by the ruling party (KMT) and CTS was founded by the Ministry of National Defense, and therefore their coverage tend to favor the government.

Although all the three networks are supervised by the government agency, the media in Taiwan enjoy certain press of freedom since on January 1, 1988 when Martial law was lifted. Nowadays, the media can evaluate and criticize government's policy like the "watchdog" function in Western media.

Like the American television networks, the three Taiwan television networks, supported primarily by advertising and partly by the government, offer news highlights, evening news, news magazines and programs of comments and analysis.

There is also a nonprofit Public Television system which broadcasts to more than 6 million receivers. The Cable TV is not yet legitimized, but is expected in the near future. Some underground Cable TV are operated by the opposition party (DPP).

Method

Content analysis will be applied to examine how the packaging of American and Taiwan political news on television mobilizes the public's ideology.

Two American and two Taiwan half-hour evening newscasts were selected for purpose sampling. The two American networks selected are ABC and CBS, while the two Taiwan networks selected are TTV and CTV.

The time frame was from September 24, 1991 to September 30, 1991. The ABC, CBS and CTV evening news were directly videotaped by the researcher in Maryland. The TTV evening news were videotaped in Taiwan. The CTV news exclude all foreign news because they were broadcasted on Channel 56 in Maryland and

Virginia to serve the overseas Chinese.

The total 123 American stories and 216 Taiwan stories were coded by the researcher. The coding involved two units of analysis; the story itself and the individual sources within the story.

A coding scheme was constructed that consisted of five sections. The first section dealt with such details as date, network, and type of story (either anchor tell story, correspondent's field story, or anchor voice-over).

In the second section, each story was categorized as Foreign News or Domestic News. Foreign news was defined as "events occurring in any foreign country (except in U.S.A. or Taiwan) or domestic events occurring in home country". Foreign at home and domestic abroad news accounted for a large percentage of foreign news. News items concerning American or Taiwan government officials in foreign countries were also included. Only the purely domestic stories were excluded. Within this definition, the stories about the United Nation's inspection team in Iraq fall in the Foreign News category. The stories about President's Bush's proposal to reduce nuclear weapons fall in the Domestic News category, but the story about the Soviet Union's response toward Bush's proposal belong to the Foreign News category.

The third section of the coding instrument dealt with topics. The topic of each American story was chosen from 10 possible choices: Universal Peace, Social Order, Education, Health, Economics, Science, Trials, Riots in foreign countries, Domestic

Politics and Others. These ten categories were devised primarily according to the news during the week. For example, the riots news refer to riots in Romania and Haiti. The domestic political news are largely about judge Thomas' nomination. Most the economy news emphasize on the recession and the stories about the health are all concerning AIDS. Moreover, the universal peace items are mainly United Nations' team in Iraq and Bush's proposal of nuclear weapons reduction.

Each Taiwan news story was coded according to whether it was a political news or not. Taiwan is a small island, so domestic political stories occupy a great proportion of everyday's total number of stories. Compared to domestic issues, Taiwan television newspeople attribute relatively very little time to foreign news.

Since the political stories dominate other kinds of stories in Taiwan television news, the object of the study to examine the extent to which the Taiwan news media serve as ideological propagandist will be the political news.

During the week from September 24 to September 30, the prime stories in American news are the United Nation's inspection on Iraqi nuclear weapons programs and the reduction of American nuclear weapons. Since these two events are significant and put at the top of the agenda, the analysis of this study will focus on these two events rather on others like economy or health stories.

The fourth section, the "underlying value" of the Taiwan political news and American and Iraqi nuclear weapons stories were coded. The underlying values are similar to Gans' "enduring values" and to the elements of Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model, such as leadership, social order, universal peace, ethnocentrism, anticommunism.

In the fifth section, the news source was coded. Two variables were used: type of source and number of times each source was used within a story. The source may be any individual, agency or institution credited with providing information. News source diversity was determined by the number of viewpoints from different news sources appearing in the political affairs. The source is either a direct cited source (appear and speak on the camera) or an indirect source--the source's speech, no matter appearing on the camera or not, was summarized by the correspondent.

Findings and Discussion

Basic Data Description

Altogether, the sample specified 123 American stories and 216 Taiwan stories. All those stories which were anchor tell stories, anchor voice-over stories were dropped. The stories being coded were all correspondent field reports.

Of the total 123 American news stories, 64 appeared on ABC and 59 on CBS. Of the total 216 Taiwan news stories, 86 (excluding foreign news) appearing on CTV and 130 (including foreign news) appearing on TTV.

Substantial dispersion existed in the ratio between foreign news and domestic news on Taiwan evening news broadcasts and on American networks (see Table 1). Generally, on American networks, everyday during the sample week except September 27, the foreign news and the domestic news received almost equal proportions of the total news stories over the sample week. There were approximately 5 or 6 stories for each kind of news everyday.

Quite to the contrary, the foreign news received relatively small proportions of the total news stories on Taiwan networks everyday over the sample week. On the average, only about 17 percent of the total news stories were contributed to foreign news. This may be because Taiwan is a small country whose policy or any act won't affect the international community as much as other Western countries. Thus, most news in Taiwan concern the domestic issues rather than international matters. Moreover, all the texts of the foreign news were directly translated from Visnews or WTN. Taiwan television networks do not have own staff to cover international affairs. The foreign news were all anchor-voice interpretation stories with Visnews or WTN pictures. Since the foreign news is not considered important in Taiwan and most of them concentrated on the United States affairs, they were excluded in this study.

Topics of the Networks

The classification of American and Taiwan news content into a few major topic categories resulted in almost one half (47%) of all American news items clustering into the Universal Peace and Health categories and one-third of all Taiwan news items clustering into the Political News category.

The political stories hold a great proportions of the total domestic news stories on Taiwan television evening news (see Table 2). On the average, 32.7 percentage of the total news stories were political news which largely concern the conflicts in Legislative branch between the ruling party (KMT) and the opposition party (DPP). Since the political news are usually the prime stories concerning divergence on political philosophy, they became the object of the propaganda analysis.

As Table 3 illustrates, about one-third of the total American news items cluster into the Universal Peace category which primarily involved the United Nation's inspectors in Iraq and American reduction of nuclear weapons. Therefore, these two stories are the objects of the propaganda analysis.

Sources and Themes

The sources appearing and cited most frequently on camera in both United States and Taiwan were the government authority. Table 4 shows the number of sources directly cited or indirectly quoted in Iraq stories. Table 5 shows the numbers of sources in US nuclear weapons stories. Table 6 and 7 show the numbers of sources directly quoted or indirectly referred to in the Taiwan political stories.

The examination of the news sources is significant because sources have to offer explanations and thus construct the framework for presenting different social issues in the media and for the audience's understanding. Therefore, by examining the source frequency, one can observe whether the media is a tool of status quo.

United States

The United Nation's inspection team in Iraq is the top story during the first three days of the sample week. The significance given to this event by the networks is suggested by the presence: over 50% of the total number of stories. But the network's attention to the subject faded gradually and shifted to President Bush's proposal to reduce American nuclear weapons.

The sources cited in the Iraq stories heavily depend on the American government authority, such as Pentagon, President and American inspectors. Only 14.63% were affiliated with Iraqi officials. All the other 85.37% of sources consisted of president of United Nation Security Council and American authorities who condemned Iraq's detaining the inspectors and insisted to take all the documents about the nuclear weapons programs away. They called Iraqi behavior as an "unacceptable behavior."

There was no room for Iraq to fight back on the evening newscasts of the three commercial U.S. television networks. Almost all the relevant stories were anti-Iraqi. The figures clearly reveal the familiar preoccupation of journalists with authoritative sources.

The result of analyzing the sources fits to Herman and Chomsky's assumption for the propaganda model. Official sources of the United States are to be used heavily and uncritically in connection with one's own abuses. Authoritativeness, according to Herman and Chomsky (1988) and Gans (1979) is a principal consideration of journalists when selecting sources. Journalists see these authority as more credible than others because of their formal designation as officials. The newsworkers may be critical of particular agencies or specific officials, but the governmental-bureaucratic structure cannot be doubted as a whole. In addition, if the subject of the story were controversial, authoritative sources provide journalists protection from criticism. This new-gathering routine leaves the existing political order intact.

During the last four days of the sample week, the network's attention shifted to Bush's proposal to reduce the nuclear weapons. The sources used are primarily American officials who praised this proposal. Four Soviets were quoted: they "welcomed" this proposal. In short, all the sources used by the networks were to mobilize public support for this proposal.

However, everyday, there was at least one story concerning the Soviet response. If the Soviet Union could not follow American step to reduce its own nuclear weapons, the American proposal would be reversed for national safety.

These two stories about the nuclear weapons reveal the enduring values of news process: ethnocentrism and universal peace. American news implied and justified the United Nations' "right" to inspect Iraq by heavily showing the authorities' anti-Iraqi speeches. However, the United States will never allow any foreign country to inspect its own nuclear weapons programs. It will never cut its own unless the Soviet Union does the same. United States think that it will well control the weapons to keep the universal order, but that Iraq will use them to threaten the universal peace.

Taiwan

The figures on Table 6 reveal the same news routine on CTV newscasts: heavy reliance on officials sources. 27.42% of all sources were elected officials of the ruling party (KMT). Additional 20.97% of sources were other government officials (all KMT members). The cabinet members were cited 8.06% of times. Totally, the ruling party members (including the cabinet members, elected officials, government officials, and KMT officials) were cited 54.83% (over 50%) of times. The elected officials of the opposition party (DPP) were cited only 17.74% of times.

The figures on Table 7 also reveal TTV newscasts's dependence on official information. It is also notable that TTV used more citations from the opposition party (DPP) than CTV and so it is more objective than CTV.

On TTV news during the sample week, quite opposite to CTV, elected officials of the opposition party (DPP) were cited the most frequently. Maybe, it was because of DPP's fighting in Legislative branch during the week.

However, totally, the ruling party members (including the cabinet members, elected officials of KMT, government officials and KMT officials) were cited 41.65% of times. Government officials (all KMT members) were cited 21.74% of times.

The dominant theme on Taiwan news is the political stability. The political instability always comes from the opposition party's unreasonable action or behavior. The explanation television newsworkers offered always condemned DPP and supported KMT's policy.

While DPP proclaimed that the president should be elected by the whole citizenry, KMT claimed that representatives' voting was the most appropriate way. While DPP asked for "Taiwan Independence," KMT claimed that DPP was intended to overturn the government. While DPP appealed for their ends in the Legislative branch, KMT said DPP was disturbing the political order. In one word, when two parties held opposite opinion toward a controversial issue, television stories will favor the ruling party.

Conclusion

The findings on the analysis of the thematic structure and news source diversity of the U.S. and Taiwan television news confirm the social function of television news. Both American and Taiwan television has failed to some extent to live up to the expectations of the media in a pluralistic democracy. News stories in both countries rely heavily on government sources who determine the limits within which all competing definitions of reality will appear and concentrate mostly on the theme of political stability, social order and international peace. These findings parallel those of Herman and Chomsky and support the hegemonic assumptions, suggesting that mass media, while using massively dominant political sources and thus focusing public attention on a narrow range of issues, serve as instruments in mobilizing public support for state perspective and agenda.

The findings support the assumption that the news media in Taiwan function as agents of legitimation to promote social order and political stability. They are operated by the government (the ruling party) to mobilize public support for their interest and despite for the opposition party. The findings support the hegemonic assumption that the media contribute to the maintenance of consent for a system of power. The political news in Taiwan, while quoting heavily the ruling party, function to intensify the image that only KMT is the only legitimate authority.

While Taiwan news focus on the domestic political stability, the news media in United States function to support the nation's foreign policy and to legitimize the nation's deeds toward foreign countries. This study focuses on the news of United Nation's inspection team in Iraq and on the Bush's proposal to reduce the nuclear weapons. The sources used are primarily American officials who insisted to inspect all nuclear weapons facilities in Iraq and praised Bush's proposal. The coverage, by heavily quoting the anti-Iraqi speeches, implied that Iraq is an "enemy" country threatening the world peace while the United Sates is an universal peace contributor.

Moreover, American news coverage of the Romania riots and Haiti riots were not as massive as Soviet coup (August 24, 1991). According to Herman and Chomsky's theorem of propaganda model, the

Soviet Union, for the United States, was a "worthy" victim but the Haiti and Romania were not, since the coups in these two countries could not threaten the American interests.

Some features of the U.S. and Taiwan media not explored in this study correspond to the elements of Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model. First, for the mass media in both countries, the advertising is the primary income source. Second, both the U.S. and Taiwan media are profit-oriented. Particularly in Taiwan, the ownership is concentrated. Without government support, no one can establish a national TV network. That's why nowadays the all three TV networks were funded by government-related organizations. Although nowadays they enjoy the freedom of the press and claim themselves being operated independently, their news are most indirectly principled by the flak machines, which is the third component of the propaganda model. Although there is no formal reports or research on the flak machines in either country, some media critics have revealed this problem. Moreover, since both countries are capitalist democratic countries, "anti-communism" prevails in both countries. Although the news during the sample week did not show much on this issue, some scholars like Bennett (1988) has argued that the appearance of communism/socialism anywhere in the world described by the media as "inherently threatening to democracy, freedom, and the American way of life." Taiwan, while standing on the opposite side of mainland China, opposes particularly to the Communism. Thus, the "anti-communism" always remains the dominant political ideology in Taiwan.

It is unfortunate that because of the resource constraint, this study does not permit a non-random, more larger sample analysis. The sample size is limited to one sample week. Neither was it possible to compare the news coverage of the same event, either domestic or foreign, in these two countries because the U.S. television news did not carry Taiwan events and the foreign news in Taiwan was supplied by Western news agencies.

Anyway, in sum, this study gives some indication of the different extent to which each country's media function to maintain the status quo. Although newsworkers have been trying hard to present competing viewpoints toward an event, the status quo is little changed. The elite sources still supply most of the information found in both American and Taiwan television newscasts. These findings might be interpreted to imply that the media may have less control over the agenda they present than they would like to think.

Table 1

Distribution of Foreign News and Domestic News in U.S. and Taiwan News

	9/24	9/25	9/26	9/27
ABC Foreign	4 (40%)	7 (58%)	7 (54%)	3 (27%)
Domesitc	6 (60%)	5 (42%)	6 (46%)	8 (73%)
CBS Foreign	4 (44%)	7 (64%)	4 (40%)	1 (13%)
Domestic	5 (56%)	4 (36%)	6 (60%)	7 (87%)
CTV Foreign				
Domestic	12	11	13	13
TTV Foreign	1 (17%)	5 (22%)	2 (12%)	1 (6%)
Domestic	14 (93%)	18 (78%)	17 (88%)	16(94%)

Table 1 (Continued)

Distribution of Foreign News and Domestic News in U.S. and Taiwan News

	9/28	9/29	9/30
ABC Foreign		3 (38%)	4 (40%)
Domestic		5 (62%)	6 (60%)
CBS Foreign	6 (46%)		2 (25%)
Domestic	7 (54%)		6 (75%)
CTV Foreign			
Domestic	15	10	12
TTV Foreign	5 (26%)	5 (33%)	3 (14%)
Domestic	14 (74%)	10 (67%)	19(86%)

Table 2

Political News in Taiwan TV News

	CTV	TTV
9/24	4 (33%)	8 (57%)
9/25	4 (36%)	6 (33%)
9/26	5 (38%)	5 (29%)
9/27	4 (31%)	2 (13%)
9/28	4 (27%)	3 (21%)
9/29	2 (20%)	2 (20%)
9/30	7 (58%)	6 (32%)

Table 3

Themes in U.S. Stories

	ABC 9/24	CBS 9/24	ABC 9/25	CBS 9/25
Universal Peace Ethnocentrism (Political)	4 (50%)	4 (36%)	5 (42%)	3 (27%)
Social Problems Social Order	1 (12.5%)	1 (9%)		
Education				
Health	1 (12.5%)	1 (9%)	3 (25%)	3 (27%)
Economy		1 (9%)	1 (8%)	
Science		1 (9%)		
Trials	1 (12.5%)	1 (9%)		
Riots			1 (8%)	1 (9%)
Domestic Polit.				
Others	1 (12.5%)	2 (18%)	2 (16%)	4 (36%)

Table 3 (Continued)

Themes in U.S. Stories

	ABC 9/26	CBS 9/26	ABC 9/27	CBS 9/27
Universal Peace Ethnocentrism (Political)	4 (31%)	1 (10%)	4 (36%)	4 (33%)
Social Problems Social Order				1 (8%)
Education			1 (9%)	
Health	1 (8%)	2 (20%)	1 (9%)	
Economy	2 (15%)	2 (20%)	2 (18%)	
Science	1 (8%)			
Trials	1 (8%)	1 (10%)	1 (9%)	1 (8%)
Riots	2 (15%)	2 (20%)	1 (9%)	
Domestic Polit.	1 (8%)			
Others	1 (8%)	2 (20%)		5 (42%)

Table 3 (Continued)

Themes in U.S. Stories

	CBS 9/28	ABC 9/29	ABC 9/30	CBS 9/30
Universal Peace Ethnocentrism (Political)	7 (50%)	5 (62.5%)	3 (30%)	3 (37.5%)
Social Problems Social Order				
Education		1 (12.5%)	2 (20%)	2 (25%)
Health	1 (7%)			
Economy				
Science				
Trials				
Riots	1 (7%)		1 (10%)	1 (12.5%)
Domestic Polit.			1 (10%)	1 (12.5%)
Others	5 (36%)	2 (25%)	3 (30%)	1 (12.5%)

Proportions of Topics over the Sample Week

Universal Peace	36.71%
Social Problems	2.34%
Education	4.7%
Health	10.16%
Economy	6%
Science	1.6%
Trials	4.7%
Riots	8%
Domestic Polit.	4%
Others	21.8%
Total	100.00%

Table 4

News Sources in Iraq Stories

	ABC 9/24	CBS 9/24	ABC 9/25	CBS 9/25
Number of Stories	3 (60%)[*]	3 (75%)	4 (57%)	3 (43%)
UN	1	1		
Iraqi Officials	**1**[**]	1	1	1
Government Agency	1			
Pentagon	1		**1**	
UN Inspector	2	1	1	
President	1	1 + **1**	1	
Cabinet Members			2	2
Other Government Officials			1	
Officials From Foreign Countries			1	

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[*] The percentage of Iraq stories of the total foreign news (Number of Iraq stories divided by the total number of foreign news).

[**] The number with bold indicates the "indirect" citation/s by the correspondent.

Table 4 (Continued)

News Sources in Iraq Stories

	ABC 9/26	CBS 9/26	ABC 9/27	CBS 9/27
Number of Stories	3 (43%)	1 (25%)	1 (33%)	2 (100%)
UN	2	2		
Iraqi Officials			1	1
Government Agency				
Pentabon			1	1
UN Inspector	1			1
President				
Cabinet Members				1
Other Government Officials	1	1		
Officials From Foreign Countries				

Table 4 (Continued)

News Sources in Iraq Stories

	CBs 9/28	ABC 9/30	CBS 9/30
Number of Stories	1 (17%)	1 (25%)	1 (50%)
UN			1
Iraqi Officials			
Government Agency			
Pentabon			
UN Inspector	2	1	1
President			
Cabinet Members			
Other Government Officials			
Officials From Foreign Countries			

Table 5

News Sources in US Nuclear Weapons Stories

	ABC 9/27	CBS 9/27	CBS 9/28
Number of Stories	3	2	3
President	1	1	1
Cabinet Member/s	1	1	4
Other Government Officials			1
Government Agency	1	2	
USSR Officials	2		
USSR Government Agency	1		
Gorbachev			1
US Army			4
USSR People			
Analysts			3

Table 5 (Continued)

News Sources in US Nuclear Weapons Stories

	ABC 9/29	ABC 9/30	CBS 9/30
Number of Stories	3	2	2
President		1	1
Cabinet Member/s	1		1
Other Government Officials			
Government Agency		2	
USSR Officials		1	
USSR Government Agency	2		
Gorbachev		1	
US Army	2		2
USSR People	1		
Elected Officials (R)		2	
Analysts			1

Table 6

News Sources in Taiwan domestic Political News

CTV News

	9/24 N=4	9/25 N=4	9/26 N=5***	9/27 N=4	9/28 N=4	9/29 N=2	9/30 N=7
Cabinet Member/s	1 + 2				2		
Elected DPP	1	1	2	1 + 4		1	1
Elected KMT	2 + 1		4	6			4
Elected Other Parties	2	1		2			
Other Govern Officials	3	2	2	2	1	1	2
Prof	1				4		1
Public	1						
KMT Officials		1					
President	1				2		

Percentage of Source Uses

Cabinet Member/s	8/06%
Elected DPP 17/74%	
Elected KNT	27.42%
Elected Other Parties	8.06%
Other Govern Officials	20.97%
Professors	9.68%
President	4.84%
KMT Officials	1.61%
Public	1.61%

*** Of five, one is anchor-tell story.

Table 7

News Sources in Taiwan domestic Political News

TTV News

	9/24 N=8	9/25 N=6	9/26 N=5	9/27 N=2	9/28 N=3	9/29 N=2	9/30 N=6
Cabinet Member/s	1						1
Presidnet				1	1	1	1
Elected DPP	3	4	3	1	1	1	1
Elected KMT	1			1	1		2
Elected Other Parties		2					
Govern Officials	4		1		2	1	2
Prof.	1				3		2
Public							
KMT Officials		2					1

Percentage of Source Uses

Cabinet Member/s	4.35%
President	8.7%
Elected DPP	30.43%
Elected KMT	10.87%
Elected Other Parties	4.35%
Government Officials	21.74
KMT Officials	4.69%
Professors	13.04%

NOTES

1. Herman and Chomsky (1988) identify the flak as negative responses to a media statement or program. It may take the form of letters, telegrams, phone calls, petitions, lawsuits, speeches and bills before Congress, and other modes of complaint, threat, and punitive action. It may be organized centrally or locally, or it may consists of the entirely independent actions of individuals. Herman and Chomsky state that the government is a major producer of flak, regularly assailing, threatening, and "correcting" the media, trying to contain any deviations from the established line.

2. I adapt the following discussion about Gramsci's hegemony concept from Todd gitlin, The Whole World is Watching (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Denis McQuail, Mass Communication Theory (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983); and Pamela J. Shoemaker, "Building a Theory of News Content," Journalism Monograph, June 1986. Their citations refer to Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, Ed. and Trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971).

3. For a more detailed discussion of Marcuse and Ellul, see Herbert J. Gans, Popular Culture and High Culture: An Analysis and Evaluation of Taste. New York: Basic Books, 1974, pp.43-51.

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